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SUMMARY  
ESSAYS IN A FRICTIONAL LABOUR MARKET 
WITH INACTIVE WORKERS 
 
 
In this Ph.D. thesis, I study the role of inactive workers (i.e., individuals classified by standard 
statistical measures in the labour market as non-participants or as out-of-labour force) in the 
context of a frictional labour market model. The theis is organised as follows. 
In Chapter 1, I survey some of the most relevant contributions investigating the cyclical 
behaviour of the out-of-labour force variable and the main problems, which arise from its 
inclusion in the modern theoretical framework studying the dynamics of the labour market 
variables.  
In Chapter 2, entitled "Do Out-of-Labour Force Workers Matter for the Cyclical Behaviour of 
the Labour Market Aggregates?", I develop a search and matching model with three labour 
market states, characterized by worker heterogeneity, endogenous separations and idiosyncratic 
home productivity shock, embedded into a standard DSGE (Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium) model. The goal of this study is to analyse the ability of such a model to replicate 
the observed large volatility of labour market variables such as vacancies, job-finding rate, 
labour market tightness and unemployment, that the standard search and matching model is not 
able to explain.1 This framework is based on the empirical evidence regarding direct worker 
                                                          
1    The standard search and matching model a’ la Mortensen and Pissarides with exogenous separation, no search 
intensity and aggregate shock to total factor productivity is able to replicate usually one-tenth of the empirical 
volatility of labour market variables. 
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flows between all three labour market states. The focus is not only on the unemployment to 
employment flow, but also on the out-of-labour force to employment flow. The presence of 
these two channels is developed by a mechanism resembling that of labour market segmentation 
(workers belonging to the two groups, i.e. unemployment and out-of-labour force, cannot search 
for a job in the same market, but each group searches in his own sub-market). The crucial 
mechanism able to replicate large second moments for vacancies, job-finding rate and labour 
market tightness, together with consistent worker flows, is related to the presence of frictions 
related to home productivity. A new value of home productivity is drawn at the beginning of 
the period, but it is “full discovered” only at the end of the same periods. Thus, it affects the 
decisions of the agents when the search process is over. However, when the new value is 
“discovered”, agents can choose to quit the job. Firms have knowledge of the new value of 
home productivity at the end of the period as well, and they know that agents with high draws 
of home productivity might separate from the job. Then, since some of the vacancies will be 
unmatched at the end of the period, because of the endogeneous separation process driven by 
high draws of home productivity for the workers, there is an incentive for firms to advertise a 
larger number of vacancies, and this creates large fluctuation in the labour-market tightness 
variable. On the other side, workers looking for a job will accept each job is offered them since 
they know that at the end of the period they might quit the job conditional to the new high draw 
of home productivity, and this creates large fluctuations in the variables job-finding rate. 
However, the presence of an additional margin, the out-of-labour force state, plays a crucial 
role as well. Indeed, working with three labour market states helps to re-calibrate the mass of 
workers for each labour market state and the dynamics they are involved in. In particular, the 
presence of inactive workers helps to re-determine the distribution of matches not only as an 
effect of a direct flow from unemployment to employment, but also the direct flow from out-
of-labour force to employment, as it is observed in the data. The results show that this model is 
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able to generate large volatilities of labour market variables, with values for vacancy, job-
finding rate and vacancy-searchers ratio that are between 50 and 60 percent of their empirical 
counterparts, and the most relevant worker flows, especially the inactive to employment  and 
the inactive to unemployment worker flows. 
In Chapter 3, entitled "The Real Wage of Newly Hired Workers over the Business Cycle: When 
the Difference between Flows from Unemployment and Flows from Out-of-Labour Force 
Matters", I investigate the response of real wages to two aggregate cyclical indicators, i.e., the 
unemployment rate and the aggregate labour productivity, for different groups of workers, 
namely, job stayers, newly hired workers from unemployment, newly hired workers from out-
of-labour force and job changers. The motivation for this exercise stems from the large debate 
on the empirical validity of the search and matching model. A basic search and matching model 
fails to replicate the large volatilities in unemployment, vacancies and job-finding rate. As a 
possible solution, researchers have focused on the role of wage and its rigidity. More precisely, 
following the work of Rudanko (2009), it has been suggested that hiring decision is the forward-
looking variable and the number of jobs created depends on the wage to be paid to the newly 
hired workers. The presence of an acyclical real wage for new entrants into employment would 
represent the empirical cornerstone to support the empirical validity of the search model. 
However, models have been basically developed by assuming that the flow of new entrants into 
employment comes only from the unemployment state while empirical evidence shows the 
existence of worker transitions into employment from both unemployment and out-of-labour 
force (together with job to job transitions). Thus, the methodology used in these works results 
difficult to be supported. After reviewing evidence of these large flows, a model incorporating 
worker transitions in employment from both the unemployment state and the out-of-labour 
force state is estimated, using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation 
(SIPP), a longitudinal nationally representative panel for the U.S. economy, over the period 
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1996-2013, and the results shed light on the cyclical behaviour of the real wage. Indeed, I find 
that the real wages of newly hired workers coming from unemployment are less procyclical 
than the real wages for newly hired workers coming from out-of-labour force. Introducing as 
an additional control variable the category of job to job changers does not affect qualitatively 
or quantitatively our findings, since the difference in the cyclical properties of the wages for 
the marginal workers from unemployment and out-of-labour force is maintained. These results 
could be explained in terms of the different compositional effects for the two groups of 
individuals. During periods of expansion of the economic activity, whilst workers joining 
employment from unemployment are more likely to be low-skilled workers and to find a low-
paid job, the workers joining employment from out-of-labour force do not show the same 
compositional change. On the contrary, this last group, in the good times, consists of high-
skilled workers that find a high-paid job and show a higher elasticity of real wage compared to 
that of newly hired workers from unemployment. 
In Chapter 4, entitled "Labour Market Transitions and Wealth", I investigate the relationship 
between labour market transitions and wealth. More precisely, I estimate the impact of wealth 
on the “exit” margins, i.e., the probability for individuals to transition into the two non-
employment states: unemployment and out-of-labour force. Researchers have shown that 
search and matching models including idiosyncratic home or market productivity shocks are 
able to replicate labour market transitions between employment and unemployment, but these 
models fail in explaining the flow from inactivity to employment and, at a smaller extent, the 
movements between inactivity and the other two labour market states. Furthermore, they are 
developed specifying preferences in linear terms, removing in this way any role for accumulated 
assets/savings in terms of consumption smoothing activity. This last point is particularly 
relevant in my analysis, given that flows into the non-employment states can be considered as 
the start of a new search activity but nothing is said as regards the resources used that can 
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finance searching. My inquiry recognises that a crucial role can be attributed to wealth, in that 
process. A few papers have investigated whether wealth can finance active searching, i.e., 
searching while individuals are in the unemployment state, but no answer has been given to the 
question whether wealth can finance passive searching, i.e., searching while individuals are in 
the out-of-labour force state.2 In this chapter, I try to provide an answer to this question, and 
more specifically, I test the presence of heterogeneity in the exit margin, between unemployed 
and out-of-labour force individuals. Using the transitory-permanent decomposition for the 
wealth effect, I find that a transitory increase in wealth exerts a positive impact on the 
probability of transitioning to out-of-labour force and the probability of transitioning to 
unemployment, while a permanent increase in wealth has a negative impact on both transition 
probabilities. However, I find that the quantitative effect is larger for the probability of 
transitioning into out-of-labour force compared to the probability of transitioning into 
unemployment. Thus, a temporary increase in wealth makes the individuals more likely to 
transition into out-of-labour force rather than in unemployment, while a permanent increase in 
wealth makes individuals less likely to transition into out-of-labour force.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2    Statistical measurements basically differentiate active and passive searching according to the probability of the 
searcher to get potentially in contact with the employer. This is quite likely for active searchers, while the 
probability to observe this contact between the employer and the passive searchers is zero.  
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CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
“Given the frequency of movements between unemployment and not-in-labor-force, it is difficult 
to distinguish between these two states....these states are functionally indistinguishable.”  
Kim B. Clark and Lawrence H. Summers (1982, p.204 and 207)  
“Since anyone without a job and actively searching for one is classified as unemployed, the 
workers who move directly from out of labor force to employment are most likely the result of 
inadequate measuring,…”  
Barbara Petrongolo and Christopher A. Pissarides (2001, p.416)  
 
During the decades the performance of the labour market in western countries has 
received renewed interest. Following the Great Recession, most of the developed countries have 
suffered a sharp contraction in their economic activity, with a substantial worsening in most of 
their labour market indicators. Researchers and policymakers have focused on the behaviour of 
the unemployment rate because of the cost that high unemployment levels generate for the 
individuals and the economy as a whole. Looking at the performance of the largest economy, 
i.e., the U.S., one observes a dramatic increase in the unemployment rate from 4.4 percent in 
December 2006 to 9.9 in December 2009, one of the largest values of unemployment in the 
post-war period and close to the highest peak of 10.8 percent reached in November 1982 (Figure 
1.1). Despite the fact that the U.S. economy moved out of the recession in August 2009, the 
unemployment rate did not show a fast recovery to its pre-crisis level, even after the economic 
stimulus and the very drastic measures undertaken by the U.S. Government (i.e., the 
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implementation of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) and the Recovery Act) and the 
Federal Reserve Board (i.e., the Fed Fund rates were cut from 5.25 percent in 2007 to a value 
between 0-0.25 percent in 2009, along with the implementation of the Quantitative Easing), 
took place. The ineffectiveness of these measures to reverting the labour market indicators back 
to their pre-recession values is manifested by the persistence of high levels of unemployment, 
around 10 percent, even one year later, in November 2010, more than five quarters after the end 
of the recession. It was only in August 2011 that a value for the unemployment rate reached 5 
percent, i.e., the unemployment rate at the onset of the recession, with the measurements from 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics certifying a value of 5.1 percent, with a further fall to 4.5 percent 
in March 2017, almost seven years after the end of the recession. 
A similar path has been observed for the other countries in the OECD. The performance of the 
labour market in these economies over the same period shows roughly the same dynamics. The 
OECD average unemployment has been heavily affected by the financial crisis, and a closer 
look at the data shows that the unemployment rate increased from 5.8 percent in December 
2006 to 8.43 percent in December 2009, with a final value of 8.13 percent in December 2010. 
The recovery path for the OECD economies has displayed a similarly slow recovery process, 
as the U.S. labour market. Ineed, it is possible to observe values for the unemployment rate 
above 6 percent until the beginning of 2017.3  
Looking at an additional relevant labour market indicator, namely the U.S. employment-to-
population ratio (Figure 1.2), one can easily observe the scarring effect produced by the 
                                                          
3   Some notable exceptions in terms of the unemployment rate in the OECD area are Greece, who started to 
experiment higher levels of unemployment from 2010, with values around 13 percent, and then moved to a 
value of 23 percent for the unemployment rate at the beginning of 2017, after a peak to 28 percent in September 
2013, and Spain, who has experimented higher values for the unemployment rate since the beginning of 2009, 
with values around 16-17 percent, and moved to values of unemployment rate in the interval 20-25 percent in 
the period 2010-2016, to finally reaching 18 percent in 2017.  
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financial crisis.4 Indeed, the employment-population ratio fell from a value of 63 percent in 
2007 to that of 60 percent at the beginning of 2017, with a drop to values in the range 58-59 
percent over the 2010-14 period. Disentangling the ratio by gender, it is observed that both men 
(Figure 1.3) and women (Figure 1.4) have suffered the consequences of the economic downturn, 
with the lowest values reached, during the recession, being roughly 9 percentage points below 
the pre-crisis levels of 2006. However, the employability conditions seem to be slightly more 
alleviated for women than for men, since the last statistical measures in 2017 show that the first 
group is only 2 percentage points far from the initial levels in 2006, against the 4 percentage 
points gap for men. 
These figures have given rise to a large debate on the weak performance of the labour market. 
Unsurprisingly, this debate has been developed by analysing the behaviour of the 
unemployment rate as the key variable to be taken into account. Thus, large attention has been 
devoted to developing a setup involving the relationship between only two labour market states: 
employment and unemployment. In this sense one can justify the development of theoretical 
models explaining jobless recovery, i.e., the weak recovery of the labour market indicators, 
accompanied by the positive growth rates for the GDP, into the standard economic environment 
with only two labour market states.5  
                                                          
4   The “scarring effect” is usually defined in terms of a negative long-term effect that individuals experiment in 
consequence of adverse events in their lives. In the literature, scarring effects have been related to poverty, i.e., 
the probability of experimenting longer periods of poverty is increased by the fact the individual is poor in one 
year (Cappellari and Jenkins, 2002), or with reference to unemployment, i.e., an individual who has been 
unemployed will be more likely to suffer from this negative experience in terms of future labour market 
outcomes (Arulampalam, 2001).  
5    Jobless recovery is not a new feature restricted to only the last recession. Indeed, as reported by Jaimovich and 
Siu (2012), this phenomenon has characterized the last three recessions of the U.S. economy (i.e., 1990-91, 
2001 and 2007-09). However, after the Great Recession the combination of an extremely weak performance 
of the labour market with a recovery of the economic activity has motivated researchers to deeply investigate 
this issue. Shimer (2012) explains the presence of jobless recovery as a consequence of real wage rigidity in a 
context of search frictions in the labour market, Jaimovich and Siu (2012) offer an explanation of the jobless 
recovery related to the presence of technological changes and Mitman and Rabinovich (2014) suggest that the 
extension of unemployment benefits during recessions can provide an insightful view about the jobless 
recovery.  
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This is also the basic structure of the benchmark model currently used to address and analyse 
fluctuations in the labour market variables, the search and matching model, i.e., a model in 
which wedges to the creation of new matches between firms and workers are produced by the 
presence of search frictions, then generating flows between employment and unemployment. 
Thus, as clearly claimed by Veracierto (2008), “such a model basically allows to be only 
employed or unemployed at any point in time”.  
Little interest has been showed for the third labour market state: the out-of-labour force state 
(i.e., the inactivity state), despite representing a large fraction of the population in the developed 
countries, i.e., a figure around 30-40 percent.6   
Following the very recent contributions of Shimer (2013) and Elsby, Hobjin and Sahin (2015), 
new evidence about the empirical relevance of flows between inactivity and the other two 
labour market states has been provided. Using microdata from the Current Population Survey 
(CPS), Mankart and Oikonomou (2017) find that the monthly gross flow from inactivity to 
employment is larger than the unemployment to employment gross flow, by a factor of 1.7. 
They find that 5 percent of the out-of-labour force workers transition each month into the 
employment state (and a figure around 3 percent transition into unemployment), while 3 percent 
of the individuals classified as employed transition into the out-of-labour force state, while the 
value for the transition unemployment to inactivity is much larger, a figure around 22 percent.    
However, the relevance of worker flows between out-of-labour force and the other two labour 
market states has been largely neglected in the analysis of the dynamics of the labour market 
and this was also true for the study of the labour market recovery after the Great Recession. 
                                                          
6    In the literature, individuals not belonging to the most investigated labour market states, i.e., the employment 
and unemployment states, are defined in different terms: inactive individuals, non-participants or out-of-labour 
force individuals. These definitions do not identify different characteristics or properties of the individuals 
collected in the not-in-labour force category. Thus, I will use these terms interchangeably in all the chapters of 
the PhD thesis.  
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Much of the distrust about results coming from any analysis grounded on a framework including 
the out-of-labour force state, as a relevant variable explaining the dynamics of the labour 
market, arises from the statistical classification of individuals, in the different labour market 
states, used by the Bureau of Labour Statistics. Indeed, while unemployment is defined as “an 
active searching condition related to one of the following activities: a) contacting an employer 
directly or having a job interview, b) sending out resumes or filling out applications, c) placing 
or answering advertisement, d) checking unions or professional registers”, out-of-labour force 
is defined as “the passive searching condition related generally, but not exclusively, to the 
following activities: a) attending a job training program or course, b) reading help-wanted ads”. 
From this classification it follows that unemployed workers are considered as active individuals 
with a search activity that can potentially create a contact with the employer, while out-of-
labour force workers are described as inactive individuals that do not work, and they are neither 
on layoffs (i.e., workers experimenting a temporary interruption in work) nor looking for a job. 
All these events prevent inactive workers from enjoying a positive probability of becoming 
employed.  
Thus, individuals included in the inactivity state have been always considered under a twofold 
scenario. On the one hand, inactive individuals have been seen as a group of workers that does 
not display any direct impact on the labour market dynamics since this is developed around the 
reference framework with only the two standard labour market states, employment and 
unemployment. The out-of-labour force state has been basically considered as a residual 
category useful to determine only second-order effects for the employment state through the 
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intermediate movement of its members in the unemployment state. In other words, it would 
play a role only in re-filling or re-absorbing unemployed workers over the business cycle.7  
 
The motivation supporting such an approach stems from the assumption that the empirical 
evidence regarding worker flows from out-of-labour force to employment is a “statistical 
illusion”. In other words, the inactivity to employment worker flow should take place through 
the “compulsory” intermediate transition into the unemployment state (Petrongolo and Pissarides, 
2001). Thus, according to the proponents of this approach, there is no a direct flow from out-of-
labour force to employment, but, instead, a movement from out-of-labour force to 
unemployment and, finally, to the employment state. To deal with this “misclassification” 
problem the concept of “time-aggregation bias” has been developed in the literature (Petrongolo 
and Pissarides, 2001), i.e., the failure of statistical measurements to capture the intra-monthly 
active searching. 
On the other hand, it must be stressed how out-of-labour force workers have sometimes been 
seen as a group of workers that can be lumped together with the unemployed workers, bringing 
to the disappearance of any difference between the two states, with the former group aggregated 
with the latter one (Carneiro, Guimares and Portugal, 2012, and Haefke, Sonntag and Van Rens, 2013). 
This PhD thesis aims at investigating the dynamics of the labour market, moving from a 
narrowed reference model with only two labour market states into a model with three labour 
                                                          
7    Works discussing this approach are developed within a framework with endogenous labour force participation. 
These contributions investigate the ability of models incorporating this feature to explain the large business-
cycle fluctuations of labour market variables. Examples are Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005), Haefke and Reiter 
(2006) , Veracierto (2008) and Ebell (2011). A shared feature of these studies is that they do not allow inactive 
workers to exert a job-finding activity (i.e., they do not allow inactive workers to move directly from the out-
of-labour force state to employment). Finally, one must acknowledge the presence in the literature of 
contributions replicating the worker flows between all three labour market states, but not directly investigating 
the behavioural differences between out-of-labour force and unemployment. Examples are Kim (2008), Pries 
and Rogerson (2009), Moon (2011). 
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market states. Thus, the primary goal of the thesis is to contribute to the development of a 
framework describing the behaviour of the labour market variables consistent with the empirical 
evidence regarding worker flows, i.e., including the presence of the out-of-labour force state 
alongside with employment and unemployment. Then, by analysing the dynamics of the out-
of-labour force in comparison with the other two labour market states, i.e., the employment and 
unemployment states, the main goal is to investigate whether out-of-labour force and 
unemployment are undifferentiated or distinctive labour market states.  
The choice of making use of the search and matching framework to investigate the issue of inactive 
workers comes from the ability of this kind of set-up in dealing with equilibrium labour market 
participants in the different labour market states. A quite well understood feature of the standard real 
business cycle model is that this kind of model does not allow movements of workers from and into the 
out-of-labour force state. More precisely, the benchmark real business cycle model adopts the basic 
assumption of fixed labour force size, and given the baseline labour market structure of this model, i.e., 
a structure with only two states: employment and unemployment, this implies that there is no room for 
the out-of-labour force state. Furthermore, in this model holds the key assumption of frictionless 
markets, which implies the non-existence of equilibrium unemployment or inactivity.  
On the contrary, the search and matching model allows for endogenous movements in the labour force 
size (i.e. the labour force size is not fixed). More precisely, the search and matching framework allows 
for unemployment and out-of-labour force fluctuations and consequently it creates room for agents’ 
decisions involving worker flows between not only employment and unemployment, but from and to 
out-of-labour force as well. Thus, this model allows for a role for the inactivity state.    
Compared to the standard real business cycle models, the presence of search frictions in labour market 
models substantially modifies the behaviour of a business cycle model since it leads to more than 
sufficient amplification and propagation in comparison with the data. Indeed, search and matching 
models are able to reproduce consistently second moments for variables such as labour force 
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participation rate, out-of-labour force, inactive job-finding rate and wage of newly hired workers coming 
from the out-of-labour force state.   
In theory, a different approach to the study of the behaviour of inactive workers could be developed, by 
using, for example, a framework with heterogeneous agents, just following the work of Lucas and 
Rapping (1969). In the model developed by these authors, worker flows between three labour market 
states could be rationalised in terms of optimal individual’s labour supply response to movement in the 
prices (i.e., shocks to wages). However, previous empirical studies like Ham (1982) have clearly showed 
how non-employment spells could not be interpreted as optimal labour supply response. 
Some empirical evidence, suggesting unemployment and out-of-labour force are not 
homogeneous states, comes from the work of Elsby, Hobjin and Sahin (2015). These authors 
describe the effect of the non-participation margin on the cyclical behaviour of unemployment 
during a recession. Based on U.S. data from the CPS, they show that using the benchmark 
framework with only worker flows between two states, i.e, employment and unemployment, is 
misleading in interpreting the volatility of the unemployment rate. Indeed, the presence of the 
unemployment to out-of-labour force and the out-of-labour force to unemployment flows 
account for one-third of the overall cyclicality in the unemployment rate, with a more 
substantial role for the former flow. Choi, Janiak and Villena-Roldan (2015) investigate the 
behaviour of transition probabilities between three labour market states using a life-cycle 
framework for the U.S. economy. They find that the behaviour of inactive workers plays a 
relevant role in shaping the low participation rate of older workers. However, and more 
interestingly, they find that a model with two labour market states, i.e., a model excluding the 
out-of-labour force state, cannot generate empirical transitions between employment and 
unemployment if inactive workers and unemployed workers are behaviourally different 
individuals, i.e., distinct behavioural equations govern transitions in and out of these labour 
market states. Indeed, abstracting from the inactivity state in replicating empirical worker flows 
24 
 
would require flows between employment and unemployment through the out-of-labour force 
state (indirect flow) need to be equal to direct flows between these two states, implying what 
the authors call the “inactivity irrelevance condition”, a condition that might be satisfied only 
if inactive workers and unemployed workers are behaviourally not different groups of 
individuals. However, as said above, this is an assumption difficult to be supported. 
Furthermore, grouping together unemployed and out-of-labour force workers makes the model 
informationally inefficient regarding the behaviour of unemployed workers, given that the size 
of the inactivity state is much larger than that of the unemployment state, making the aggregate 
transition (i.e., the combination of out-of-labour force and unemployment) resembling that of 
the out-of-labour force.  
To the best of my knowledge, the only study investigating the behaviour of out-of-labour force 
and unemployment states as different labour market states is Flinn and Heckman (1983). In 
their empirical analysis, they test the hypothesis of considering the distinction between 
transition from unemployment to employment and the transition from out-of-labour force to 
employment as not significant, and their results reject this hypothesis, i.e., there are significant 
differences between the two transition rates. This result brings the authors to argue that two 
different behavioural equations characterize the transitions from out-of-labour force to 
employment and from unemployment to employment. Hence, a three state labour market model 
cannot be reduced to a two state labour market model, aggregating unemployment and out-of-
labour force into a single non-employment state. However, they conclude that “unemployment 
is a state that facilitates the job search process”, thus they interpret their findings still 
supporting the view that out-of-labour force is a labour market state, which is “subordinated” 
to the unemployment state, in describing the transition of individuals into the employment state.  
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The importance of testing this assumption, i.e., the hypothesis that out-of-labour force and 
unemployment are distinct labour market states, stems from the normative implications of this 
analysis. If the two labour market states are made up by the same kind of individuals, then it 
would make sense to assimilate them or to group them together in the non-employment group. 
However, if this assumption does not hold, then it is methodologically flawed to work with a 
homogeneous group of non-employed individuals so as to remove one group from the analysis 
of the dynamics of the labour market. The presence of heterogeneity between the unemployed 
and the inactive workers should lead to the implementation of more adequate macro-models, in 
order to explain the cyclical behaviour of labour market variables. Indeed, much of the analysis 
regarding the behaviour of the labour market variables using the search and matching model 
has been developed inside the theoretical framework with a representative agent model, but, if 
the two labour market states identify different individuals, it seems more appropriate to shift 
towards an approach using a heterogeneous agents model in dealing with this issue.  
Therefore, a crucial point is to try and provide an answer to the following questions: is it crucial 
to distinguish between these two groups of workers and why? Whilst much of the recent 
research has analysed and developed models with heterogeneous agents, this has been done in 
terms of generating models able to reproduce the empirical cross-sectional distributions for 
variables such as wealth, reservation wages and hours worked, using a framework with ex-post 
individual heterogeneity, following the seminal paper of Krusell and Smith (1998), together 
with Huggett (1993) and Aiyagari (1994). My work is still interested in the presence of 
heterogeneity between agents, but the approach is developed looking at the existence of ex-ante 
heterogeneity as well. Then, I return back to the initial question: does this form of heterogeneity 
matter? To answer to this question, I rely on four studies that have faced different issues from 
the ones investigated in this paper, but whose conclusions reflect the substantial improvements 
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that can be obtained through more realistic models in terms of comprehension and analysis of 
the economic behaviour of micro- and macro-aggregates. 
Guvenen (2009) builds up an asset pricing model, with two different types of agents, and where 
a crucial role is played by the limited stock market participation and heterogeneity in the 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (EIS), i.e. the response of growth rate of consumption to 
changes in the real interest rate. The rationale for such a model raises from the failure of 
previous macro-finance models to replicate both real business cycle and asset pricing facts. 
However, exploiting previous evidence provided by Mankiw and Zeldes (1991), regarding the 
more volatile consumption growth for stockholders, compared to that of non-stockholders, 
Guvenen (2009) studies the properties of a model with the presence of heterogeneous values 
for the EIS among these two groups of workers: stockholders and non-stockholders. In this 
setting, non-stockholders have a lower EIS compared to that of stockholders, as suggested by 
empirical studies using micro-level dataset (Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002). This heterogeneity in 
the EIS between stockholders and non-stockholders is crucial, in order to replicate empirical 
moments for the model. Indeed, it allows to explain the presence of a smooth consumption 
growth rate, with a large countercyclical equity premium. Due to the large value of EIS for 
stockholders, these agents can afford to insure non-stockholders, who demand for 
countercyclical consumption smoothing. However, they require a larger premium to bearing 
the burden of insuring non-stockholders and this implies a large equity premium, mirroring the 
high value empirically observed. On the other side, since they represent only a small fraction 
of the overall population, the large volatility of consumption for this group does not deeply 
affect the aggregate consumption volatility. Indeed, the latter mirrors the consumption volatility 
of the non-stockholders, who are the largest group in the economy. Thus, the presence of two 
groups of agents, and allowing for individual heterogeneity in the EIS between them, explain 
the volatility of aggregate variables, such as consumption and investment, and asset price facts, 
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such as the equity premium puzzle. In contrast, the representative agent model is not able to 
replicate all of these facts.  
Mankart and Oikonomou (2017) consider a model with search frictions in the labour market 
and incomplete financial markets, allowing for joint household search. In their model, the job 
search decision is no more the choice made by a household represented as a single-unit agent, 
but it is the result of a choice made jointly by the two individuals the household consists of, i.e., 
wife and husband. Joint search theory is usually built upon the idea that the search decision is 
the result of an interaction process between the members of the household. The authors take 
into account the failure of previous models to jointly explain the behaviour of the aggregate 
employment (procyclical), unemployment (countercyclical) and labour force participation 
(acyclical). They propose a model in which labour market outcomes are the result of a risk-
sharing mechanism at the family level. Indeed, they assume that the aggregate unemployment 
risk can be self-insured at the family level, by adjustments at the labour supply from the other 
member of the household, who is not affected by the negative shock. However, this result is 
possible when the household is made up of two ex-ante heterogeneous individuals, in terms of 
different search technology, separation probability, value of leisure and potential earnings. The 
specification with ex-ante identical identical agents, i.e., the representative agent model, is not 
able to replicate the empirical moments, since the joint decision, at the household level, 
regarding the time they flow in and out-of-labour force in order to insure the household against 
unemployment risk, is not differentiated between agents. 
Chang and Kim (2006) investigate the macro and micro differences in the labour supply 
elasticities as a function of the reservation wage and the wealth distribution. They study a model 
with incomplete financial markets and labour supply decisions, populated by a continuum of 
households, each of them consisting of two individuals, i.e., husband and wife, who have 
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different market productivity. Results from this model show that the response of individuals, in 
terms of aggregate labour supply elasticity, is a value around one, which is larger than the 
standard micro-level estimates, but well below the values obtained in the representative agent 
model. Crucial to derive the more realistic aggregate labour supply elasticity is the cross-
sectional distribution of the assets and reservation wages, a finding that the representative agent 
model cannot produce given the presence, in that case, of an environment with identical agents.   
Jaimovich and Siu (2012) present a model accounting for both job polarization and jobless 
recovery. They show how a search and matching model with two groups of agents, 
differentiated in terms of skills, can capture both phenomena. Introducing high-skilled and 
medium-skilled workers to identify a distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive tasks 
performed by these workers, they illustrate how a negative aggregate productivity shock can 
bring about the disappearance of jobs for middle-skilled workers. Indeed, after the negative 
aggregate productivity shock occurs, the value of the match for high-skilled workers tends to 
increase compared to that of middle-skilled workers. This implies middle-skilled workers start 
to train themselves, in order to search for a job in the labour market segment for high-skilled 
workers, but when this happens the jobs for middle-skilled workers disappear and job 
polarization occurs. Furthermore, given the presence in the middle-skill jobs of low-
productivity workers unable to transition into the high-skilled segment, the surplus in the 
matches, i.e., the rent obtained as difference between the value of a match and the value 
functions for unmatched individuals,  related to those workers falls and consequently these jobs 
are subject to a higher rate of destruction. However, the transition of middle-skilled workers 
into the group of high-skilled workers brings about an increase in the output and a recovery of 
the economy. However, with a low job-finding rate for jobs related to routine tasks, jobless 
recovery occurs. Thus, the employment dynamics in this model are driven by the skill 
heterogeneity between workers. 
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Whether or not the framework with heterogeneous agents, e.g. Guvenen (2009), is relevant for 
our analysis can be understood when one thinks in terms of a representative versus a 
heterogeneous agent model, in an environment including both unemployed and out-of-labour 
force individuals. If new hires from unemployment show a different procyclicality of their 
wages compared to new hires from out-of-labour force, as it will be investigated in Chapter 3, 
and if the probability of transitioning into the inactivity state is different from the probability 
of transitioning into unemployment, as it will be investigated in Chapter 4, it can be thought of 
these two groups of individuals as belonging to distinctive labour market states. This would 
lead us to conclude that the representative unemployed individual might be different from the 
representative inactive worker. In that case, the current approach in the search and matching 
literature, using a model including only the representative unemployed individual would be 
methodologically inconsistent. A significant difference in the behaviour of the inactive and the 
unemployed workers would imply that any theoretical framework explaining the dynamics of 
the labour market should also include the representative inactive worker, as well. However, any 
aggregation between the representative unemployed and the representative inactive worker 
would represent a shift from the theoretical framework of the representative agent model to that 
of heterogeneous agents model.  
The consequences of the presence of heterogeneity between unemployed and inactive workers 
are better explained if one thinks about the impact of this differentiation on the labour market 
variables. For example, in terms of job-finding rate, in the basic search and matching model, 
one takes into account only the representative unemployed individual. However, the empirical 
evidence on gross worker flows suggests that the job-finding rate is determined not only by 
unemployed workers looking for a job, but also by out-of-labour force workers. Cole and 
Rogerson (1999) was among the first to explicitly state the difficulties of replicating the 
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empirical volatility for this variable without tracing back to the presence of flows into 
employment from out-of-labour force.  
Furthermore, despite the fact that inactive workers fill positions advertised by the firms, it is 
not clear what is the mechanism behind the hiring process. In other words, it is not clear if 
vacancies are advertised for both unemployed and out-of-labour force workers, or whether there 
exist different criteria, such as sorting or ranking between them, which inform the decision of 
the firms. Assuming the extreme scenario of ranking, in a manner in which the majority of 
vacancies are posted only for unemployed workers, then the variable vacancy would be mainly 
driven by the unemployed group. However, the job-finding rate would be mainly driven by the 
out-of-labour force state given gross flow from out-of-labour force to employment is roughly 
twice as large as the gross flow from unemployment to employment. Then, the final stage of 
this process would be that the representative newly hired and the representative vacancy would 
be determined by two separate groups of workers, and the cyclical properties for the 
representative hired might be very different from those of the representative vacancy. 
In terms of results, in Chapter 2 I show that a three labour market state model is able to generate 
large volatilities for key labour market variables and replicate the most relevant empirical 
worker flows.  
Previous papers have investigated the business-cycle moments of a two-states frictional labour 
market model, but they have been unsuccessful in reproducing the large volatilities of key 
labour market variables such as vacancies, job-finding rate and unemployment. Different 
solutions have been proposed such as wage rigidities (Shimer, 2005), institutional factors (Hall, 
2005), small rents (Hagedorn and Manovskii, 2008), asymmetric information on worker 
productivity (Kennan, 2010). However, some authors have examined the business cycle 
performance of models including as an additional feature the endogenous labour force 
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participation, i.e., the model assumes participation to labour market is not fixed (restrict to 
employment and unemployment). Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005),  Haefke and Reiter (2006), 
Veracierto (2008) and Campolmi and Gnocchi (2016) are examples of this strand of research. 
However, the models of these authors do not allow for inactive workers to direct transition into 
employment, hence inactive workers cannot be part of the large group of job searchers and 
cannot fill a vacancy. Such models allow only to the group of unemployed workers to flow 
directly into employment after a successful searching period.  
The benchmark model developed in Chapter 2 is able to replicate 50 percent of the empirical 
unemployment volatility, a result that constitutes a substantial improvement compared to the 
usual values (close to one-tenth the empirical analog) obtained by standard search model. The 
model is also able to generate large fluctuations for the job-finding rate, vacancies and vacancy-
searchers ratio, with values that represent around 50-60 percent of their empirical counterparts. 
Moreover, the model performs well in replicating the empirical value for the Beveridge Curve, 
since the simulated value obtained is close to 70 percent of the empirical counterpart.  
Furthermore, I am able to replicate the empirical values for the most relevant worker flows. 
Indeed, the model is successful in reproducing the out-of-labour force to employment flow, a 
statistical measure that previous papers have failed to match. The model is also able to explain 
60 percent of the employment to unemployment worker flow, 70 percent of the unemployment 
to employment worker flow and 65 percent of the employment to out-of-labour force worker 
flow, even if the model shows some drawbacks in replicating the two worker flows between 
unemployment and out of labour force. In this case, the model overpredicts the flows by a factor 
close to 50 percent. 
The reasonable performance of the model in replicating volatile second moments relies on two 
channels. The first channel is the existence of frictions in the “full discovery” of the new value 
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of the idiosyncratic variable. Indeed, the model is specified such that the value for home 
productivity is “common knowledge” for all the agents only at the end of the period, even if the 
new draws occur at the beginning of the same. This implies that after a positive aggregate 
productivity shock, this is a good moment for firms to open new vacancies and for workers to 
accept jobs offered to them. Hence, new matches between firms and workers occur. However, 
some of these new matches are destroyed at the end of the current period, after workers have 
full knowledge of the new draws of home productivity, given that a high draw of ℎ𝑡 would 
bring the worker to quit the job. Since firms are forward-looking agents, they know a fraction 
of newly formed matches will be destroyed for the newly matched job-finders drawing high 
values of home productivity, and they will increase the number of vacancies posted on the 
market. This produces large fluctuations in vacancies, and it brings to large fluctuations for the 
other labour market variables as well. The second channel is the introduction of a third margin, 
i.e., the inactive workers. Indeed, it allows to redefine the mass and the flows of workers 
between the three labour market states. 
In Chapter 3, I show that real wages for newly hired workers coming from out-of-labour force 
behave differently, over the cycle, from the real wages of newly hired workers coming from 
unemployment. I investigate the cyclical behaviour of real wages by estimating a wage equation 
in terms of the response to some aggregate cyclical indicators, specifically the unemployment 
rate and the aggregate labour productivity. In this exercise, I move one step forward compared 
to the standard empirical specifications of previous models. Indeed, prior studies, apart from 
the established interest in the standard categories of workers such as ongoing workers and job 
changers, have focused on either individuals classified as unemployed or individuals gathered 
into a large “black-box”, i.e., the non-employment state, to study the cyclical behaviour of real 
wages. I propose a new approach in investigating this relationship by disentangling the group 
of non-employment in the unemployed and the out-of-labour force workers and I estimate the 
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cyclicality of real wages not only for individuals belonging to the unemployment state, but also 
for individuals classified as inactive workers.  
Previous works investigating the cyclical behavior of real wages have found a large 
procyclicality for the wage of newly hired workers, while a substantial lower cyclicality has 
been observed for the overall wages, a result suggesting real wages of job stayers are less 
responsive to the cycle. More in details, Haefke, Sonntag and Van Rens (2013), using data from 
Current Population Survey for the U.S. economy, show how the real wages of new hires is more 
sensitive than the real wages of ongoing workers to labour productivity shocks. They find 
percentage values for the elasticity of real wages for new hires in the interval 0.8-0.9, compared 
to values close to 0.2-0.3 for the elasticity of real wages for job stayers. Kudlyack (2014), who 
uses data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth for the U.S. economy, finds similar 
values to those in Haefke, Sonntag and Van Rens (2013).  
Using data from the “Quadros de Pessoal”, an employers/employees longitudinal dataset for 
the Portuguese economy, Carneiro, Guimares and Portugal (2012) and Martins, Solon and 
Thomas (2012) find that the real wages of newly hired workers, using the unemployment rate 
as the aggregate cyclical indicator, is strongly procyclical. Carneiro, Guimares and Portugal 
(2012) find a value for the semi-elasticity of real wage for marginal workers of 2.20 percentage 
points, while Martins, Solon and Thomas (2012) find a value of 1.60 percentage points, 
assuming a fall of one percentage point in the unemployment rate. Both values are larger than 
the semi-elasticity of wage for job stayers. When the aggregate labour productivity is taken into 
account as the reference cyclical indicator, Carneiro, Gumares and Portugal (2012) find a value 
for the elasticity of real wage close to 1.10 percentage points, while Martins, Solon and Thomas 
(2012) find a value close to 0.50 percentage points. Both values are larger than the analog value 
for the job stayers. On the contrary, Gertler, Huckfeldt and Trigari (2016) investigating the 
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relationship between real wages and unemployment rate, using data from the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation (SIPP) over the period 1990-2012, for the U.S. economy, find that 
the strong procyclicality of real wages of newly hired workers coming from unemployment 
disappears when job to job movements are taken into account. Indeed, they find a value for the 
semi-elasticity of real wages equal to 0.155 percentage points, very close to 0.160 reported for 
job stayers, while the semi-elasticity of wages for job changers is equal to 1.90 percentage 
points. 
However, the controversy in the literature between these two different approaches has been 
developed along a sharply stylized definition of the labour market, i.e., one with only two labour 
market states: employment and unemployment. 
Using data for the U.S. economy, from the Survey of Income Participation Program, over the 
1996-2013 period, I document the large presence of direct flows of workers from the out-of-
labour force state to the employment state and I estimate a model where it is allowed for entry 
wages for marginal workers coming from both unemployment and out-of-labour force. I 
identify four different groups of workers: job stayers, newly hired workers from unemployment, 
newly hired workers from out-of-labour force and job changers, with this last group being 
defined as, respectively, (i) individuals making a job to job transition with a monthly break 
between consecutive spells of employment, and (ii) individuals making a job to job transition 
with weekly’s (shorter than one month) break between consecutive periods in the employment 
state.  
Estimating the model according the two different approaches used in the literature, i.e., the one 
proposed by Carneiro, Guimares and Portugal (2012), allowing for staggered wages (they 
assume wages are set one year in advance), which is labeled as CGP model, and the other one 
used by Gertler, Huckfeldt and Trigari (2016) that use higher-frequency data, which is labeled 
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as GHT, I find, for the case with non-employed workers grouped together in one large “non-
employment” state, a value for the semi-elasticity of real wage for job stayers and marginal 
workers close to 0.20 and 0.227 percentage points, when I use the GHT specification, and 
values of 1.452 and 1.704 percentage points, with the CGP specification. Then, the real wages 
for marginal workers are more procyclical compared to the wages for the job stayers. 
Introducing the distinction between marginal workers from unemployment and marginal 
workers coming from out-of-labour force, I find percentage values for the semi-elasticity of 
wages for marginal workers coming from unemployment and out-of-labour force, with the GHT 
specification, of 0.194 and 0.328 percentage points, compared to 0.204 for job stayers, and 
percentage values of 1.575 and 2.201, compared to 1.454 for job stayers, when the CGP model 
is used. This implies that there exists a substantial wedge between the two measures of the semi-
elasticity of real wages for the new hires belonging to the two different groups, with the real 
wages for new hires coming from out-of-labour force more procyclical than the real wages for 
new hires coming from unemployment. When job changers are introduced in the model to 
control for the presence of individuals making job to job movements able to explain the large 
procyclicality of real wages of newly hired in the context of a “cyclical job-upgrading” 
environment, I find estimates of 0.317 percentage points for new hires from out-of-labour force 
and 0.194 percentage points for new hires from unemployment, when the GHT approach is 
used, and estimates of 2.222 and 1.610 percentage points for the semi-elasticity of real wage of 
new hires from, respectively, out-of-labour force and unemployment, when it is used the CGP 
model. Furthermore, it can be also observed that there is evidence of a larger procyclicality in 
the real wages of job changers, with values of 0.373 and 2.342 percentage points. To test the 
robustness of this empirical analysis, I repeat this exercise using the aggregate labour 
productivity as the cyclical indicator and I find that the elasticity of real wages of newly hired 
workers from unemployment is equal to 0.945 percentage points and for the newly hired 
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workers coming from out-of-labour force is equal to 1.006 percentage points, for the GHT 
specification, while it is equal to 0.991 and 1.055 percentage points, respectively, for newly 
hired from unemployment and out-of-labour force, with the CGP model. 
In Chapter 4, I show that wealth exerts a significant impact on the probability of transitioning 
in the non-employment states. More precisely, in this study I investigate how wealth can affect 
the “exit margin” for an individual in the labour market, i.e., the probability for individuals to 
transitioning into unemployment and out-of-labour force.  
Researchers have shown that search and matching models including idiosyncratic home or 
market productivity shocks are able to replicate labour market transitions, but these models are 
usually developed in a framework with only two labour market states and with risk neutral 
agents. However, if one considers the transition into the non-employment states as the start of 
a new search activity, a not fully addressed question is: what can finance this search? In this 
sense a crucial role emerges for wealth. While a few papers (Bloemen and Stancanelli, 2001, 
and Algan, Chevron, Hairault and Langot, 2003) have examined whether wealth can finance 
active search, i.e., searching while individuals are in the unemployment state, no answer has 
been given to the question whether wealth can finance passive searching, i.e., searching while 
individuals are in the out-of-labour force state. In this work, I test the presence of heterogeneity 
in the exit margin, i.e., the existence of differences between the probability of transitioning into 
unemployment and the probability of transitioning into out-of-labour force. I develop this 
analysis by using the transitory-permanent decomposition wealth effect.  
Using data from the Survey of Income Participation Program for the U.S. economy, over the 
period 1996-2013, I estimate the impact of wealth on the transition probabilities. I find that a 
transitory increase in wealth exerts a positive impact on the probability of transitioning to out-
of-labour force and the probability of transitioning to unemployment, but values for the former 
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transition probability are nearly twice as large as those for the latter. On the other side, I find 
that a permanent increase in wealth has a negative impact on both transition probabilities, with 
the coefficient for the transition probability to out-of-labour force much larger than that for the 
transition probability to unemployment. More precisely, I find that a transitory increase in 
individual wealth by $ 100,000 dollars increases by 50 percent the probability of transitioning 
to out-of-labour force and by 30 percent the probability of transitioning to unemployment. On 
the contrary, a permanent increase in individual wealth by $ 100,000 dollars decreases by 60 
percent the probability of transitioning to out-of-labour force and by 40 percent the probability 
of transitioning to unemployment. Using as main regressor a broader definition of wealth 
(including all other forms of wealth reported in the dataset such as real estate property assets 
and life insurance policies) the estimates confirm that a transitory increase in wealth exerts a 
positive impact on the probability of transitioning to out-of-labour force and unemployment, 
while the sign is reversed for the permanent effect. However, coefficients are in this case 
roughly 50 percent lower than in the benchmark case.  
Testing the robustness of our results by including in the model specification indicators of more 
illiquid forms of wealth such as home ownership, mortgaged home or other variables related to 
housing wealth, I find no substantial changes in the effect of wealth on the transition 
probabilities.  
Controlling by gender, one can observe that a transitory increase in wealth makes males more 
likely to transitioning into out-of-labour force rather than in unemployment, while the effect is 
reversed for females, where an increase in wealth makes this group of individuals more likely 
to transitioning into unemployment. When it is considered the permanent effect of an increase 
in wealth, I find that males are less likely to transitioning into out-of-labour force than to 
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unemployment and the same qualitative indication holds for females, even if the difference 
between the two coefficients is very small.  
However, when I control for salary income, I find that estimates for the variable wealth confirm 
the standard qualitative results with the positive impact of a transitory increase in wealth on the 
probability of becoming inactive and unemployed, and a negative impact on the transition 
probabilities for the case of the permanent increase in wealth, but one can see that quantitatively 
the effect of wealth is now quite different from previous results. Indeed, I find that a transitory 
increase in wealth increases the probability to transitioning into out-of-labour force only by 20 
percent, and the probability to transitioning into unemployment by roughly 12 percent. The 
values are negative and much lower for the permanent effect, 12 percent and 4 percent. 
Similar results are reported when I control for both gender and salary income. Looking at the 
coefficients, I find that a temporary increase in wealth for males rises the probability of 
transitioning into out-of-labour force by 27 percent and that to transitioning into unemployment 
by 8 percent, while for females the values are 16 percent and 18 percent, respectively. 
Examining the effect of a permanent increase in wealth, I find in this case a fall in the probability 
of transitioning into the inactivity state by 18 percent compared to the value of 7 percent for 
unemployment for males, while the values are 7 percent and 5 percent for females. 
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Figure 1.1 
Current Population Survey (CPS): Unemployment rate U.S 
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Figure 1.2 
Current Population Survey (CPS): Employment-population ratio U.S 
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Figure 1.3 
Current Population Survey (CPS): Employment-population ratio men U.S 
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Figure 1.4 
Current Population Survey (CPS): Employment-population ratio women U.S 
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2.1 Introduction 
In the last three decades, starting with the seminal papers of Merz (1995) and Andolfatto 
(1996), a growing body of the literature in labour economics has investigated the business-cycle 
moments of a standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model where the classical 
Walrasian labour market environment is substituted out by a frictional labour market, based on 
the search and matching model, as developed by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). Results show 
how this approach has been initially successful in explaining a large set of macroeconomic 
aggregate facts, especially some labour market statistics that previous models have not been 
able to replicate. However, as Shimer (2005) and Costain and Reiter (2008) show in their 
papers, the empirical validity of this theoretical model is quite questionable when a basic search 
model, with exogenous separation rate and no intensity in search, is taken into account. Indeed, 
this framework does not fit quantitatively well with the cyclical fluctuations of labour market 
variables. The negative correlation between vacancies and unemployment (the so-called 
Beveridge curve) disappears and the volatility of labor market aggregates falls short of their 
empirical counterparts. This is particular true for the unemployment volatility, giving rise to the 
famous Shimer’s puzzle. Several attempts have been since made to provide further support to 
the empirical validity of the search model, with different specifications of the model able, to a 
certain extent, to reproduce the empirical large volatilities of unemployment, vacancies and job-
finding rate, together with a realistic negatively-sloped Beveridge curve. To solve this puzzle, 
that was in the spotlight of the recent search literature, researchers have focused on the behavior 
of aggregate real wages. Indeed, the standard search and matching model shows a substantial 
procyclicality of the aggregate real wages, while the equivalent in the data is almost acyclical. 
The strong procyclicality of the wage would operate as an instrument reducing the firms’ 
incentive to increase the number of opening vacancies after a positive productivity shock, 
because it would be directed towards an increase in the wage and this would decrease the 
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potential future profits of the firms and, consequently, their willingness to open new vacancies. 
To overcome these problems, a form of wage rigidity has been proposed as a possible solution 
(Shimer, 2004, Hall, 2005). However, this explanation basically relies on a definition of 
aggregate wage rigidity, which is not shared by most recent contributions on this topic. Rudanko 
(2009) investigates, in a directed search environment, the ability of a micro-founded rigid 
aggregate wage model to explain the volatility of unemployment, vacancies and their negative 
correlation. She micro-founds the aggregate wage rigidity by assuming both workers and firms 
engage in self-enforcing contracts (i.e., long-term wage contracts) and she finds that the 
resulting low volatility of aggregate wage is not able to explain any of these variables, 
suggesting to devote more attention to the wages of marginal workers, in the firm’s hiring 
process, since this is the forward-looking variable firms are interested in when they choose to 
advertise new vacancies.  
However, focusing on the newly hired workers’ wage elasticity and its suggested rigidity, as 
the crucial variable able to explain this broad range of aggregate labour market facts, has come 
to be questioned in some recent contributions on the subject. In two independent papers, 
Pissarides (2009) and Haefke, Sonntag and Van Rens (2013) state that the wage of marginal 
workers is not rigid, but very sensitive to the aggregate productivity shock. While Pissarides 
(2009) presents his results by surveying the literature on the topic, Haefke, Sonntag and Van 
Rens (2013) empirically investigate the degree of elasticity of the wage of marginal workers 
and they find that this type of wage reacts strongly, usually with a value close to one, to labour 
productivity shocks, differently from the wage of ongoing workers, which is quite rigid. 
Kudlyack (2014) confirms these results. Carneiro, Guimares and Portugal (2012) and Martins, 
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Solon and Thomas (2012) also show that there this empirical evidence supporting the 
assumption of the presence of elastic real wages for newly hired workers.8 
According to this analysis, it seems that the wage of marginal workers is not the appropriate 
form of wage to be taken into account to explain the Shimer’s puzzle, since its procyclicality 
comes at odds with the necessary large degree of rigidity required to replicate the data.9 
Challenging this literature, focused on the rigidity of aggregate wage as a solution to the 
Shimer’s puzzle, Hagedorn and Manovski (2008) show how it is possible to rationalize the 
cyclical volatility of labour market variables in an environment where wages are still flexible. 
Basically, they show that a model allowing for little rents from employment is successful in 
getting this result. Indeed, in this setting, workers receive a flow output from unemployment, 
reflecting the value of insurance, leisure and home production, which is roughly equivalent to 
95 percent of their earnings when employed.10 Then, small shocks to the value of new 
employment relationship translate into large percentage shocks to rents from employment that 
can yield large fluctuations in vacancies and unemployment. 
However, this solution relying on a high constant level of opportunity cost of employment is 
not supported in the data. Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016) show in their paper that 
the opportunity cost of employment (apart from being a value probably lower than what 
Hagedorn and Manovski (2008) propose) is not constant but procyclical, making the surplus 
                                                          
8    Both papers use the unemployment rate as main cyclical indicator, differently from Haefke, Sonntag and Van 
Rens (2013) that use the labour productivity as cyclical indicator. 
9    This view is challenged by Gertler, Huckfeldt and Trigari (2016). These authors, investigating empirically the 
procyclicality of real wages of marginal workers using data from the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP), show that wages for the new hires are almost acyclical. They explain this result because 
of the presence of cyclical job-upgrading, i.e., the higher ages paid are the result of the improving quality of 
jobs offered in good times, and the presence of job changers, who are the workers enjoying mostly the 
successful match for these jobs.  
10   This value in Shimer (2005) and Gertler and Trigari (2009) is 40 percent, and in Hall (2005) a number around 
70 percent of the employment’s earnings. 
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relatively stable over the business cycle and eliminating any type of large fluctuation in 
vacancies and unemployment. 
In this chapter, I test the ability of a modified Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model 
to replicate the broad set of U.S. labour market statistics when a more realistic approach to the 
dynamics of labour market variables, in the form of heterogeneous workers and direct 
transitions between all the labour market states, is taken into account. 
I modify the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model introducing the participation decision of 
non-employed in a different way from what the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model does. One 
common feature, in the line of research developed with search and matching models, has been 
to consider just workers in two labour market states: employment and unemployment, while 
little attention has been devoted to the third state: out-of-the-labor force, with some notable 
exceptions like Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005), Haefke and Reiter (2006), Kim (2008), 
Veracierto (2008), Ebell (2011) and Campolmi and Gnocchi (2016). Indeed, the inactive 
participation margin, as suggested by some recent works (Barnichon and Figura, 2015, Elsby, 
Hobjin and Sahin, 2015), has to be taken into account if one wants a complete understanding 
of the dynamics of the labor market. Despite the out-of-labour force to unemployment transition 
rate is a modest figure around 2.8 percent, while the unemployment to employment rate of 
transition is a figure around 22 percent (Shimer, 2013, Elsby, Hobjin and Sahin, 2015), the 
gross flow from out-of-labour force to employment matters, since it would represent around 45 
percent (according to Blanchard and Diamond, 1990) or 60 percent (according to Canon, 
Kudlyack and Reed, 2014, and Mankart and Oikonomou, 2017) of the overall gross flow of 
workers into employment. Abstracting from the out-of-labour force to employment flow would 
provide us with only a partial representation of the dynamics of the labour market.  
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The main finding of the chapter is that an otherwise standard Mortensen-Pissarides model 
featured by three labour market states, idiosyncratic home productivity and endogenous 
separation generates large volatility in vacancies, job-finding rate and labour market tightness 
and it is able to match the more relevant gross worker flows across the three labour market 
states: employment, unemployment and out-of-labour force. 
Indeed, the answer of the model in terms of volatility of the key variables is enhanced by the 
presence of an additional margin in the characterization of the labour market framework, that 
is, the passive searchers margin.  
To the best of our knowledge, this represents the first work successfully replicating empirical 
moments for the labour market variables and the worker flows. Previous attempts to produce 
this result have failed either in one way or the other (or both). The more evident failure of these 
models, in terms of reproducing worker flows, is about their ability to replicate the out-of-
labour force to employment flow (see Garibaldi and Wasmer, 2005, Haefke and Reiter, 2006). 
As stated by Krusell, Mukoyama, Rogerson and Sahin (2012), “one view in the literature is that 
a search and matching model with rigid wage formation and frictions that are entirely driven 
by productivity fluctuations can explain the date well. From the present perspective, such a 
model will likely be hard to square with labor market flows”.  
The mechanism able to explain the cyclical behaviour of vacancies, job-finding rate and labour 
market tightness, together with worker flows, is related to the presence of frictions related to 
home productivity. It is assumed that the value of home productivity is drawn at the beginning 
of the period, but it affects the decisions of the agents when the search process is over, i.e., at 
the end of the period. In other words, “discovering” the new value of home productivity takes 
time. The presence of this friction in the adjustment of the information process for the 
idiosyncratic variable allows for a consistent answer in terms of number of vacancies posted in 
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the markets by the firms, with direct effects on the job-finding rate and labour market tightness. 
After the aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity shocks take place, both firms and workers 
have knowledge of the aggregate shock, but they will discover the new value of the 
idiosyncratic home productivity only at the end of the period. However, as said above, this 
process takes time and it affects the decisions of agents only at the end of the period, when there 
is no further presence of search and matching activity. This implies that, on one side, firms 
know that with the “realisation” of the new draw of home productivity at the end of the period, 
a large number of workers matched in the current period could quit. Indeed, a fraction of 
vacancies posted this period will be still open next period, despite the match in the current 
period, because at the end of the current period, in the case of a new high draw of home 
productivity, some of the matches will be destroyed. This drives firms to advertise a large 
number of vacancies and it creates large fluctuations in the variable vacancy.  
On the other side, workers looking for a job will accept each job is offered them since they 
know that at the end of the period they can quit the job conditional to the new high draw of 
home productivity. This drives workers to the begin of the period, to accept each job is offered 
them and to a large fluctuation in the job-finding rate. 
However, the presence of an additional margin, the out-of-labour force state, plays a crucial 
role as well. Indeed, working with three labour market states helps to re-calibrate the mass of 
workers for each labour market state and the dynamics they are involved in. In particular, the 
presence of inactive workers helps to re-determine the distribution of matches not only as an 
effect of a direct flow from unemployment to employment, but also the direct flow from out-
of-labour force to employment, as it is observed in the data.  
This chapter proceeds as follows. The model is laid down in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2, it is 
introduced the matching model and the labour force classification. In Section 2.3, it is described 
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the calibration strategy and perform a quantitative analysis. In Section 2.4, results are discussed. 
In Section 2.5, sensitivity analysis is performed of our findings is performed. Section 2.6 
concludes. 
2.2 The Model 
2.2.1   Preferences and Technology 
The model is in discrete time. It is a variant of the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) 
matching model with both aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty, where the idiosyncratic 
variable refers to home productivity. It consists of a continuum of (homogeneous) firms and a 
continuum of workers. Workers and firms are both infinitely-lived and maximising agents. 
Workers have total mass equal to one and are assumed not to be pooled in the standard two 
labour market groups: unemployed and employed, but they are separated in three different 
groups: employed, active searchers and passive searchers. 
This distinction comes down from a more realistic approach to labour market facts. Indeed, 
following the contribution of Jones and Riddel (1999) and Krusell, Mukoyama, Rogerson and 
Sahin (2016), it has been stressed how the empirical evidence supports the fact that there exist 
substantial and volatile flows of workers into the employment state not just from the 
unemployment state but also from what is called out-of-labour force state. 
For example, Krusell, Mukoyama, Rogerson and Sahin (2016), investigating the behavior of 
gross worker flows using the matched Current Population Survey (CPS) data for the period 
1968–2009, show a large movement of gross worker flows over the cycle. 
[INSERT TABLE 2.1 ABOUT HERE] 
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Moreover, as stated by Canon, Kyudlack and Reed (2014), figures from Current Population 
Survey, for the period 2003-2014, show that the ratio of the two gross worker flows: out-of-
labour force to employment and unemployment to employment, has been equal to 1.6, 
implying, on average, that the gross flow out-of-labour force to employment is much larger 
than the unemployment to employment gross flow.  
Furthermore, using data from American Time Use Survey (ATUS), it is possible to infer the 
existence of a quite low but still positive searching activity carried out by the group of workers 
typically classified in the official statistics as out-of-labour force, i.e., agents not exerting any 
kind of active search effort in order to find a job. 
Empirical data from ATUS, show that agents in the inactivity state spend in a searching activity 
around 40 seconds per day, much less than the time spent for the same activity by agents in the 
unemployment status, which is around 23 minutes per day, but pretty close to the time spent by 
agents in the employment status, which is around 52 seconds per day.  
A suggested solution to rationalize these results comes from a careful reading of the 
questionnaire of Bureau of Labor Statistics (1994), which distinguishes between active and 
passive searching.11 As stated in the structure of the section on the labour market conditions: 
                                                          
11   The classification of individuals in the different labour market states, i.e., either unemployment or out-of-labour 
force, is obtained in the Current Population Survey by looking at the answer provided by each respondent in 
the interview, which usually takes place either the second or the third week of each month. In this occasion, it 
is asked to the respondent to report her employment status in the reference week.  People are classified as 
unemployed if they do not have a job, have actively looked for work in the 4 weeks preceding the interview, 
and are currently available for work. Furthermore, workers expecting to be recalled from temporary layoff are 
counted as unemployed whether or not they have engaged in a specific job seeking activity. All persons who 
were not employed or unemployed during the brief reference period and hence not currently active for diverse 
reasons are classified as out-of-labour force. This category includes retired persons, students, those taking care 
of children or other family members, and others who are neither working nor seeking work. From this 
classification it follows that unemployed workers are considered as active individuals with a search activity 
that can potentially create a contact with the employer, while out-of-labour force are individuals who have no 
job and are neither on layoffs nor looking for one. All these events prevent inactive workers from enjoying a 
positive probability of becoming employed. Other studies investigating the business cycle properties of labour 
market models with search frictions are prone to pool together unemployed and out-of-labour force workers. 
Indeed, second moments for vacancies or job finding rate are computed assuming the existence of only one 
labour market state, i.e., unemployment, despite the fact information on both variables are used (e.g., empirical 
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“An active searching condition is related to one of the following activities: a) contacting an 
employer directly or having a job interview, b) sending out resumes or filling out applications, 
c) placing or answering advertisement, d) checking unions or professional registers”, while the 
passive searching condition is related generally, but not exclusively, to the following activities: 
“ a) attending a job training program or course, b) reading help-wanted ads”. 
Whereas the first method of searching (i.e., active search) is the cornerstone of modern 
statistical methods to identify movements from unemployment to employment, less attention 
has been devoted to the second one (i.e., passive search). However, Montgomery (1991) shows 
that passive searching methods matter for the creation of labour market matches. Indeed, he 
reports in his work empirical evidence suggesting that 50 percent of all workers currently 
employed find jobs through non-active searching methods. 
This evidence contradicts the idea that inactive workers have no direct access to the 
employment state, implying the existence of a form of searching activity for them as well. 
Hence, the difference between unemployed agents and out-of-labour force agents relies on the 
different intensity in searching (quite significant for the agents in the former group, pretty low 
for those in the latter group). In order to accomplish with these empirical facts, it is introduced 
                                                          
flows into and out-of the inactivity state). However, this procedure used by other studies is not correct and it 
greatly affects the reliability of any investigation directed to test the empirical plausibility of the search model. 
Considering, for example, the models by Merz (1995) or Andolfatto (1996) that allow agents to search and 
enjoy leisure while they are unemployed but that restrict them to stay in the labour force. As it has been stressed 
by Veracierto (2008), if the main reason why agents become unemployed in those models is to enjoy leisure 
(i.e. if intertemporal substitution in leisure is the main factor driving employment fluctuations), a significant 
number of agents would want to leave the active labour force in order to enjoy even more leisure a transition 
into the inactivity state is allowed. Thus, most of the flows from employment to unemployment during a 
recession could end up being flows from employment to out-of-labour-force once the additional participation 
margin “inactivity” is included in the model, generating highly counterfactual behaviour. Lumping together 
unemployment and out-of-the-labor-force into a single non-employment state (as in Andolfatto, 1996) may 
hide similar problems. Thus, explaining together employment, unemployment and out-of-labour force 
dynamics is important to obtain a better understanding of the labour market dynamics.  
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the following classification for workers: employed, active searchers and passive searchers. In 
this way, it is possible to deal with a three state labour market model with search frictions. 
2.2.2     The Agents 
Workers have preferences defined by  
 
𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽𝑡  
𝑛
𝑖=0
(𝑈(𝐶𝑡
𝑖) − 𝑔𝑖) 
(1) 
where 0<β<1 is the discount factor, 𝑈(𝐶𝑡
𝑖) is the utility from consumption that individuals 
obtain in the different labor market states, with i identifying, respectively, the employment state, 
i=w, the active searching state, i=u, and the passive searching state, i=olf. Let 𝑔𝑖 be the 
participation cost (related to the activity of the workers and it is expressed in terms of the flow 
output from the different labour market states), while E is the expectational operator. 
One can write: 
 𝑔𝑖: = {
𝑔𝑤
𝑔𝑢
𝑔𝑜𝑙𝑓
          
if the worker is working
if the worker is searching actively
if the worker is searching passively
  
with 𝑔𝑤> 𝑔𝑢 >𝑔𝑜𝑙𝑓. 
The functional form of the utility function is specified as follows  
 𝑈(𝐶𝑡
𝑖) = 𝑐𝑡
𝑖  (2) 
that is, there is linear utility in consumption, with 
𝑐𝑡
𝑖 ≔ {
𝑐𝑡
𝑤 = 𝜐𝑡
𝑤
𝑐𝑡
𝑢 = 𝜐𝑡
𝑤
𝑐𝑡
𝑜𝑙𝑓 = 𝜐𝑡
𝑤
        
if the worker is working
if the worker is searching actively
if the worker is searching passively
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where 𝜐𝑡
𝑖 is to be specified below. 
It is also assumed that each worker is equipped with one unit of time to be consumed and the 
time constraint is defined as  
 1 = 𝑡𝑛
𝑖
+ 𝑡ℎ
𝑖
+ 𝑡𝑠
𝑖
+ 𝑡𝑙
𝑖
 (3) 
where, 𝑡𝑛
𝑖
 is the time spent into the job, 𝑡ℎ
𝑖
 is the time spent in home production, 𝑡𝑠
𝑖
 is the time 
spent in the job search activity and 𝑡𝑙
𝑖
 is the time spent in leisure. 
Using data from the American Time Use Survey, it is assumed that: 
1) 𝑡𝑛
𝑖
 is the inelastic number of hours devoted to the working activity;  
2) 𝑡ℎ
𝑖
 is the inelastic number of hours devoted to home production, differing between employed, 
active searchers and passive searchers, with 𝑡ℎ
𝑜𝑙𝑓
>  𝑡ℎ
𝑢
>  𝑡ℎ
𝑤
;  
3) 𝑡𝑠
𝑖
 is the inelastic number of hours devoted to searching activity, which is related just to 
active searchers and passive searchers, with 𝑡𝑠
𝑜𝑙𝑓
< 𝑡𝑠
𝑢
, i.e., non-employed workers can decide 
to search actively or passively for a job, and this implies a different time consumption activity;  
4) 𝑡𝑙
𝑖
 is the inelastic number of hours devoted to leisure, with 𝑡𝑙
𝑜𝑙𝑓
> 𝑡𝑙
𝑢
> 𝑡𝑙
𝑤
 . 
If everything is defined in terms of utility flows, I can write: 
 𝜐𝑡
𝑤 = 𝑡𝑛
𝑤
𝜛𝑡 + 𝑡
ℎ𝑤ℎ𝑡+𝑡
𝑙𝑤𝑙𝑡 (4) 
 𝜐𝑡
𝑢 = 𝑡𝑠
𝑢
+ 𝑡ℎ
𝑢
ℎ𝑡+𝑡
𝑙𝑢𝑙𝑡 (5) 
 𝜐𝑡
𝑜𝑙𝑓 = 𝑡𝑠
𝑜𝑙𝑓
+ 𝑡ℎ
𝑜𝑙𝑓
ℎ𝑡+𝑡
𝑙𝑜𝑙𝑓𝑙𝑡 (6) 
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where 𝜛𝑡 is the hourly wage
12 and it will be determined in section 2.2.7. The risk-neutral 
identical entrepreneurs (or firms) have preferences defined by 
 
𝐸0 ∑ 𝛽
𝑡
∞
𝑡=0
𝑐𝑡
𝐸  
(7) 
where 0 < 𝛽 < 1 is the discount factor, 𝑐𝑡
𝐸 is consumption, which is equal to the profits, 𝜋𝑡, 
and 𝐸 is the expectational operator. In a certain period a firm can be active or vacant. A vacant 
firm is one posting a vacant position and looking for a worker. An active firm is a firm matched 
with a worker and producing output, defined in terms of aggregate stochastic productivity 
process, 𝑧𝑡, that it is assumed is homogeneous for all workers. I set 𝑧𝑡 to follow a Markov 
process (to be specified later on). The steady-states for the aggregate productivity and the home 
productivity levels are normalized to 1. 
The number of vacancies posted in period 𝑡 is given by 𝜈𝑡. Although firms can costlessly create 
those vacancies, each period of time they incur a recruiting cost 𝑘 per vacancy posted. 
2.2.3     The Modified Matching Model 
The labour market features search frictions in the matching process between job searchers 
and vacancies posted by firms. Following Mumford and Smith (1999), who show that workers 
cannot be considered perfect substitutes in the search process, I assume that labor markets are 
segmented. This assumption can be justified in terms of a generalized form of directed search, 
making workers just searching in small segments of the labour market.  
                                                          
12  In section 2.2.7, the wage is determined according to the Nash bargaining process, but I will deal with a 
definition of wage, denoted as 𝜔𝑡, that assumes the individuals work all the hours devoted to the working 
activity. 
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Data from ATUS confirm that inactive workers are more likely to spend a large fraction of their 
time in the production of home goods, while unemployed devote a lower amount of time to this 
activity. 
Then, it is reasonable to assume that individuals differ in their abilities to perform tasks related 
to home goods production. This implies that there exists a substantial level of heterogeneity 
between workers according to their different comparative advantage in terms of home 
productivity.  Moreover, as it is showed in this study, this difference in home productivity is a 
long-lasting effect since it is related to the occurrence of the idiosyncratic productivity shock 
which is estimated to be quite persistent. 
However, this information in terms of heterogeneous levels of home productivity is usually 
common knowledge and this means it is also shared by the firms.  
Thus, it is possible to state that markets are segmented according to the different comparative 
advantage in home productivity. For each level of home productivity, i.e., unemployment and 
inactive labour market state, there is a continuum of workers with total mass equal to one, but 
each group of workers searches in its own segmented market. 
In other words, this setup captures the idea that because of the differences in home productivity 
a worker can only match with vacancies opened in her segmented market. 
Workers searching for a job, as explained above, are of two types: 1) active searchers, who 
show a higher level of search intensity and 2) passive searchers, who show a lower level of 
search intensity. In both cases, the search intensity is defined in terms of time (hours) spent for 
searching. 
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Firms post vacancies for the two different types of workers (i.e., active and passive searchers) 
in segmented markets. 
The process by which workers and firms match with each other is described by a constant-
returns-to-scale function of the number (measure) of vacancies and the number of job searchers 
of each type. Specifically, the number of matches, in each separated market, is determined by 
the aggregate matching function  
 𝑚𝑖 ((𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑡), 𝜈𝑡
𝑖) = 𝛾𝑖𝑠𝑖
𝛼𝑖
𝑎𝑡
𝛼𝑖𝜈𝑡
𝑖1−𝛼
𝑖
 (8) 
where 𝑎𝑡 defines the job searchers (applicants), with 𝑎𝑡 that can be either 𝑢 if she is an active 
searcher or 𝑜𝑙𝑓 if she is a passive searcher, 𝑠𝑖 defines the search intensity (which is defined in 
terms of time spent for searching and it is normalized to 1 for active searchers), 𝜈𝑡
𝑖 defines the 
vacancies posted by firms, 𝛾𝑖 denotes the matching efficiency parameter and 𝛼𝑖 defines the 
elasticity of the matching function. 
It follows from the constant-returns-to-scale assumption that the rate at which job searchers 
match with firms depends only on the ratio of vacancies to job searchers in each separated 
market, 
 
𝜃𝑡
𝑖 =
𝜈𝑡
𝑖
𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑡
 
(9) 
where 𝜃𝑡
𝑖 is the tightness ratio. I let 𝑓𝑖(𝜃𝑡
𝑖) denotes the job searchers’ matching rate, where 
 
𝑓𝑢(𝜃𝑡
𝑢) =
𝑚𝑢(𝑠𝑢𝑢𝑡 , 𝜈𝑡
𝑢)
𝑠𝑢𝑢𝑡
 
(10) 
and 
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𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑓(𝜃𝑡
𝑜𝑙𝑓) =
𝑚𝑜𝑙𝑓(𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑓𝑡, 𝜈𝑡
𝑜𝑙𝑓)
𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑓𝑡
 
(11) 
I specify the firm’s matching rate, 𝑞𝑖(𝜃𝑡
𝑖), as follows 
 
𝑞𝑢(𝜃𝑡
𝑢) =
𝑚𝑢(𝑠𝑢𝑢𝑡 , 𝜈𝑡
𝑢)
𝜈𝑡
𝑢  
(12) 
and  
𝑞𝑜𝑙𝑓(𝜃𝑡
𝑜𝑙𝑓) =
𝑚𝑜𝑙𝑓(𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑓𝑡, 𝜈𝑡
𝑜𝑙𝑓)
𝜈𝑡
𝑜𝑙𝑓  
(13) 
 
2.2.4     The Timing 
The timing of the events within a period is straightforward. At the beginning of the period, 
𝑡 = 0, workers are already in their own segmented sub-market. Consistent with the previous 
notation, I let employed be denoted as 𝑤𝑡, active searchers be denoted as 𝑢𝑡 and passive 
searchers be denoted as 𝑜𝑙𝑓𝑡. 
At 𝑡 = 0, the shocks (aggregate and idiosyncratic) occur and unmatched workers and 
entrepreneurs start to engage in the search and matching process.  
However, it is assumed in the model that only the aggregate productivity shock, 𝑧𝑡, is common 
knowledge after its occurrence at 𝑡 = 0, while the new value of home productivity, ℎ𝑡, is fully 
“discovered”, by both workers and firms, only at the end of the period, when the search process 
is over, despite the fact that the shock to home productivity occurs at the beginning of the period. 
Then, any decision of the workers related to the change in the value of ℎ𝑡 is feasible only at the 
end of the period and it involves only separations (i.e., movement from employment to either 
unemployment or inactivity state) and movements between the two non-employment states 
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(i.e., transitions between unemployment and out-of-labour force). This is consistent with the 
idea there exist segmented markets (workers cannot search in different segments of the labour 
market in the same period).  
Moreover, the importance of the draws of ℎ𝑡 for employed inddividuals, among the group of 
workers, is noticeable. Indeed, in the model, it is assumed that wages for ongoing workers are 
sticky, i.e., they are less elastic than the wages of newly hired workers, as it is confirmed by 
empirical research (Haefke, Sonntag and Van Rens, 2013, Carneiro, Guimares and Portugal, 
2012, and, to a certain extent, Martins, Solon and Thomas, 2012; on the contrary Gertler, 
Huckfeldt and Trigari, 2016). More precisely, job stayers cannot to re-bargain their wages at 
the end of each period since the wage is just exogenously partly adjusted to the aggregate 
productivity shock. This implies that high draws of home productivity have no effects on wages 
already bargained. However, changes in home productivity can lead the employed workers to 
leave the employment status, in order to start to look for a job again but with a new, likely 
higher, level of home productivity, which can bring to a higher wage since the worker’s outside 
option is higher. Hence, at the end of the period 𝑡, when the idiosyncratic shock to home 
productivity is common knowledge, workers can decide whether to remain into employment or 
separate, moving either into the active searching state or the passive searching state.  
Thus, only a fraction of new matches survive at the end of period 𝑡, for them wages are 
bargained, but they start to produce only next period. 
At the beginning of the period, 𝑡 = 0, matches still alive from previous period are realized and 
after the aggregate productivity shock has occurred, these workers start to produce. Finally 
wages are paid. 
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Workers not matched with a firm, who discover the value of ℎ𝑡 at the end of the period, choose 
whether to continue to look for a job in the same labour market state in the next period, i.e., 
respectively active searching or passive searching, or switching labour market state (the active 
searchers (passive searchers) will move into a labour market state where they search passively 
(actively)). 
2.2.5    The Equilibrium 
The individual worker’s and firm’s problem can be formulated recursively. The state of 
the economy is described by the pair (𝑧𝑡, ℎ𝑡), where 𝑧𝑡 is the stochastic aggregate productivity 
and ℎ𝑡 is the idiosyncratic home productivity. Fluctuations in technology are defined in terms 
of a discrete Markov process with transition matrix, 𝑍, and elements represented by 𝜍𝑖,𝑗 =
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜍′ = 𝜍𝑗|𝜍 = 𝜍𝑖). Home productivity, ℎ𝑡 , is heterogeneous and stochastic. It is defined in 
terms of a discrete Markov process with transition matrix, 𝑄, and elements represented by 
𝜑𝑙,𝑚 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜑
′ = 𝜑𝑙|𝜑 = 𝜑𝑚). Let 𝑊(𝑧, ℎ) denote the value function of an employed 
worker, 𝑈(𝑧, ℎ) the value function of a worker actively searching for a job, 𝑂𝐿𝐹(𝑧, ℎ) the value 
function of a worker passively searching for a job. Let 𝔼 be the expectational operator with 
respect to the aggregate productivity state. The idiosyncratic home productivity level, ℎ𝑡, is 
assumed to evolve stochastically over time according to a Poisson process at rate λ, i.e., next 
period’s idiosyncratic productivity level will be equal to the current period’s idiosyncratic home 
productivity level with probability rate 1-λ, while, with probability λ, next period’s home 
productivity level will be switching to a new value. In the case the home productivity level 
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switches to a new value, this will be drawn randomly according to the c.d.f. G(h) defined over 
the support ℎ 𝜖 [ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑛, ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥]. The value functions can be defined as follows:13 
 𝑊(𝑧, ℎ−1) = 𝜐
𝑤(𝑧, ℎ−1) + 𝛽𝔼𝜆∫ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑛
ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝑊(𝑧′, ℎ), 𝑈(𝑧′, ℎ), 𝑂𝐿𝐹(𝑧′, ℎ)]𝑑𝐺(ℎ) 
(
(14) 
 
 𝑈(𝑧, ℎ−1) = 𝑏
𝑢 + 𝜐𝑢(ℎ−1)
+ 𝛽 {𝑓𝑢(𝜃𝑢(𝑧))𝔼𝜆∫
ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑛
ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥
[𝑊(𝑧′, ℎ)]𝑑𝐺(ℎ)
+ (1 − 𝑓𝑢(𝜃𝑢(𝑧))) 𝔼𝜆∫
ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑛
ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥
[𝛬(𝑧′, ℎ)]𝑑𝐺(ℎ)} 
(
(15) 
 
 𝑂𝐿𝐹(𝑧, ℎ−1) = 𝜐
𝑜𝑙𝑓(ℎ−1)
+ 𝛽 {𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑓 (𝜃𝑜𝑙𝑓(𝑧)) 𝔼𝜆∫
ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑛
ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥
[𝑊(𝑧′, ℎ)]𝑑𝐺(ℎ)
+ (1 − 𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑓 (𝜃𝑜𝑙𝑓(𝑧))) 𝔼𝜆∫
ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑛
ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥
[𝛬(𝑧′, ℎ)]𝑑𝐺(ℎ)} 
  
(16) 
with 𝛬(𝑧, ℎ) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥[𝑈(𝑧, ℎ), 𝑂𝐿𝐹(𝑧, ℎ)]. 
Moreover, I denote 𝑓𝑢(𝜃𝑢(𝑧)) as the job-finding probability for an active searcher and 
𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑓 (𝜃𝑜𝑙𝑓(𝑧)) as the job-finding probability for a passive searcher. 
The interpretation of the value function for the employed is quite standard. The equity value of 
employment is equal to the utility flow and the capital gain or loss from the re-optimization 
                                                          
13  The value function for the worker is specified in very general terms in this section, but it will be recast in terms 
of notation when it will deal with the determination of surplus in each segmented sub-market.  
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after the shocks. The employed worker can choose whether to leave the employment state, after 
the realization of ℎ𝑡. She can separate either in active searching or in passive searching.  
The interpretation of the value functions for an active and a passive searchers is as follows. It 
is stated that the equity value of being an active searcher/passive searcher is equal to the utility 
flow (i.e., 𝑏𝑈 + 𝜐𝑢(ℎ−1) and 𝜐
𝑜𝑙𝑓(ℎ−1), respectively, for active searcher and passive searcher, 
where 𝑏𝑈 represents the unemployment benefit) and the potential capital gain deriving from 
finding a job, with the movement in the employment state. The active (passive) searcher can 
also choose either to move into passive searching (active searching), or to remain in the same 
state if she does not match with a firm. Put simply, both active and passive searchers face, with 
different job-finding probabilities, the chance to find a job and moving into the employment 
state with next period’s value function 𝑊(𝑧′, ℎ). With probabilities (1 − 𝑓𝑢(𝜃𝑢(𝑧))) and 
(1 − 𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑓 (𝜃𝑜𝑙𝑓(𝑧))), the job-finding activity is not successful and they can decide whether 
searching actively, 𝑈(𝑧′, ℎ), or passively, 𝑂𝐿𝐹(𝑧′, ℎ), next period, according to the value of ℎ𝑡 
following the shock to home productivity.  
Finally, the equilibrium condition defining the threshold value that brings workers to choose 
between remaining into the employment state or moving into a searching state is written as 
follows  
 𝑊(𝑧, ℎ∗) = 𝛬(𝑧, ℎ∗) (17) 
and the equilibrium condition defining the threshold value that brings workers to choose 
between moving into active searching state or passive searching state is 
            𝑈(𝑧, ℎ∗∗) = 𝑂𝐿𝐹(𝑧, ℎ∗∗) (18) 
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When a value of ℎ𝑡 below the threshold value ℎ
∗ is drawn, the employed worker will choose to 
stay in the employment state, while for values above ℎ∗ she will leave the employment state 
(endogenous separation). 
When ℎ𝑡 is above (below) the threshold value ℎ
∗∗, the active (passive) searcher will choose to 
leave her own labor market state to move into the passive searching state (active searching 
state), while the passive (active) searcher will remain in her own labour market state. 
The discussion on these equilibrium conditions in terms of effects on worker flows will be 
developed further in section 2.2.8 
2.2.6     Introducting Firms 
Since, I assume there exist separate markets for the different groups of workers, the 
choices of vacancies and wages in the labour market for a group are independent of the choices 
and the outcomes for the other group. The segmentation of markets implies that there are some 
firms posting in the sub-market for active searchers and other firms posting in the sub-market 
for passive searchers. 
The value functions for a filled position in the sub-market for active searchers and passive 
searchers are, respectively, given by 
 𝐽𝑈(𝑧, ℎ−1) = 𝑧𝑡 − 𝜔𝑡
𝑖 (𝑧, ℎ−1) + 𝛽𝔼𝜆∫ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑛
ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐽𝑈(𝑧′, ℎ)𝑑𝐺(ℎ) (19) 
and  
 𝐽𝑂𝐿𝐹(𝑧, ℎ−1) = 𝑧𝑡 − 𝜔𝑡
𝑖 (𝑧, ℎ−1) + 𝛽𝔼𝜆∫ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑛
ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝐽𝑂𝐿𝐹(𝑧′, ℎ)𝑑𝐺(ℎ) (20) 
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where 𝑧𝑡 − 𝜔𝑡
𝑖 (𝑧, ℎ−1), with 𝑖 = 𝑢, 𝑜𝑙𝑓, is the net flow of profit from the filled position, and the 
remaining terms are the discounted expected values of the matches in the two different sub-
markets, conditional to the draw of new value of home productivity. 
The equilibrium number of job vacancies is determined by the free-entry conditions, which 
state that vacancies earn zero profits:  
 𝑘 = 𝛽𝑞𝑢(𝜃𝑢(𝑧))𝔼𝜆∫
ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑛
ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥
 𝐽𝑈(𝑧′, ℎ)𝑑𝐺(ℎ) (21) 
and 
 𝑘 =  𝛽𝑞𝑜𝑙𝑓 (𝜃𝑜𝑙𝑓(𝑧)) 𝔼𝜆∫
ℎ𝑚𝑖𝑛
ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥
 𝐽𝑂𝐿𝐹(𝑧′, ℎ)𝑑𝐺(ℎ) (22) 
where 𝑘 is the job posting cost, and 𝑞𝑢(𝜃𝑢(𝑧)) and 𝑞𝑜𝑙𝑓 (𝜃𝑜𝑙𝑓(𝑧)) are the job-filling rates for 
active and passive searchers. 
2.2.7     The Wage Determination and Surplus 
When it is described how wages are determined, it is necessary to distinguish between 
the wage of existing workers and the wage of newly hired workers. As it has been showed in 
the literature (Carneiro, Guimares and Portugal, 2012, and Martins, Solon and Thomas, 2012, 
Haefke, Sonntag and Van Rens, 2013), the wage of newly hired workers is more elastic than 
the wage of existing workers.14 
                                                          
14  In the empirical papers on this topic, when the aggregate cyclical indicator is represented by the aggregate 
labour productivity, the elasticity of wages of existing workers is a value close to 0.3 percentage points, while 
the elasticity of wages of newly hired workers presents values in the interval 0.8-0.9 percentage points for 
Heafke, Sonntag and Van Rens (2013), using U.S. data from the Current Population Survey. Carneiro, 
Guimares and Portugal (2012), using a large dataset for the Portuguese economy, the “Quadros de Pessoal”, 
find values close to 1 for the job stayers and equal to 0.059 percentage points for the incremental effect. Martins, 
Solon and Thomas (2012), using the same Portuguese dataset, find values that confirm the results in Carneiro, 
Gumares and Portugal (2012), with a very small incremental effect for the new hires and an overall value for 
the elasticity of wages close to 0.55 percentage points,  When one takes into account the unemployment rate 
as a cyclical indicator, it is found that the semi-elasticity of wages of existing workers is a value between 1.60 
in Martins, Solon and Thomas (2012) and 2.20 percentage points in Carneiro, Guimares and Portugal (2012). 
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In this chapter, it is assumed that the wage of job stayers, 𝜔𝑗𝑠 is determined using the 
formulation popularized by Blanchard and Gali (2010), i.e., 
 𝜔𝑗𝑠(𝑧, ℎ−1) = 𝜔
𝑛ℎ𝑤(𝑧, ℎ−1)𝑧
𝜏 (23) 
Where 𝜔𝑛ℎ𝑤 is the average wage for newly hired workers and 𝜏 is a parameter with a value 
lower than one. This implies the wage of job stayers is more rigid than the one for newly hired. 
The wage for newly hired workers, 𝜔𝑛ℎ𝑤
𝑖
(𝑧, ℎ−1), with 𝑖 = 𝑢, 𝑜𝑙𝑓, is determined by a 
generalized Nash bargaining solution that can be written as  
 
𝜔𝑛ℎ𝑤
𝑖
(𝑧, ℎ−1) = 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥 (𝑊
𝑖(𝑧, ℎ−1) − 𝛪(𝑧, ℎ−1))
𝜓
𝐽𝑖(𝑧, ℎ−1)
1−𝜓 
(24) 
with 𝑖 = 𝑈, 𝑂𝐿𝐹 and where  𝜓 is the worker’s bargaining power (it is assumed the same value 
for all agents and sub-markets) and 𝛪(𝑧, ℎ−1) is the threat point, which is represented by either 
U(𝑧, ℎ−1) or OLF(𝑧, ℎ−1). The wage is derived by assuming that a fixed fraction of the surplus 
accrues to the worker and the firm. The total match surplus is shared in accordance with the 
above Nash solution. A worker earns wages in the current period and in the subsequent periods 
if the match survives, but after the first period, the wage is determined exogenously, because 
she becomes an ongoing worker.  
Finally, let 𝑆𝑈(𝑧, ℎ−1) and 𝑆
𝑂𝐿𝐹(𝑧, ℎ−1) denote the match surplus between a worker and a firm 
in each sub-market. The match surplus is defined to be the sum of the payoffs of the worker 
and the firm:  
                                                          
However, the semi-elasticity of wages of newly hired workers is equal to 2.70 percentage points in the latter 
paper and to 1.80 percentage points in the former. A different sets of results are provided by Gertler, Huckfeldt 
and Trigari (2016). These authors, using data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation, a 
longitudinal dataset for the U.S. economy, show that the semi-elasticity of wage for job stayers is close to 0.16 
percentage points, while the incremental effect can be either a positive or negative value, according to the 
different specification of the model, but not significant. 
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 𝑆𝑈(𝑧, ℎ−1) = 𝑊
𝑈(𝑧, ℎ−1) − 𝑈(𝑧, ℎ−1) + 𝐽
𝑈(𝑧, ℎ−1) (25) 
and  
 𝑆𝑂𝐿𝐹(𝑧, ℎ−1) = 𝑊
𝑂𝐿𝐹(𝑧, ℎ−1) − 𝑂𝐿𝐹(𝑧, ℎ−1) + 𝐽
𝑂𝐿𝐹(𝑧, ℎ−1) (26) 
 
2.2.8     The Worker Flows 
Working with a three labour market state model allows us to compute values for all the 
empirical gross worker flows. Workers in the employment state can decide to separate only at 
the end of the period 𝑡, after the new idiosyncratic value of home productivity is fully 
discovered.15 However, the worker can choose to move either in active searching or in passive 
searching. It is assumed that a threshold value, ℎ∗, determines the decision rule of the workers, 
i.e., the choice between quitting the job because they prefer to search again to obtain a higher 
wage and remaining in the same job. More precisely, the threshold value ℎ∗ comes from the 
condition  
 𝑊(𝑧, ℎ∗) = 𝛬(𝑧, ℎ∗) (27) 
and it is to be interpreted in the standard way:  
-if ℎ < ℎ∗ the worker will remain in the employment state;  
-if ℎ > ℎ∗ the worker will separate.  
This implies that the separation rate for workers moving into active searching is given by 
                                                          
15   In theory separations can be determined by the decisions of the firms, but the model parameters are assumed 
such that this case does not arise in our model. 
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𝑆𝑅𝑡
𝐸𝑈 =
𝐸𝑈𝑡
𝑚𝑡
 
(28) 
and the separation rate for workers moving into passive searching is given by 
 
𝑆𝑅𝑡
𝐸𝑂𝐿𝐹 =
𝐸𝑂𝐿𝐹𝑡
𝑚𝑡
 
(29) 
where 𝑚𝑡 is the overall number of matches, 𝐸𝑈𝑡 is the employment to unemployment worker 
flow and 𝐸𝑂𝐿𝐹𝑡 is the employment to out-of-labour force worker flow. 
To determine the employment to unemployment and the employment to out-of-labour force 
worker flows, since the model is defined in terms of endogenous separation, one needs to take 
into account the distribution of ℎ across the existing matches. Assuming that the surplus for the 
workers, is strictly decreasing in ℎ, there exists a value ℎ∗, such that the match is destroyed when 
the draw of ℎ is greater than ℎ∗, as explained in the section above. Since 𝐺(ℎ) is the c.d.f. for 
all values of ℎ, which is assumed identical and independently distributed, the employment to 
unemployment worker flow and the employment to out-of-labour force worker flow are defined 
as follows: 
 𝐸𝑈𝑡 = 𝜆𝐺(ℎ)𝑚𝑡 (30) 
for ℎ 𝜖 [ℎ∗, ℎ∗∗), where ℎ∗∗ is the threshold value that determines the choice of agents to move 
between the unemployment state and the out-of-labour force state, as it will be further discussed 
below, and 
 𝐸𝑂𝐿𝐹𝑡 = 𝜆𝐺(ℎ)𝑚𝑡 (31) 
for ℎ 𝜖 [ℎ∗∗, ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥].  
Furthermore, our model introduces the possibility to have flows between active searching state 
and passive searching state. This happens because it is also allowed non-employed workers to 
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change labour market state at the end of the period after a new draw of ℎ. This is determined by 
the following threshold value, ℎ∗∗, which determines the choice of both active and passive 
searchers between the different labour market states in which starting to search for a job next 
period. 
The threshold is determined by the condition 
 𝑈(𝑧, ℎ∗∗) = 𝑂𝐿𝐹(𝑧, ℎ∗∗) (32) 
and its interpretation is basically the following: 
-if ℎ < ℎ∗∗ the active searcher will remain in her own state and the passive searcher will move 
into the active searching state; 
-if ℎ > ℎ∗∗ the passive worker will remain in her own state and the active searcher will move 
into the labour market state representing passive searching.  
Thus, it is constructed the unemployment to out-of-labour force, 𝑈𝑂𝐿𝐹𝑡, and the out-of-labour 
force to unemployment, 𝑂𝐿𝐹𝑈𝑡, worker flows. I can write 
 𝑈𝑂𝐿𝐹𝑡 = 𝜆𝐺(ℎ)𝑢𝑡 (33) 
for ℎ 𝜖 [ℎ∗∗, ℎ𝑚𝑎𝑥], and 
 𝑂𝐿𝐹𝑈𝑡 = 𝜆𝐺(ℎ)𝑜𝑙𝑓𝑡 (34) 
for ℎ 𝜖 [ℎ∗, ℎ∗∗). Lastly, it is possible to measure the job-finding rate and the number of new 
hires related to the unemployment to employment, 𝑈𝐸𝑡, and the out-of-labour force to 
employment, 𝑂𝐿𝐹𝐸𝑡, worker flows.  
I can write  
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𝐽𝐹𝑅𝑡
𝑈𝐸 =
𝛾𝑢𝑠𝑢
𝛼𝑢
𝑢𝑡
𝛼𝑢𝜈𝑡
𝑢1−𝛼
𝑢
𝑠𝑢𝑢𝑡
 
(35) 
and 
 
𝐽𝐹𝑅𝑡
𝑂𝐿𝐹𝐸 =
𝛾𝑜𝑙𝑓𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑓
𝛼𝑜𝑙𝑓
𝑜𝑙𝑓
𝑡
𝛼𝑜𝑙𝑓𝜈𝑡
𝑜𝑙𝑓1−𝛼
𝑜𝑙𝑓
𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑓𝑡
 
(36) 
which are the two matching functions related to the two segmented markets. Finally the flows 
of new hires are measured by the following worker flows  
 𝑈𝐸𝑡 = 𝑚𝑡
𝑢𝑢𝑡 (37) 
and 
 𝑂𝐿𝐹𝐸𝑡 = 𝑚𝑡
𝑜𝑙𝑓𝑜𝑙𝑓𝑡 (38) 
 
2.3  Simulation and calibration 
2.3.1   The Solution Method  
To solve the model I use the free-entry condition and the equations for surplus together 
with the equations describing the aggregate and idiosyncratic laws of motion. The aggregate 
stochastic productivity, 𝑧𝑡, is a Markov process. I assume a 21-state process, whose vector of 
values, 𝜍, and probability transition matrix, 𝑍, is chosen to approximate an AR(1) process with 
autocorrelation, 𝜌(𝑧), and standard deviation, 𝜎(𝑧). The Tauchen’s method is used to represent 
it. The idiosyncratic home productivity process, ℎ(𝑡), is approximated by a 140-state Markov 
process, with vector of values, 𝜑, and transition matrix 𝑄. 
The model is solved numerically using value function iteration given the saddlepoint 
stability property of the matching model. Indeed, since the left side of the surplus equation is 
increasing in 𝜃𝑡, whereas the right side is decreasing in the same variable, because of the 
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decrease in the surplus value when 𝜃𝑡 increases, there is a unique 𝜃𝑡 that solves the equation. 
Once I solve for 𝜃𝑡, the surplus functions are solved. The model is simulated for 1,000 months. 
All monthly series are logged and HP detrended using a smoothing parameter of 129,000 as 
suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002). I replicate the simulations 1,000 times, and despite each 
series consists of 1000 observations, I discard the first 674 observations and I use only the last 
336 (corresponding to the data from I/1976 to XII/2004) to compute the standard moments: 
mean, standard deviations and autocorrelations. Reported statistics are averages over 1,000 
simulations.  
2.3.2   The Calibration  
To simulate and solve the model, I will use values for the parameters that are standard in 
the literature. However, this will not be possible for all parameters because the model developed 
in this chapter considers three and not only two labour market states. Finding empirical 
evidence to provide suitable values for parameters as regards the passive searching state is not 
an easy task.  
The baseline calibration is presented in Table 2.2. The period length is one month, which is 
different from the frequency used in the literature, i.e., the weekly frequency (e.g., Hagedorn 
and Manovski, 2008), but it allows to get a perfect fit with the frequency concerning worker 
flows. 
Four parameters are calibrated following what are the standard assumptions in the literature. I 
set the discount factor, 𝛽, equal to 0.9967, which is consistent with the annual interest rate of 4 
percent. The process for aggregate productivity is obtained from a 21-state Markov process, 
𝜍𝑖,𝑗 = 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝜍
′ = 𝜍𝑗|𝜍 = 𝜍𝑖), which approximates an AR(1) process ln 𝑧𝑡+1 = 𝜌𝑧 ln 𝑧𝑡 + 𝜖
𝑧, 
with 𝜖 𝑧~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜖𝑧
2 ). Consistent with the values used in the Real Business cycle literature, I set 
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the persistence of technological process, 𝜌𝑧, equal to 0.97 and the standard deviation of the 
innovation process, 𝜎𝑧, equal to 0.0077 (Bils, Chang and Kim, 2012). Unfortunately, the 
calibration of the idiosyncratic home productivity is quite challenging because there are not 
empirical measures of the dispersion of home productivity. The solution is to consider this 
variable like a measure of “relative productivity” since, in the reality, what one should try to 
measure is the difference between market productivity and home productivity. I assume that 
the idiosyncratic shock evolves according to a 140-state Markov process 𝜑𝑙,𝑚 =
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑏 (𝜑′ = 𝜑𝑙|𝜑 = 𝜑𝑚) that approximates an AR(1) process ln ℎ𝑡+1 = 𝜌ℎ ln ℎ𝑡 + 𝜉
ℎ, with 
𝜉ℎ~𝑁 (0, 𝜎
𝜉ℎ
2 ). I set the persistence parameter, 𝜌ℎ, equal to 0.9895, and the standard deviation 
of the innovation process, 𝜎ℎ, equal to 0.227. The high value set for the persistence and the 
volatility of home productivity shock are derived from the results reported by Topel and Ward 
(1992), with estimates reporting a high persistence for the individual wages and earnings, with 
the standard deviation in the annual growth rate in earnings being equal to 19 percent.  
The steady state productivity level for aggregate and idiosyncratic process is normalized to one. 
The flow cost of posting a vacancy 𝑘, is equal to 17 percent of monthly productivity. This is 
the value suggested by Fujita and Ramey (2012), based on survey evidence on employer 
recruitment behaviour.  
To calibrate the values of the matching function, I use the Cobb-Douglas matching technology 
as proposed by Shimer (2005). However, the fact I have segmented markets implies I have two 
matching functions, i.e, 𝑚𝑖(𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑡, 𝜈𝑡
𝑖) = 𝛾𝑖𝑠𝑖
𝛼𝑖
𝑎𝑡
𝛼𝑖𝜈𝑡
𝑖1−𝛼
𝑖
. I normalize to one the value of the 
efficiency parameter of the matching function, 𝛾, while the elasticity parameter of the matching 
function, 𝛼, is set equals to 0.5 for both matching functions. The same value, 0.5, is used for 
the workers’ bargaining power, 𝜓, as it is the common value used in the literature on search 
and matching with the exception of Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). 
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The unemployment benefit 𝑏𝑈 is set equal to 0.041 based on Chodorow-Reich and 
Karabarbounis (2016). The real wage flexibility parameter, 𝜏, is set equal to 0.3 following 
Haefke, Sonntag and Van Rens (2013). 
As concerns the values for the participation costs for all the three groups of workers, since there 
is no supporting empirical evidence about these variables, I choose then such that the model 
replicates the observed employment, unemployment and out-of-labour force rates. 
Data about the time spent in working, home production, searching and leisure activities is 
derived by ATUS dataset. 
[INSERT TABLE 2.2 ABOUT HERE] 
2.4  Results  
Results of the baseline calibration are presented in the tables below, while findings from 
the sensitive analysis will be presented in next section. Table 2.3 reports monthly US data 
(1976-2004) for labour market tightness, unemployment, vacancies and job-finding rate as well 
as the correlation between unemployment and vacancies, i.e., the so-called Beveridge Curve, 
and the other labour market variables. Statistical facts are taken using data from the Bureau of 
Labour Survey (BLS). They are defined in logs as deviations from an Hodrick-Prescott trend 
with smoothing parameter 129,000.  
[INSERT TABLE 2.3 ABOUT HERE] 
In what follows, I will first discuss the results produced by the baseline model for the active 
searchers and the passive searchers, and then I will show how results from aggregation can be 
compared with findings from prior models. 
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Tables 2.4 and 2.5 report the findings of the simulated model for the two segmented markets, 
while Table 2.6 presents the findings when I aggregate the two segmented markets. The results 
of the monthly calibration have not been aggregated to a quarterly frequency, so that they can 
be compared to the usual empirical monthly values for the labour market variables and the 
worker flows. 
 [INSERT TABLE 2.4 ABOUT HERE] 
Looking at the results in Table 2.4, where it is considered only the segmented sub-market for 
active searchers, i.e., the unemployed, one can observe that the model for this group of 
individuals replicates well a large part of the empirical volatility for the labour market variables. 
The reasonable performance of the model in generating volatile second moments relies on two 
channels. The first, and more relevant in terms of impact on the creation of vacancies, is the 
existence of frictions in the “full discovery” of the value of the idiosyncratic variable after the 
occurrence of the shock. More precisely, the home productivity shock occurs at the beginning 
of the reference period, but its value is fully “realised” by the agents only at the end of the same 
period. This implies that when there is a positive aggregate productivity shock, i.e., there is an 
expansion of the economic activity, it is a good moment for firms to open new vacancies and 
for workers to accept jobs offered to them. Hence, firms and workers form new matches. 
However, the survival of these matches, at the end of the period, is subject to the new draws of 
home productivity. With a high draw, workers matched in the current period are likely to quit 
their jobs and search again next period. Indeed, the higher value for the idiosyncratic home 
productivity brings about an increase in the worker’s outside option. Since firms are forward-
looking agents, they know a fraction of newly formed matches will be destroyed at the end of 
each period, then they are more likely to increase the number of vacancies posted on the market. 
However, the workers are also forward-looking agents and after a positive aggregate 
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productivity shock, they know it is a good moment to form a match, since they do not have 
information on the new  idiosyncratic value of home productivity until the end of the period. 
Moreover, even in the case of a high draw, they will be able, when the new value of home 
productivity is common knowledge, to quit the job and search for a better match next period. 
All this dynamics produces large fluctuations in vacancies and, to a certain extent, in the job-
finding rate and labour market tightness as well. 
Looking at the results, I mainly focus on the cyclical behaviour of the key labour market 
variables. In particular, it can be observed that the volatility of unemployment is equal to 4.122. 
Despite being below its empirical value, it is a much larger figure compared to the values 
reported in the previous papers using the standard Mortensen-Pissarides model. Indeed, the 
baseline search model usually generates too little volatility for the unemployment variable 
(Shimer, 2005, and Costain and Reiter, 2008), roughly a value around one-tenth of the empirical 
counterpart. The particular specification of the present model, incorporating variability in the 
separation rate and transitions between unemployment and out-of-labour force, helps in 
increasing the volatility of unemployment (while in the literature, one finds a constant 
exogenous separation rate, with a counterfactual absence of volatility in the separation rate). 
The volatility of the labor market tightness ratio and job-finding rate is for both around 50 
percent of the analog value in the U.S. data, while the value for vacancy observed in the 
simulation is roughly 60 percent of its empirical counterpart. Observing the correlation values 
between vacancies and labor market tightness with unemployment, one can see that the values 
fall short of their empirical analogs. The model’s correlation between unemployment and 
vacancies is -0.632 compared to -0.89 in the data, while the correlation between labour market 
tightness and unemployment is equal to 70 percent of its empirical value. It could be argued, 
given the calibration strategy used in this chapter, that the mildly weak performance of the 
model is direct evidence of the inability of unemployed workers’ rents to generate enough 
75 
 
impact on aggregate labour statistics, but this conclusion does not hold in this model since it 
allows for endogenous separation rate (a result that holds particularly for high-wage workers as 
highlighted by Mueller (2017)).  
Results for the model with the group of passive searchers, i.e., the out-of-labour force 
individuals, are reported in Table 2.5.  
[INSERT TABLE 2.5 ABOUT HERE] 
The figures in Table 2.5 are quite challenging to be interpreted since statistical measures for 
labour market variables in a search model are usually interpreted in relation with the 
unemployment state and not with reference to the out-of-labour force state. Thus, a comparison 
will be made using the values generated for the scenario with unemployed. Overall, the model 
seems to work well since it is able to produce a volatility for out-of-labour force, a value of 
0.231 , which is close to 0.3, i.e., its empirical value. The variables labour market tightness, 
job-finding rate and vacancy show also a remarkable volatility, with values, respectively, 
around 65 percent, 80 percent and 75 percent of the simulated analogs found for the unemployed 
group in Table 2.4.  
Looking at aggregated model, the results show a substantially higher level of cyclical volatility 
for the variables compared to the volatilities resulting in previous studies based on standard 
search and matching models. The findings in Table 2.6 show that the cyclical fluctuations in 
vacancies, job-finding rate and labor market tightness represent around the 50 percent of the 
empirical counterparts. These results support the assumption that including the passive 
searchers margin plays an important role in generating results that can resemble empirical 
moments.  
[INSERT TABLE 2.6 ABOUT HERE] 
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Table 2.7 reports the empirical and simulated values for worker flows. It can be observed that 
the model does a good job in replicating the out-of-labour force to employment worker flow, a 
statistic previous papers have failed to match. This is a crucial result since the present model 
does not necessarily address this issue. Indeed, the inclusion of the passive searchers just 
produces a chance for these individuals to find a job, but the searching activity of passive 
searchers is calibrated on data from ATUS and the value of time devoted to searching by passive 
searchers in the survey is pretty low compared to that observed for active searchers, implying 
a lower intensity in searching and a lower successful likelihood rate in finding a job, even in 
the presence of segmented labour markets. The model is decent in terms of reproducing the 
employment to unemployment and the employment to out-of-labour force worker flows. While 
the model explains 60 percent of the former, it is also able to explain 65 percent of the latter. 
The specification of the model, allowing for endogenous separation, plays a key role in 
generating realistic monthly worker flows compared to the results reported in the literature in 
the case of the presence of only exogenous separations. However, in order to obtain a better 
match one could probably introduce, together with endogenous separation, a slight form of 
exogenous separation like in Fujita and Ramey (2012). Furthermore, the model grossly 
overpredicts the flows from unemployment to out-of-labour force and from out-of-labour force 
to unemployment. They are roughly twice as large as the ones found in the data. The value for 
the former flow is equal to 0.199, while it is 0.122 in the data, and for the latter flow, it can be 
observed a value of 0.039 compared to 0.021 in the data. Finally, the unemployment to 
employment worker flow is roughly 70 percent of its empirical counterpart. These results seem 
to support the idea that the temporary fluctuations in home productivity drive the flows between 
these two labor market states. A larger magnitude in the aggregate productivity shock would 
probably improve the model, by bringing active and passive searchers to larger movements into 
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the employment state instead of moving backward and forward between these two labor market 
states, following the new draws for the idiosyncratic variable. 
[INSERT TABLE 2.7 ABOUT HERE] 
2.5  Sensitivity Analysis 
In this section, I test the robustness of the model by introducing a calibration for the 
bargaining power and workers’ surplus from a new match that resembles that proposed by 
Hagedorn and Manovski (2008).  The exercise that is proposed is similar to that used in their 
study by Fujita and Ramey (2012).  
2.5.1     A New Calibration: Comparison with the Hagedorn and Manovski (2008) model 
The goal in this sub-section is to test the implications for this model to introduce a 
calibration similar to that proposed in their work by Hagedorn and Manovski (2008). As it has 
been showed by these authors, the Shimer’s puzzle can be rationalized and the volatilities for 
the labour market variables are replicated when one allows for a different calibration of the 
search and matching model from the standard set-up proposed in the literature. Especially, 
introducing a high replacement rate (a value close to 90 percent, quite different from the values 
usually used in he majority of the contributions on this issue, that are included in the range 40-
70 percent) and a small workers’ bargaining power (below 5 percent) produces realistic results 
for the relevant moments and correlations. 
The basic strategy is to follow Hagedorn and Manovski (2008) by calibrating the value of the 
replacement rate and workers’ bargaining power in order to match the elasticity of wages to the 
aggregate productivity shock and the steady-state wage-productivity ratio. Indeed, the authors 
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aim at producing an elasticity of wages that is lower than that produced by the search models 
with a standard calibration.  
Results presented in Table 2.8 show that adopting a calibration a’ la Hagerdon and Manovski 
(2008) produces substantially more volatile moments. This effect can be attributed to the fact 
that, following a positive aggregate productivity shock, individuals are less willing to separate 
since the workers’ outside option declines compared to the value of the match.  
However, the model presents little improvements in terms of responses of worker flows. Indeed, 
the worker flows show a lower responsiveness to the TFP shock due to the fact that the incentive 
provided to the workers in terms of higher productivity and, consequently, the lower value for 
the workers’ outside option, brings about a drop in the rate of separations for the workers. 
[INSERT TABLE 2.9 ABOUT HERE]  
2.6 Conclusions 
The objective of this chapter is to investigate the ability of a three state frictional labour 
market model to replicate both the empirical labour market volatilities and worker flows. I 
present a model where workers heterogeneity in terms of idiosyncratic home productivity and 
direct worker flows between the three labour market states play a key role. When I simulate the 
baseline model, I obtain results showing a large volatility for labour market variables such as 
unemployment rate, vacancy and labour market tightness, compared to their values in the 
standard search model, and more realistic worker flows. Indeed, the simulated second moments 
can replicate between 50 and 60 percent of their empirical analogs and the model is also able 
to perform quite well along the replication of the other worker flows, especially the out-of-
labour force to employment worker flow, a statistical value that previous models have struggled 
to replicate. 
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These result crucially depends on three assumptions. The presence of frictions in the adjustment 
of the information process regarding the idiosyncratic variable, the role played of out-of-labour 
force as an extra participation margin and the inclusion of endogenous separations. 
In particular, the introduction of the third labour market state, i.e., the passive searchers margin, 
is a clear enhancement in modelling search and matching models, since it explicitly allows to 
address the recurrent drawback of search models in generating direct worker flows from 
inactivity to employment. 
Furthermore, allowing for endogenous separation not only helps to replicate the empirical 
cyclicality of the separation rate, but it also affects the volatilities of vacancies, labor market 
tightness and job-finding rate.  
When a calibration a’ la Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) is introduced, together with the two 
standard features of the baseline model, i.e.e, endogenous separations and passive searchers 
margin, the second moments of all the variables above mentioned show greater values 
compared to those in the baseline model, but the performance of the model in terms of 
replicating worker flows is less satisfying since the rate of separation experience a substantial 
drops due to the increasing value of the match compared to the workers’ outside option. 
Despite the good performance of the model, it can be observed how a more realistic approach 
would also need to take into account the role played by the firms, which is not covered in the 
present work. Incorporating the firm’s side into the model (e.g., allowing for separations driven 
by job-specific productivity shock) would enrich the dynamics of the behaviour of agents in 
matching and separation, providing more accurate results in terms of movements between the 
labour market states. 
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Table 2.1 
 
Krusell, Mukoyama, Rogerson and Sahin (2016) estimates of Cyclical properties of Unemployment 
rate, Labour Force Participation rate and Gross Worker Flows  
 
 U LFP E-U E-OLF U-E U-OLF OLF-E OLF-U 
         
std(x) 7.6 .21 5.4 2.0 4.9 3.8 2.7 4.0 
corrcoef 
(x,y) 
-.87 .46 -.82 .33 .78 .78 .64 -.70 
correcoef 
(x,x(-1)) 
.92 .72 .73 .20 .84 .73 .41 .75 
Notes: Quarterly average values of monthly series for the U.S. economy over the period 1978-2009. Std(x): 
standard deviation of the variable X; corrcoef(x,y): correlation between the variable X and the GDP; 
corrcoef(x,x(-1)): correlation between X(t) and X(t-1). All series are logged and HP filtered. The variable U 
indicates the unemployment rate, the variable LFP indicates the labour force participation rate, the variable E 
indicates the employment and the variable OLF indicates the out-of-labour force. 
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Table 2.2 
Calibration 
Parameters Description Value 
β                                                 Discount factor 0.9967 
α Matching function elasticity 0.5 
ψ Workers' bargaining power 0.5 
γ                                                  
Matching function 
efficiency 
1 
𝑏𝑢 Unemployment benefit 0.041 
κ Cost of posting a vacancy 0.17 
ρz                                               
Persistence of the 
technological shock 
0.95 
σz 
Volatility of the 
technological shock 
0.0077 
ρh                                             
Persistence of the 
idiosyncratic shock 
0.9895 
σh 
Volatility of the 
idiosyncratic shock 
0.227 
τ                                              Real wage flexibility 0.3 
gw 
Participation cost for 
Employed 
0.942 
gu 
Participation cost for 
Unemployed 
0.211 
golf Participation cost for OLF 0.043 
li Leisure value 1 
   
Data from American Time Use Survey (ATUS) 2003-2009 
Parameters Description Value (minutes per day) 
𝑡ℎ
𝑤
 
Time spent in home 
production for employed 
119 
𝑡ℎ
𝑢
 
Time spent in home 
production for unemployed 
154 
𝑡ℎ
𝑜𝑙𝑓
 
Time spent in home 
production for inactive 
individuals 
178 
𝑡𝑠
𝑢
 
Time spent in searching for 
unemployed 
23 
𝑡𝑠
𝑜𝑙𝑓
 
Time spent in searching for 
inactive individuals 
0.37 
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics 
Monthly US data: Sample period 1976:I-2005:IV 
 
Unemployment 
Out of 
labour 
force 
Vacancies 
Labour 
market 
tightness 
Job 
finding 
rate 
Labour 
productivity 
Std. Dev. 9.6 0.294 10.1 19.1 7.72 0.0077 
Monthly 
Autocorrelation 
0.936 0.776 0.940 0.941 0.926 0.794 
Correlation 
matrix 
Unemployment 
Out of 
labour 
force 
Vacancies 
Labour 
market 
tightness 
Job 
finding 
rate 
Labour 
productivity 
Unemployment 1 0.621 -0.894 -0.971 -0.949 -0.234 
Out of labour 
force 
 
1 -0.622 -0.554 -0.432 -0.177 
Vacancies   1 0.975 0.897 0.329 
Labour market 
tightness 
   
1 0.948 0.302 
Job finding 
rate 
    1 0.294 
Labour 
productivity 
     1 
  
Notes: Seasonally adjusted unemployment rate, u, and out-of-labour force rate, olf, are constructed by using 
the monthly official BLS unemployment rate and out-of-labour force rate from the Current Population Survey 
(CPS); vacancies are obtained through the seasonally adjusted help-wanted advertising index constructed by 
the Conference Board; the labour productivity is defined as the monthly average output per worker, which is 
the seasonally adjusted real average output per worker constructed by using the index constructed by 
Macroeconomic Advisers. The Index has been developed from National Income and Production Account 
(NIPA) data. The series are deflated by using a GDP deflator index developed by Macroeconomic Advisers 
and transformed in per-capita terms by dividing the real term series by CPS total population series. Job-finding 
rates are obtained using data for the monthly worker flows from the Current Population Survey for the U.S. 
economy over the period 1976-2005. The values for the variables are reported in logs and de-trended using HP-
filter, with smoothing parameter 129,000 as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002).  
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Table 2.4  
Simulated moments for the Unemployment segmented market 
 
Unemployment Vacancies 
Labour 
market 
tightness 
Job 
finding 
rate 
Labour 
productivity 
Std. Dev. 4.122 5.982 8.148 3.711 0.0077 
Monthly 
Autocorrelation 
0.903 0.934 0.922 0.929 0.794 
Correlation 
matrix 
Unemployment Vacancies 
Labour 
market 
tightness 
Job 
finding 
rate 
Labour 
productivity 
Unemployment 1 -0.632 -0.723 -0.695 -0.645 
Vacancies  1 0.911 0.889 0.884 
Labour market 
tightness 
  
1 0.886 0.899 
Job finding 
rate 
   
1 0.765 
Labour 
productivity 
    
1 
 
Notes: Comments in Table 2.3 apply. 
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Table 2.5 
Simulated moments for the segmented market with Out of Labour Force 
 Out of 
labour 
force 
Vacancies 
Labour 
market 
tightness 
Job 
finding 
rate 
Labour 
 productivity 
Std. Dev. 0.231 4.809 5.134 3.112 0.0077 
Monthly 
Autocorrelation 
0.912 0.904 0.872 0.894 0.794 
Correlation 
matrix 
Out of 
labour 
force 
Vacancies 
Labour 
market 
tightness 
Job 
finding 
rate 
Labour 
 productivity 
Out of labour 
force 
1 -0.412 -0.523 -0.491 -0.459 
Vacancies  1 0.782 0.811 0.778 
Labour market 
tightness 
  1 0.807 0.724 
Job finding 
rate 
   1 0.699 
Labour 
productivity 
    1 
 
Notes: Comments in Table 2.3 apply. 
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Table 2.6 
Simulated moments for the Aggregate model 
 
Unemployment 
Out of 
labour 
force 
Vacancies 
Labour 
market 
tightness 
Job 
finding 
rate 
Labour 
productivity 
Std. Dev. 4.122 0.231 5.398 6.334 3.442 0.0077 
Monthly 
Autocorrelation 
0.903 0.912 0.904 0.872 0.894 0.794 
Correlation 
matrix 
Unemployment 
Out of 
labour 
force 
Vacancies 
Labour 
market 
tightness 
Job 
finding 
rate 
Labour 
productivity 
Unemp+OLF - - -0.595 -0.643 -0.612 -0.545 
Vacancies   1 0.842 0.781 0.811 
Labour market 
tightness 
   1 0.814 0.824 
Job finding 
rate 
    1 0.709 
Labour 
productivity 
     
1 
 
Notes: Comments in Table 2.3 apply. 
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Table 2.7 
 
U.S. monthly worker flows data: 1976:I-2005:IV 
 E U OLF 
E 0.971 0.011 0.018 
U 0.166 0.712 0.122 
OLF 0.037 0.021 0.942 
    
 Monthly worker flows simulated results 
 E U OLF 
E 0.981 0.007 0.012 
U 0.111 0.685 0.199 
OLF 0.031 0.039 0.927 
Notes: Data for the monthly worker flows are from the Current Population Survey for the U.S. economy over 
the period 1976-2005. The variable U indicates the unemployment rate, the variable E indicates the 
employment and the variable OLF indicates the out-of-labour force. 
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Table 2.8 
Re-calibrating the model using Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) approach 
 
Unemployment 
Out of 
labour 
force 
Vacancies 
Labour 
market 
tightness 
Job 
finding 
rate 
Labour 
productivity 
Std. Dev. 5.618 0.271 5.698 6.734 3.502 0.0077 
Monthly 
Autocorrelation 
0.911 0.902 0.910 0.902 0.890 0.794 
Correlation 
matrix 
Unemployment 
Out of 
labour 
force 
Vacancies 
Labour 
market 
tightness 
Job 
finding 
rate 
Labour 
productivity 
Unemp+OLF - - -0.782 -0.801 -0.738 -0.672 
Vacancies   1 0.882 0.811 0.855 
Labour market 
tightness 
   1 0.837 0.868 
Job finding 
rate 
    1 0.749 
Labour 
productivity 
     1 
 
Notes: Comments in Table 2.3 apply. 
 
Monthly worker flows using Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) approach 
 E U OLF 
E 0.986 0.004 0.010 
U 0.104 0.727 0.169 
OLF 0.029 0.029 0.942 
Notes: Comments in Table 2.7 apply. 
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3.1 Background and Literature Review 
The business cycle moments of the real wages have been attracting the interest of the 
researchers since the 1930s. The first investigations on the cyclical behaviour of the real wages 
of existing workers date back to the works of Dunlop (1938) and Keynes (1939), followed by 
the contributions later on of Lucas (1977) and Mankiw (1989), who have tried to shed light on 
this issue. However, results have not been conclusive. While Keynes (1939) supported the view 
of countercyclical real wages, empirical evidence provided by Dunlop (1938) showed that real 
wages are procyclical. The other studies mentioned above have found that the real wages can 
be described as weakly procyclical (and often statistically not significant). The main reason 
why these studies have raised critiques lies in the nature of the data used for the analysis, 
basically aggregated time-series data. Indeed, the use of aggregate data has been rising concerns 
since it implies that, on average, the composition of the workforce does not change over the 
business cycle.  
Only with the development of micro-level datasets researchers have been allowed to investigate 
the issue from this different perspective. Bils (1985) and Solon, Barsky and Parker (1994) are 
the most prominent studies taking into account the key role played by workforce compositional 
changes over the business cycle on the fluctuations of real wages. Indeed, if hirings or layoffs 
are not independent outcomes from the type of workers that experiment these events (e.g., 
during expansions low-skilled workers might represent a disproportionate part of employed 
workers, producing a downward bias in the cyclicality of the real wages and vice versa, as 
showed by Barsky, Solon and Parker (1994)), then the presence of compositional changes 
would generate a bias in the estimation of the aggregate real wage (i.e., it is faced the problem 
of composition bias). While the results in Bils (1985) have supported the idea of a significant 
rigidity of real wages of existing workers (with the presence of a higher elasticity for the real 
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wage of job changers, since the estimates show that a fall of one percentage point in the 
unemployment rate would produce an increase in the wage of job changers of 3.5-4 percentage 
points), in Solon, Barsky and Parker (1994) the authors have reported evidence of procyclical 
real wages even among the job stayers, with the individual's real wage growth increasing by 
more than one percentage point when unemployment rate falls by one percentage point. 
A set of additional results can be found in the works of Barlevy (2001) and, Devereaux and 
Hart (2006), who investigate the behaviour of real wages for job changers. Their findings show 
that the real wages of job changers are much more flexible than the real wages of job stayers. 
The interest for the cyclical behaviour of real wages has seen a further resurgence in the very 
recent years, with the seminal contributions of Pissarides (2009) and Haefke, Sonntag and Van 
Rens (2013), followed by the works of Carneiro, Guimares and Portugal (2012), Martins, Solon 
and Thomas (2012), Kudlyack (2014) and Gertler, Huckfeldt and Trigari (2016). However, 
differently from the studies in the past decades, that were developed following an approach 
focused on the behaviour of real wages of ongoing workers and job changers, these latest set of 
papers have devoted much more attention to the behaviour of real wages of newly hired 
workers. The rationale giving rise to this new strand in the literature rests on the debate 
surrounding the empirical validity of the search and matching model (e.g., Mortensen and 
Pissarides, 1994). Following the contributions of Shimer (2005) and Costain and Reiter (2008), 
it has been showed that the standard search and matching model with Nash bargaining wage 
process is unable to replicate the empirical volatilities of unemployment, vacancies and job-
finding rate.16 Introducing a form of aggregate real wages rigidity in the wage bargaining 
                                                          
16   Studies trying to provide a solution to this puzzle are countless. The works cited represent the seminal papers 
dealing with this issue, but substantial contributions have been provided for, and it is an incomplete list yet, by 
Cole and Rogerson (1999), Hall (2005), Hall and Milgrom (2008), Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008), Gertler 
and Trigari (2009), Kennan (2010), Gertler, Huckfeldt and Trigari (2016). 
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process appears to be a reasonable (the empirical values about volatility of real wages are lower 
than those obtained in the standard search models with wages determined through Nash 
bargaining process) and plausible (the search model with a form of real wages rigidity does a 
good job in making the simulated volatilities of all key labour market variables consistent with 
their empirical counterparts) solution to put an end to this controversy. However, as pointed out 
by Haefke, Sonntag and Van Rens (2013), “in a frictional labour market the forward-looking 
variable is the job creation and the amount of jobs that are created depends on the expected 
net present value of real wages over the entire duration of the newly created jobs”. This implies 
that what really matters in the search and matching model is not the behaviour (rectius: rigidity) 
of aggregate real wages, but the behaviour (rectius: rigidity) of the real wages of newly hired 
workers coming from the unemployment state.17 This is the relevant variable able to provide an 
answer to the unemployment volatility puzzle. 
Pissarides (2009) is the first author arguing on the empirical validity of the canonical search 
and matching model as affected by the newly hired workers' wages. He summarizes 
microeconometric evidence about the cyclicality of real wages of newly hired workers as 
opposed to cyclical behaviour of the real wages of the job stayers, since it is the cyclicality of 
the real wages in the individual new matches the key variable able to explain the large empirical 
volatilities in the search and matching model. Results from studies on wage behaviour, 
according to Pissarides, clearly show that wages of job stayers are less procyclical than wages 
of overall workers, thus suggesting the presence of a relevant form of wage elasticity in the new 
jobs. 
                                                          
17  Rudanko (2009) using a directed search model with long-term labour contracts shows that the presence of a 
rigid aggregate real wages is not able to improve considerably the performance of the search model in terms 
of volatilities of unemployment, labour market tightness and job-finding rate. Then, she also argues that the 
variable one should pointing to in order to replicate empirical moments for unemployment, vacancies and job-
finding rate is the hiring real wage. 
 
92 
 
Results from Haefke, Sonntag and Van Rens (2013), who use data from the Current Population 
Survey (CPS), show how the real wages of new hires is more sensitive than the real wages of 
ongoing workers to labour productivity shocks. Their findings show a value close to one as 
regards the elasticity of real wages for new hires, compared to values close to 0.2-0.3 for the 
elasticity of real wages for job stayers. These results are confirmed by Kudlyack (2014), who 
uses data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY). Furthermore, Carneiro, 
Guimares and Portugal (2012) and Martins, Solon and Thomas (2012), both using the same 
employers/employees longitudinal dataset regarding Portugal economy, the Quadros de 
Pessoal, find that the real wages of newly hired workers, using the unemployment rate as the 
aggregate cycle indicator, is strongly procyclical, confirming the results in Haefke, Sonntag and 
Van Rens (2013).18   
All together, the crucial aspect in these studies is that the standard assumption validating the 
search and matching model, i.e., the rigidity of real wages of new hires, is no more retainable.19  
Nevertheless, a different conclusion is suggested by Gertler, Huckfeldt and Trigari (2016), who 
investigate the relationship between real wages and unemployment rate, using data from the 
Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) for the U.S. economy. These authors find 
no signs of a strong procyclicality of real wages of new hires coming from the unemployment 
state. Their findings are based on two inter-related set of arguments: 1) the empirical evidence 
                                                          
18    It has to be mentioned as the results, in these two studies, about the elasticity of real wages of ongoing workers 
are not concordant. While findings in Carneiro, Guimares and Portugal (2012) suggest that the real wages of 
ongoing workers are quite elastic but less procyclical than the real wages of new hires, results in Martins, Solon 
and Thomas (2012) suggest that real wages of job stayers are almost as much procyclical as the real wages of 
new hires. 
19   A subtler issue is: what is the required level of rigidity of real wages able to replicate the empirical volatilities 
for the labour market variables? Martins, Solon and Thomas (2012) and Haefke, Sonntag and Van Rens (2013) 
discuss this issue in their papers. 
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about “cyclical job-upgrading” in worker/employer matches and 2) the role played by workers 
making job to job transitions.  
Indeed, Gertler, Huckfeldt and Trigari (2016) are able to disentangle the unemployment to 
employment transition from the employment to employment transition,20 showing that the 
strong procyclicality of real wages of newly hired workers coming from unemployment 
disappears when job to job movements are taken into account as well. The procyclical 
behaviour of real wages is magnified by the change in the real wages of job changers, but it 
dramatically decreases when it is considered only the group of unemployed workers moving 
into employment. According to Gertler, Huckfeldt and Trigari (2016), the procyclical real 
wages of newly hired workers observed in the previous investigations is due to the presence of 
cyclical job-upgrading, with the substantial higher elasticity of real wages to be intertwined to 
the high wages paid to the workers making job to job transitions, as pointed out by Topel and 
Ward (1992) and Barlevy (2001). In other words, it would happen that in good times employed 
workers, with bad jobs accepted in bad times, look for better, high-paying jobs and they move 
into these new jobs when they are found, producing the substantial procyclicality of real wages, 
while unemployed workers tend to accept each job is offered them when they try to transition 
into the employment state, an event that occurs with a larger probability in good times. This 
implies it is the group of low-skilled unemployed individuals the one more likely to 
transitioning into the employment state. Thus, the procyclicality of the real wages of the new 
hires from unemployment is quite modest, given the large proportion into this group of low-
skilled workers. 
                                                          
20   The authors make use of data from real hour wages paid over time, identifying job changers as individuals 
earning different wages in two consecutive periods. 
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Looking at the dynamics of real wages from this perspective, it comes to light that the effect 
produced from the job to job transitions, together with the change in the quality (upgrading) of 
the jobs offered in the labour market, is to magnify the procyclicality of the real wages for 
newly hired workers. This result clearly affects the empirical validity of the standard search and 
matching model, because the variable researchers are interested in is the elasticity of the real 
wages of newly hired workers coming from the unemployment state and not the elasticity of 
the real wages of workers making job to job transitions. 
However, it is worth noting as the controversy in the literature between these two different 
approaches has been developed along a sharply stylized definition of the labour market. Works 
dealing with the search and matching model have dismissed any complication in the way they 
have traced out the economic structure of their models, embracing the basic assumption 
popularizing the relevance of only two labour market states, employment and unemployment, 
and assuming all new hires come from the unemployment state,21 crossing out the empirical 
classification of workers in three different labour market states: employment, unemployment 
and out-of-labour force, a classification recognizing an autonomous role to out-of-labour force, 
and wiping out the relevance, as suggested by the empirical evidence, of the transitions of 
individuals between the out-of-labour force state and the other two labour market states.22  
Recent literature has stressed the importance of considering the dynamics of the worker flows 
between the three labour market states. Shimer (2013) and Elsby, Hobjin and Sahin (2015) 
clearly show that, despite the prominent role played by the unemployment to employment flow, 
the flow out-of-labour force to employment is definitely crucial in order to get a better 
                                                          
21  Some papers, like Carneiro, Guimares and Portugal (2012), have proposed a different solution, lumping 
together all workers becoming new hires into the general group non-employment, i.e., a group including both 
unemployed and inactive workers. 
22 Conan, Kudlyack and Reed (2012), using CPS data, show that, in levels, the flow out-of-labour force to 
employment is roughly twice as large as the flow unemployment to employment. 
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understanding of the business cycle facts. For example, Elsby, Hobjin and Sahin (2015) show 
that using the benchmark framework with only worker flows between two states, that is, 
employment and unemployment, is misleading in interpreting the volatility of the 
unemployment rate. Indeed, the presence of the unemployment to out-of-labour force and the 
out-of-labour force to unemployment flows account for one-third of the overall cyclicality in 
the unemployment rate, with a more substantial role for the former flow. 
Nevertheless, the view proposed by these two works, despite being potentially more 
informative about the dynamics of the labour market, has not been consistently reiterated in the 
literature, where the majority still makes use of a conservative approach based on a framework 
with only two labour market states.  
All together, the empirical evidence described above shows that a large group of individuals, 
the out-of-labour force workers, consistently moves directly into the employment state each 
month, and this labour market transition produces not second-order effects. However, this 
straight movement is either ignored or swallowed up into the large locked black box called 
“newly hired workers”, which is usually identified as a category absorbing individuals from the 
unemployment state.  
If the new hires are to be considered as individuals with the same preferences, tastes and 
behaviour, differences between new hires coming from unemployment and new hires coming 
from out-of-labour force could be ruled out. However, if new hires coming from out-of-labour 
force are a heterogeneous group compared to new hires coming from unemployment, then the 
current exercise of researchers, pointed to lumping together all workers moving into the 
employment status in the undifferentiated state called non-employment, is methodologically 
flawed.  
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Investigating the cyclicality of the real wages of newly hired workers coming from both out-
of-labour and unemployment, not only put more discipline on the subject per se, but it also adds 
more evidence to the debate on the representative versus heterogeneous agents model, 
providing further support for the development of a valid model able to explain macroeconomic 
facts. 
In this study, I argue that the standard interpretation of the new hires as a homogeneous group 
of workers has to be rejected because the individuals moving from the non-employment state 
to the employment state show a substantial degree of heterogeneity in terms of cyclical 
responsiveness of real wages. Using data from the Survey of Income Program Participation, for 
the period 1996-2013, I find results confirming findings from previous studies, as concerns the 
semi-elasticity of real wages. The real wages for newly hired coming from non-employment 
are more procyclical than the real wages of job stayers. However, these results hold only in a 
setting with staggered wages. Indeed, following the standard approach in the literature 
suggesting that wages are set between six months and one year in advance, I find estimates of 
real wages at lower frequency are values larger than one, accommodating the presence of elastic 
real wages. On the contrary, using measures of wages at higher frequencies imply that a change 
in the unemployment rate shows a substantial lower effect on the procyclicality of the real 
wages. However, and most remarkable for the investigation I carry on in this study, I find that 
the real wages of newly hired workers coming from unemployment are less procyclical than 
the real wages of newly hired workers coming from out-of-labour force and this result is robust 
to different specifications of the model. Including job changers, in the model, produces results 
highlighting the higher procyclicality of real wages for job changers, even if at a lower 
magnitude compared to values in Gertler, Huckfeldt and Trigari (2016) and Barlevy (2001), but 
it does not affect the difference in the semi-elasticity of real wages for the two groups of new 
hires. Furthermore, when I take into account the effect on real wages of a change in the 
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aggregate labour productivity (an alternative aggregate cyclical indicator), I obtain estimates 
confirming previous results as regards the heterogeneity in the elasticity of real wages between 
new hires from out-of-labour force and new hires from unemployment. 
The chapter is developed as follows. Section 3.2 presents the dataset with the description of 
data. In Section 3.3, I discuss the empirical methodology used to investigate the relationship 
between wages and the cyclical indicators for different groups of workers and results are 
reported from the sensitivity analysis I perform. In Section 3.4, I test the robustness of my 
results. In Section 3.5, I examine the empirical relevance of the newly hired workers from out-
of-labour force. Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2 The Dataset 
3.2.1   The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) 
The data used to investigate the behaviour of real wages stems from the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation (SIPP), which is administered by the U.S. Census Bureau.  
The SIPP is a nationally representative longitudinal survey based on a stratified multi-stage 
random sample. The sample consists of civilian, non-institutionalized U.S. households. The 
interview process is conducted on each member of the household,23  who is at least 15 years 
old, and the individuals who live with them. Information is nevertheless collected for all the 
individuals who live in the households without any limitation in terms of age. 
More precisely, the SIPP can described as a collection of panels going through 1984 to 2008. 
The initial panels started each year since 1984 and they roughly covered a period of 32 months. 
                                                          
23 Individuals are followed in the panel even in the case that they move to a different address. 
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This structure produced the existence of overlap panels since a new panel was drawn at the 
beginning of each year (usually February), while the other panels drew in the previous years 
were run at the same moment. Each panel included a sample of around 12,000 households and 
roughly 30,000 individuals. 
This general structure and methodology of the SIPP faced a large change in the 1996. New 
panels starting in 1996 show an increase in the sample size (households that are regularly 
interviewed in each wave have moved from 21,823 units in the 1993 panel to 40,188 units in 
the 1996 panel, and finally to 52,031 units in the 2008 panel), an increase in the average length 
of the panels (the 1996 panel runs for 12 waves, the 2001 panel runs for 9 waves, the 2004 panel 
runs for 12 waves and the 2008 panel runs for 16 waves. This implies that the last four panels 
cover roughly a period between thirty-six and sixty months) and the drop of the overlapping 
panel structure (each panel starts after the previous one has been completed).  
In this study, I use only data coming from the panels after the change in 1995, i.e.: 1996-2001-
2004 and 2008. 
The structure of the SIPP panels is as such: in each panel all the sampled individuals included 
into a household are interviewed every four months. The SIPP divides each panel into four sub-
samples and each sub-sample is referred to as a rotation group. These four rotation groups enter 
the SIPP survey at different points in time.24  Respondents provide information about their lives 
during the previous four months, which are referred to as the reference months.25  
                                                          
24  For example, for the 2008 SIPP panel, the entry months for these rotation groups are, respectively, May, June, 
July and August 2008, respectively. 
25  This implies that the collection of information is made retrospectively, a feature that helps to somewhat 
overcome the problem of left-censoring. The information provided for the four months is thus contained in 
what is called a reference wave. 
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The information relevant for the investigation I carry out in this study is collected in the SIPP 
module called core wave files.26  
The core module files are run each four months and they provide information on individuals' 
labour market history (e.g., labour market state, occupation, industry, class of workers, etc.), 
earnings/income, demographic characteristics (e.g., age, gender, race, marital status, 
education), participation to public programs supporting household income (such as Social 
Security and Food Stamps) and other additional variables.27  
Information on the labour market state the individuals belong to is collected at a higher 
frequency, usually weekly or monthly, compared to other datasets. However, for some variables 
information is collected for one month and then the value is reported for the other three months 
forming a wave.  
The advantages of the SIPP over similar data sources such as the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID), National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NYLS) and British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS) is that the questionnaires collect a broader range of information 
concerning labour market history (at a higher frequency), it contains a larger sample 
interviewed each panel compared to the other two datasets, and there is evidence of a very low 
presence of attrition and measurement errors. 
 
                                                          
26  For the sake of completeness it must be reported how the SIPP offers a second type of files called topical 
module files collecting information on aspects related, broadly, to the following categories: assets and 
liabilities, well-being expenses, material hardship measures, fertility history, medical expenses, retirement 
plan, children support, welfare reforms, disability statistics and other minor variables, and a third type of file 
as well, the longitudinal research file, which contains information on all the waves of a panel. 
27  Regarding labour market data, information on occupation, industry, employer identification, starting and 
ending date for the job, up to two main jobs, is collected as well. 
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3.2.2     Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
A description of the characteristics of the sample, in terms of the main variables, is 
provided in Table 3.1.  The sample includes all individuals in the SIPP with age above 15 and 
below 65. Individuals with mental and physical disabilities, retired, in armed forces, running 
one or more business and working in the non-private sector are removed from the sample.28 In 
order to correct for outliers and top-coding I remove from the sample the 1 percent of top and 
bottom observations. Table 3.1 reports mean and the standard deviation for variables related to 
individual demographic characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, marital status together with 
education. More precisely, the summary statistics presented in Table 3.1 are obtained for the 
model including job stayers, new hires from unemployment, new hires from out-of-labour force 
and the group of job changers, defined as the individuals with an intra-monthly job to job 
transition detected by the presence of either a weekly spell of non-employment or a change in 
the starting date of the job between two consecutive periods in the employment state. Summary 
statistics for the job stayers are provided in column 1. Columns 2 and 3 report the descriptive 
statistics for newly hired workers from unemployment and newly hired from out-of-labour 
force. Columns 4 reports statistics for job changers.  
This is the benchmark case investigated in this chapter. However, I also estimate the model 
with different specifications of the groups of workers. This implies the construction of the 
variables described above can show quantitative differences. For this reason I provide in 
Appendix C, Table 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4, the summary statistics for three alternatives scenarios: 1) 
the case with only job stayers and newly hired workers from a large group called non-
employment; 2) the case with job stayers, newly hired from unemployment and newly hired 
                                                          
28  The sample selection procedure specified above produces the drop of 678,708 observations for the 1996 
panel, 442,891 observations for the 2001 panel, 620,637 observations for the 2004 panel and 616,620 
observations for the 2008 panel. 
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from out-of-labour force; 3) the case with job stayers, newly hired workers from 
unemployment, newly hired workers from out-of-labour force and job changers, with this last 
group defined as individuals making a job to job movement with one month’s spell of non-
employment between two consecutive periods into employment.  
As showed by Fujita and Moscarini (2013), there is clear evidence in the SIPP of the presence 
of recalls. Even if summary statistics for this group of individuals are not reported in Tables 3.1 
and 3.4 (the model specifications taking into account this additional group of workers are only 
those whose results are reported in these two tables), I find an overall value of 24,740 recalls 
spanned in the 1996-2013 period for the benchmark case including job stayers, new hires from 
unemployment, new hires from out-of-labour force and job changers.29 The procedure bringing 
to the construction of the category recalls is described in Appendix A.   
On average, the summary statistics show a slightly prevalence of men in all the groups but 
newly hired workers from inactivity, with the highest value reported for the case of newly hired 
workers from unemployment, close to 60 percent. Individuals transitioning from out-of-labour 
force to employment are those with the lowest value for age, roughly 30 years, and this makes 
the individuals from this group, on average, five years younger than the newly hired from 
unemployment. Job changers (not experimenting one month's break in their employment 
history) are the second younger group of individuals with, on average, 31 years. Labour market 
experience presents large variations between the different groups. Indeed, as it could be 
expected, the lowest value is registered for the out-of-labour force group (9 years), while the 
highest value is for the ongoing workers (17 years) followed by the newly hired from the 
unemployment state (14 years). The value for this group is even larger than that of job changers. 
                                                          
29  Values of recalls are spread over the four panel. It is possible to identify 6,940 recalls in the 1996 panel, 4,760 
recalls in the 2001 panel, 6,252 recalls in the 2004 panel and 6,788 recalls in the 2008 panel.   
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As regards the variable marital status, one can observe that the new hires from out-of-labour 
force are largely single individuals, while ongoing workers are largely involved into a stable 
relationship within a household. Indeed, the statistics show that 60 percent of the members of 
the former group are single against a value of 33 percent for the job stayers. However, 
individuals making job to job transitions are also more likely to be singles, with a value close 
to 50 percent. It is interesting to notice the higher likelihood to be single is a feature shared by 
the new hired from unemployment as well, with a value close to 45 percent.    
One can also observe how, on average, the largest proportion of each group is made by whites, 
with values above 80 percent. Finally, I find that the job stayers are the group with the largest 
level of highly educated individuals (16 percent for the education level: University). However, 
the newly hired from out-of-labour force also consist of a large fraction of highly educated 
individuals, with values for the two highest educational levels, i.e. university and less than 
university, around to 47 percent, while the newly hired workers from unemployment result as 
the less educated, with a value for education at the two highest level around to 42 percent. 
Furthermore, the value for the lowest level of education is similar between all the three groups 
of new hires (job changers are also included in this case),  around 20 percent, while it is below 
15 percent for the ongoing workers. Finally, one can observe how the (hourly) real wage is 
higher for job stayers than for the individuals in other groups as it is expected. 
In Table 3.5, Appendix C, I also report the summary statistics for the two raw groups of unemployed 
and out-of-labour force. This exercise is performed in order to highlight potential differences in terms 
of demographic characteristics between the two groups. Clearly, the unemployed and inactive workers 
included in this descriptive analysis are only those that experiment, at least one time, a movement into 
employment. Looking at the values for the case where it is taken into account only the unemployed and 
out-of-labour force male groups, it can be observed how the values for labour market experience and 
age are larger for the unemployed compared to the inactive individuals. The unemployed result also 
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more educated than the out-of-labour force since only 24 percent of all members of the former group 
have less than high school education, while the value is 40 percent for inactive workers. Differences are 
less evident when the female groups are taken into account. In this case, the gap for labour market 
experience is smaller and there is no substantial difference in terms of high level of education (i.e., 
university and less than university). Panel B reports values for the different age groups. Columns (1) 
and (2) present statistics for the case of young workers, i.e. individuals in the aging 16-24. In this case, 
statistics for labour market experience and education are not very informative. Values are very similar. 
When one considers workers in their prime age, it is possible to observe that out-of-labour force 
individuals result more highly educated (56 percent) than unemployed individuals (50 percent). Finally, 
in Panel C, it is showed that unemployed are made up of a larger proportion of skilled individuals (25 
percent) compared to inactive workers (19 percent) and that unemployed show a large presence in 
industry sectors such as construction and manufacturing compared to out-of-labour force workers (24 
percent vs 14 percent), while inactive workers are largely present in services (e.g., food services and 
accommodation and retail trade) compared to unemployed (41 percent vs 30 percent). 
 [INSERT TABLE 3.1 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 3.6 dicusses the correlation between the variables. One can see that wages and 
demographic variables show the standard correlations with the variables representing the four 
different groups of workers populating the labour market. Wages are positively correlated with 
both age and labour market experience and education for the highest level (i.e., university), 
while they are negatively correlated with the marital status single. Furthermore,  one can 
observe there is a positive correlation between real wage and the category job stayers, while the 
correlation is small and negative between the real wage and the categories job changers and 
newly hired workers (either from unemployment or out-of-labour force).  
[INSERT TABLE 3.6 ABOUT HERE] 
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3.3  Empirical methodology 
3.3.1   The Standard Approach: The Sensitivity of Real Wages of Newly Hired Workers   
coming from the Non-Employment Group 
The model that will be used to study the response of individual real wages to changes in 
aggregate conditions is a wage equation, similar to the econometric specification proposed by 
Bils (1985).  
The baseline equation is  
 log(𝜔𝑖𝑡) = 𝜒𝑖 + 𝒙𝒊𝒕
′ 𝛽1 + 𝛾
𝑢𝑢𝑡 + 𝛾𝜑
𝑛𝑒𝜄 + 𝛾𝜓
𝑛𝑒𝜄𝑢𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 (1) 
where ωit is the real hourly wage of individual i at time t, χi is an individual fixed effect, xit is a 
vector including time-varying individual level characteristics such as marital status, labour 
market experience and its square, and education, ut is the cyclical aggregate indicator (in this 
case, the unemployment rate), ι is a dummy variable equals to one if the worker is a newly hired 
and zero otherwise and eit is a zero-mean random term with constant variance.
30   
The key parameters are 𝛾𝑢, 𝛾𝜑
𝑛𝑒 and 𝛾𝜓
𝑛𝑒. While 𝛾𝑢 can be interpreted as the semi-elasticity of 
real wages with respect to the unemployment rate, 𝛾𝜓
𝑛𝑒can be interpreted as the extra differential 
in the semi-elasticity of the real wages with respect to the unemployment rate for new hires and,  
finally, 𝛾𝜑
𝑛𝑒  is to be interpreted as capturing the change in the labour market state for newly 
hired workers, i.e., the movement from non-employment to employment. One can consider the 
sum of the two coefficients, 𝛾𝑢 and 𝛾𝜓
𝑛𝑒, as expressing the overall semi-elasticity of the real 
wages with respect to the unemployment rate for new hires. 
                                                          
30   The model estimated in all sections includes also a dummy variable for the year and state. 
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Results from previous studies show there exists a negative relationship between real wages of 
newly hired workers and unemployment rate, with the values for the semi-elasticity of real 
wages close or larger than one,31 while the same relationship for all workers is less elastic,32 
indicating the presence of a lower procyclicality in the real wages of ongoing workers, since 
the larger proportion of job stayers in the overall working population compared to the small 
amount of newly hired workers. 
I proceed by estimating the above equation using data from the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation. The advantage of the SIPP dataset on the widespread employers/employees 
datasets, such as the one used by Carneiro, Guimares and Portugal (2012) and Martins, Solon 
and Thomas (2012), the “Quadros de Pessoal”, is given by the suitable property of the SIPP to 
record the labour market state the newly hired workers are coming from. Indeed, in the matched 
employers/employees datasets there is no detailed information about the labour market history 
of the newly hired workers before their inclusion in the dataset and this implies that this kind 
of dataset cannot properly address the issue I investigate in this study.33 
Moreover, a further advantage of the SIPP is also the fact that the questions concerning the 
labour market state each individual finds herself in different periods of time is associated with 
an answer that provides information at a very high frequency. Indeed, individuals are usually 
observed in the labour market state at a weekly and monthly frequency.  
                                                          
31   The procyclical behaviour of real wages for newly hired workers, when the aggregate indicator is the aggregate 
labour productivity, has been showed by Haefke, Sonntag and Van Rens (2013). 
32  An important exception, as it has been previously mentioned, is Martins, Solon and Thomas (2012), where there 
is no evidence of a significant difference in the procyclicality of real wages of both groups of workers. 
33  More precisely, the employers/employees dataset can collect information for the job changers, since these 
workers were already registered in a match with a firm, but they do not provide in-depth details on new hires 
coming from non-employment history. 
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I propose a monthly estimation since, as said above, the high frequency nature of the records in 
the dataset allows for wages and employment status to be both measured at monthly frequency.  
The transition in the employment state is measured as follows: I consider a newly hired worker 
as an individual with a tenure of four consecutive months after a spell of non-employment, as 
in Gertler, Huckfeldt and Trigari (2016). In this section, I do not differentiate for the non-
employment state the newly hired workers are coming from (either unemployment or out-of-
labour force), but I lump together unemployed workers and out-of-labour force workers into 
the same group, the so-called non-employment group (I will deal with this issue, i.e., the 
construction of the two different groups of new hires next section).  
Finally, some points about the identification of the category newly hired workers, the 
construction of the wage variable, i.e., the dependent variable, and the structure by which data 
on this last variable are collected in the SIPP must be discussed. The last two points are 
discussed below, while the procedure to construct the newly hired worker variable is discussed 
in the Appendix B. 
As regards the construction of the variable wage, three different aspects deserve a more in-
depth analysis. 
Firstly, since it is generally stated that wages are set between six months and one year in 
advance, this implies that there is a lagged relationship between real wages and unemployment 
rate. I deal with this problem by using both lags. I define as CGP model the case where I use 
the aggregate cyclical indicator with one year lag, since this time specification is that used by 
Carneiro, Guimares and Portugal (2012) to estimate their model. On the contrary, I define as 
GHT model the case where I use an aggregate cyclical indicator with a six months lag, because 
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this time specification resembles (even if it is not perfectly similar) that used by Gertler, 
Heckfeldt and Trigari (2016). 
Secondly, wages are either directly defined in terms of hourly pay rate by using SIPP data34 or 
I define them in the same terms using information on monthly job-specific earnings and job-
specific hours worked. Indeed, the SIPP does not collect values for the variable defining the 
hourly wage paid in a wave for all four months it consists of, but the value is collected just once 
and then reported for the other three months. This implies that in a wave it is observed for all 
four months the same value for the hourly wage paid. On the contrary, the SIPP provides 
information on the gross monthly wage paid to the workers each month.35 Unfortunately, the 
SIPP does not provide information on the number of hours worked in each of the four months 
that makes a wave, but information on the overall worked monthly hours is obtained through 
the variable EJBHRS that usually collects information on hours worked each week, but only 
for one month, and then this value is reported for the other three months included in the 
reference wave.36 Then there exists a reliable information only for one month, which implies 
that one could not use it together with information on the gross monthly paid wage to get an 
hourly wage paid for all four months of a wave. Thus, to settle this issue I follow Gertler, 
Huckfeldt and Trigari (2016) that propose to estimate the model on the hourly wage reported 
in the fourth month.37 I set the wages for all the months into a wave equal to that obtained 
through the interview process. This implies an artificial level of rigidity for the wage at the 
                                                          
34   This information is identified in the SIPP through the variable TPYRATE1 and TPYRATE2, since the SIPP 
collects information up to two main jobs. The variable TPYRATE, in general, reports values for the regular 
hourly pay rate. 
35   This information is identified in the SIPP through the variable TPMSUM1 and TPMSUM2, since the SIPP 
collects information up to two main jobs. The variable TPMSUM, in general, reports values for monthly gross 
pay before deductions. 
36  The variable EJBHRS1 and EJBHRS2 report values for hours worked per week at the main and second job. 
37  The hourly wage in the fourth month is the value obtained either through the variable TPYRATE or through 
the use of the variables TPMSUM and EJBHRS, with this last variable multiplied by 4.3 (number of weeks in 
a month) to make it a consistent information at monthly level. 
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intra-wave level. However, if I want to test the model using a consistent measure for wage, it 
can be observed that using the value reported for the wage in the fourth month is a more reliable 
option than just relying on all the values reported at the beginning of the employment history, 
where it can be expected that the wage for a newly hired workers is quite volatile and it takes 
time to get settled. I think that four months is a period of time that can be considered a good 
approximation of this process.  
Furthermore, I do not expect that wages of newly hired workers can initially benefit from 
overtime pay or further benefits that can substantially affect it, thus I have reasons to believe 
the correction method proposed should approximate quite well the dynamics of the true wage, 
i.e., I believe that four months is not a period of time in which it is reasonable to observe large 
fluctuations due to permanent changes in the level of wages paid.  
A different matter is whether this procedure can fit well with the dynamic of the wage for 
ongoing workers. In this last case, it could be possible to observe intra-wave changes due to 
permanent changes in the status of the workers, but I still believe the above procedure can work 
even in this case given the short period of time (four months) taken into account. Finally, the 
problem of the effects of this “artificial” wage rigidity does not rise in the case I deal with job 
changers since, as it will be discussed later on, since for that case I will implement a correction 
procedure strategy allowing to differentiate the wage of the job changers in the reference wave, 
in order to capture its elasticity. 
The other point it is needed to be discussed here concerns the “seam bias” effect. The structure 
of the SIPP is such that information are retrospectively collected every four months. Then, it 
happens that changes in variables, for example new occupation or differentials in wages, are 
often observed to the seam rather than between the four months of a wave. This phenomenon 
is quite pervasive for the SIPP and it is well-documented. However, in the present investigation 
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I am able to deal with labour market transitions at the monthly level and changes in wages at 
the monthly level for job changers are also constructed. Thus, results should not be seriously 
affected by this problem.    
I estimate this relationship by using the fixed effects estimator.38 Since the results from the two 
different estimators show no substantial differences, I will discuss in this work the findings 
obtained by using the fixed-effects estimator. Indeed, the standard approach in the literature, as 
regards the use of these two different estimators, i.e., the fixed-effects estimator and the first-
difference estimator, is based on the analysis of the different properties of the error term. A low 
serial correlation of the error term is a result that favours the use of the fixed-effects estimator. 
Since this is the case in the present study, I will focus mainly on the results obtained by using 
this estimator.  
The overall number of observations in the dataset are 2,504,475, with 2,490,645 individuals 
identified as job stayers and the overall number of observations for newly hired workers from 
non-employment is 14,120.39  Real wages are obtained by deflating wages for the monthly Price 
and Consumption Expenditure (PCE) Index and, are finally, expressed in logs. The 
unemployment rate is measured by using data from the Current Population Survey for civilian 
non-institutional workers in U.S. aged 16-64, including both men and women.  
[INSERT TABLE 3.8 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                          
38   The model is estimated with the first-difference estimator as a robustness check. Results are not significantly 
different from those obtained with the fixed-effects estimator. 
39 See Table 3.7. I do not consider recalls or job changers in this first exercise. The estimations include the state 
dummy variable with the reference category state1 (Arizona). However, results are not reported in the table, 
but are available upon request. The reference category for gender, race, marital status, education and year are, 
respectively, male, white, single, university, 1997 and 2011. The variable education is defined from the lowest 
level to the highest as 1) less than high school, 2) high school, 3) less than university. The variable marital 
status defined for married includes both cases with and without the spouse in the household. 
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From the results showed in Table 3.8, one can observe that, dealing with the two different time 
specifications for the wage setting process, it is possible to explain the different results produced 
in the literature (procyclical real wages for Carneiro, Guimares and Portugal (2012) and 
Martins, Solon and Thomas (2012) contra acyclical real wages for Gertler, Huckfeldt and 
Trigari (2016)). Estimates from the GHT model are roughly similar to those found by Gertler, 
Huckfeldt and Trigari (2016). Indeed, I find a percentage value of -0.202 as regards the semi-
elasticity of real wages of job stayers and of -0.227 percentage points for the semi-elasticity of 
the real wage of marginal workers, compared to the estimates of -0.160 and -0.155 found by 
Gertler, Huckfeldt and Trigari (2016).  
Thus, confronting our findings with those in Gertler, Huckfeldt and Trigari (2016), which is the 
most straightforward comparison study because of the spirit of their work is the closest to this 
study, I can speculate that the difference is likely to be due to the different length of the sample 
investigated and to the different methodology used in this chapter. In fact, their results are 
obtained on a dataset spanning from 1990 to 2014, while the dataset used in this work spans 
from 1996 to 2013. Furthermore, they define as job stayers only those workers receiving a wage 
and as new hires those workers who receive a wage after a period without any employment 
payment, while I define the ongoing workers as workers, but new hires, who are recorded as 
having a job, and new hires as workers moving from a labour market state different from 
employment straight on the employment state.40  
On the other hand, when I use the CGP model, results are close to those in Carneiro, Guimares 
and Portugal (2012) and Martins, Solon and Thomas (2012), since I obtain a percentage value 
for the semi-elasticity of real wages of job stayers equal to -1.452, but I also observe the 
                                                          
40   Moreover, I consider both men and women in the sample used in this work and in the aging range 16-64, while 
Gertler,  Huckfeldt and Trigari (2016) consider only men in a smaller aging period (i.e., 20-64). 
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presence of a procyclical incremental effect for the wage of new hires, which brings about an 
overall value of -1.704 percentage points, compared to -2.20 found in Carneiro, Guimares and 
Portugal (2012) and -1.8 found in Martins, Solon and Thomas (2012).41 These results confirm 
the presence of a more procyclical real wages for new hires, even if some differences still persist 
compared to estimates from other works.  
One question is thus left on the table: how can one justify the difference in the values for the 
semi-elasticity of wages with the two different specifications for the explanatory variable? As 
implicitly suggested by Gertler, Huckfeldt and Trigari (2016), it seems that the different data-
frequency used in the estimations (yearly data for Carneiro, Guimares and Portugal, 2012, and 
Martins, Solon and Thomas, 2012, but a higher data-frequency for Gertler, Huckfeldt and 
Trigari, 2016) can rationalize this puzzle. Indeed, one can speculate there is evidence of 
staggered wages and the higher elasticity found in the case of one year lag, compared with the 
case of six months lag, tends to reinforce the idea that at a lower frequencies a larger fraction 
of wage contracts adjust for the changes in the prices and this produces a higher elasticity of 
wages.      
3.3.2     A New Approach: The Sensitivity of Real Wages of Newly Hired Workers coming 
from Unemployment and Newly Hired Workers coming from Out-of-Labour Force 
While a lot of interest has been showed for the sensitivity of real wages of newly hired 
workers to changes in the aggregate cyclical indicator, a more detailed analysis on what a newly 
hired worker is has been dismissed by researchers. Reviewing the literature on the subject, one 
can observe a certain degree of heterogeneity in the way authors have approached the matter. 
                                                          
41  This value in Martins, Solon and Thomas (2012) is not clearly specified, but it can be inferred by the broad 
explanation provided by the authors about the non significant difference between the two values for the two 
elasticities. 
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Carneiro, Guimares and Portugal (2012) define the new hires as workers coming from non-
employment, with less than twelve months of tenure in their job. They characterize this category 
lumping together individuals coming from unemployment, out-of-labour force, public and 
business sector. Martins, Solon and Thomas (2012) define the category as those workers with 
no more than four months of tenure with the firm. However, they connect this criteria with a 
sample selection that is based on the “port-of-entry” jobs strategy, i.e., they select a set of jobs 
in which firms are observed over time to hire new workers. Moreover, they impose some 
constraints on the size of these firms in terms of workers employed, and on the category of 
workers, lumping together workers with the “same job” into eight categories.  Haefke, Sonntag 
and Van Rens (2013) define new hires as those individuals with at least one out of three previous 
months, before observing their current wage (i.e., being registered as employed), spent into 
unemployment. However, they allow for job to job transitions in the way they define newly 
hired workers. Gertler, Huckfeldt and Trigari (2016) consider only men and define the new 
hires as those individuals, who are in the first four months of their tenure on a job, coming from 
a period of unemployment, but they introduce some different time intervals in order to control 
for job to job transitions. 
It is clear that the current research has focused mainly on the unemployment state as the 
reference labour market state and this is consistent with the framework used by Shimer (2005) 
to describe the unemployment volatility puzzle. However, it must be stressed that the flow into 
employment cannot be reduced to the movements from unemployment to employment only. A 
much richer dynamics is present and it involves direct flows into employment from both 
unemployment and out-of-labour force. As observed by Krusell, Mukoyama, Rogerson and 
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Sahin (2016) the out-of-labour force to employment flow is an order of magnitude greater than 
the unemployment to employment flow, when measured in levels.42 
If the purpose of empirical evidence is to put more discipline on the matter, this means that 
neither considering newly hired workers as a homogeneous group of workers coming from the 
locked box “non-employment” nor assuming that only those workers coming from 
unemployment are to be considered as newly hired workers is the correct approach. In this 
section, I disentangle the large group of new hires from non-employment in the two groups: 
newly hired workers coming from unemployment and newly hired workers coming from out-
of-labour force.  
The contribution of this study is mainly directed to shed light on the cyclicality behaviour of 
the real wages of newly hired workers, conditional to the labour market state the workers are 
coming from. However, this work also aims at adding more evidence to the debate on the 
representative versus heterogeneous agent(s) model. Remarkable differences in the 
responsiveness of real wages for newly hired workers coming from different labour market 
states would imply substantial divergences in the behaviour of the individuals belonging to 
these two groups supporting the need for heterogeneous agents model in order to explain the 
dynamics of the labour market variables. 
To study the response of individual real wages to changes in aggregate conditions when one 
consider flows from both unemployment and out-of-labour force into employment, I still make 
use of a wage equation specified as follows:  
                                                          
42  Canon, Kudlyack and Reed (2012) confirm these results for the period 2002-2012. They also show that the   
ratio out-of-labour force to employment over unemployment to employment is strongly procyclical. 
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 log(𝜔𝑖𝑡) = 𝜒𝑖 + 𝒙𝒊𝒕
′ 𝛽1 + 𝛾
𝑢𝑢𝑡 + 𝛾𝜓
𝑢,𝑒𝜄𝑢𝑡 + 𝛾𝜓
𝑜𝑙𝑓,𝑒𝜄𝑢𝑡 + 𝛾𝜑
𝑢,𝑒𝜄 + 𝛾𝜑
𝑜𝑙𝑓,𝑒𝜄
+ 𝑒𝑖𝑡                                                            
(2) 
The change in the structure of the standard equation just takes into account the possibility newly 
hired workers can come from different labour market states, not only from the unemployment 
state.  
Following the notation introduced in equation (1), I have the new parameters for the newly 
hired workers from unemployment, γψu,e and γφu,e, and the newly hired workers from out-of-
labour force, γψolf,e  and γφolf,e. More precisely, the parameters γψu,e and γψolf,e  can be interpreted 
as the extra differentials in the semi-elasticity of real wages with respect to unemployment for 
new hires coming from, respectively, unemployment and out-of-labour force, while the 
parameters γφu,e and γφolf,e can be interpreted as the change in the state for newly hired workers, 
i.e., the movements from unemployed to employed and from out-of-labour force to 
employment. 
As in the previous section, I define a worker either as a newly hired workers from 
unemployment or as a newly hired workers from out-of-labour force according to the different 
labour market state the worker is coming from and conditional to the fact the worker has 
experimented at least a period of tenure on the job of four (consecutive) months. 
A crucial issue for the current investigation is that related to the presence of individuals moving 
backward and forward between unemployment and out-of-labour force before finding a job. In 
this case, I need a criteria to identify the relevant labour market state the newly hired workers 
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are coming from. The approach followed in this study is to consider only the labour market 
state the individual is registered at in the last period (i.e., last month) before finding a job.43  
I present the results in Table 3.10. In this case, the dataset includes 10,300 observations for new 
hires coming from unemployment and 3,820 observations for new hires coming from out-of-
labour force, while the number of observations for job stayers are 2,490,645.44   
[INSERT TABLE 3.10 ABOUT HERE] 
Results for the semi-elasticity of real wages for job stayers and for new hires are not 
significantly different from those reported in previous works. 
Using the GHT specification, I obtain a percentage value for the semi-elasticity of wages for 
job stayers of -0.204 and a percentage value of -1.454 when I use the CGP model, which are 
both pretty similar to the set of results I obtained with the previous model specification.  
However, the most striking fact consists in the significant difference in the behaviour of real 
wages for new hires coming from unemployment and new hires coming from out-of-labour 
force. One can, indeed, observe that the semi-elasticities of real wages for new hires coming 
from out-of-labour force and unemployment, when I use the GHT specification, are equal to -
0.328 and to -0.194 percentage points, respectively, while with the CGP specification, the semi-
elasticity of real wages for new hires coming from unemployment is equal to -1.573 and that 
for new hires from out-of-labour force is equal to -2.201 percentage points.45  
                                                          
43    Results from a model with the alternative scenario, i.e., removing from the sample the individuals transitioning 
between the two non-employment groups before finding a job, are not significantly different from those 
reported in Table 3.10. 
44  See Table 3.9 for a detailed description of the different groups of workers, when it is distinguished between job 
stayers, new hires coming from unemployment and new hires coming from out-of-labour force. 
45  The coefficient for the incremental effect of the semi-elasticity of real wage for new hires from out-of-labour 
force is significant at the 1%, while the coefficient for the incremental effect of the semi-elasticity of real wage 
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This implies that there exists a substantial wedge between the two measures of the semi-
elasticity of real wages for the new hires belonging to the two different groups, with the real 
wages for new hires coming from out-of-labour force more procyclical than the real wages for 
new hires coming from unemployment.    
Interpreting these last results is crucial, because they show the presence of heterogeneity 
between the two groups of new hires. One could argue that, in good times, as described by 
several papers in the literature (e.g., Bils, 1985, and Solon, Barsky and Parker, 1994) individuals 
transitioning from the unemployment state to the employment state are the low-quality ones, 
because in periods of expansion of the economic activity, these workers search for a job and 
they are more likely to find it (i.e., the probability to find a job for low-skilled workers is higher 
in good times rather than in bad times) and filling a substantial amount of vacancies 
(compositional workforce bias). The wage for these workers shows a lower degree of 
procyclicality, since it is likely to reflect a low-quality of the same jobs, thus resulting in “low-
paying jobs”. How can one rationalize the presence of a more elastic real wage for new hires 
coming from out-of-labour force compared to new hires coming from unemployment? In this 
case, it might be inferred that in bad times the individuals in the out-of-labour force state 
entering the employment state are the low-quality ones, because in downturns this is the group 
of inactive individuals that starts to search for a job in order to smooth consumption at the 
household level. In other words, in bad times, when the marginal value of income is high, the 
out-of-labour force workforce looking for a job is made up of low-skilled workers, who find 
and accept a job, in an attempt to insure the household against the consumption risk (which is 
higher in recession than in boom). On the other side, when there is an economic expansion, 
there is a large participation of high-quality out-of-labour force workers since their probability 
                                                          
for newly hired worker from unemployment is not significant. The coefficient for the semi-elasticity of real 
wage for job stayers is significant at the 1%. 
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of finding a better paid job is higher and this explains the possibility for new hires from out-of-
labour force to get a more procyclical wage. 
The different composition of workforces as regards new hires from unemployment and new 
hires from out-of-labour force is a further feature that sharply hinder the reduction of the newly 
hired workers from the two different non-employment states to just one category. It is 
interesting to notice that the presence of high-quality inactive workers in booms tends to 
reinforce the procyclical effect of real wages since it counterbalances the negative effect 
produced by the compositional shift in the unemployed group towards low-skilled workers. 
3.3.3   An Extension of the New Approach: The Introduction of the Job Changers  
Despite the strong focus in this chapter on the differentiation between new hires coming 
from unemployment and new hires coming from out-of-labour force, it has to be taken into 
account the fact that a recent literature (Gertler, Huckfeldt and Trigari, 2016) has emphasized 
the role played by the job changers as the variable able to capture a very large part of the 
procyclicality behaviour of the real wage observed in the previous estimates. Whilst past papers 
have considered the new hires as workers coming from a “broad” unemployment state, and 
consequently looking at their wages as the relevant variable to be taken into account in order to 
explain the unemployment volatility puzzle, Gertler, Huckfeldt and Trigari (2016) have 
challenged this methodological approach. More precisely, these authors argue that the 
substantial cyclicality of real wages for new hires coming from unemployment disappears when 
job to job transitions are included in the model. The rationale for this approach stems from the 
fact it appears that job changers is the group of workers who experiments the benefits of a 
cyclical job-upgrading. Following results provided by Topel and Ward (1992), and Barlevy 
(2001), they find evidence of a strong procyclicality of real wages for job changers, with values 
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for their semi-elasticity of real wage higher than those observed for the real wage of new hires 
coming from unemployment by roughly a factor of ten. 
Although this group of workers does not provide any direct indication to identify or affect the 
distinction between the two groups of workers of interest for us, i.e., new hires coming from 
unemployment and new hires coming from out-of-labour force, it is nevertheless significant to 
make the model informationally more efficient. In this sense, including the job changers into 
another group would produce biased estimations and excluding them from the model would 
produce a significant misspecification of the same.  
To address these concerns, I re-estimate the model as defined in the previous section but with 
the inclusion of job changers.  
However, measuring job to job transitions is both methodologically and analytically 
challenging. Regarding the former point, one can observe that it is often not clear who the job 
changers are. Broadly speaking, job changers could be described as either workers that make 
an infra-monthly transition from one job to another, such that they do not experiment any non-
employment spell in the transition between these two different jobs, or as workers that transition 
from one job to another spending a relatively small spell as non-employed. Indeed, by looking 
at the empirical evidence, it is possible to observe the presence of institutional and legal frictions 
that can produce a spell of non-employment in the transition between the previous and the new 
job. 
For the purpose of this chapter, I develop a model dealing with both specifications.46 To be 
more precise, I construct the category job changers by assuming this group is made up of, 
                                                          
46  Haefke, Sonntag and Van Rens (2013) have suggested that the two groups of potential job changers could 
represent different groups of workers, with different preferences and characteristics. Hence, it makes sense to 
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alternatively, a) workers making infra-monthly job to job transitions without observing any 
non-employment spell (E'E' job changers), b) workers making infra-monthly job to job 
transitions but with at least one week's non-employment spell (and no more than three weeks' 
non-employment spell), i.e., there are individuals that are registered as employed in two 
consecutive months but with the presence of a short spell of non-employment in between (EE 
job changers), and c) workers who make a job to job transitions with one month's non-
employment spell in the job change process (E∄E job changers), hence I look at individuals 
who have not been registered as employed in two consecutive months. 
While the category job changers as defined by letter c) is not difficult to be constructed, since 
it can be considered like a special case of the category newly hired workers with only one 
month's spell of non-employment, substantial problems rise as regards the reliability of the 
information provided by the data sets in order to identify job changers, with reference to the 
letter a) and b). Usually data sets are not very efficient in identifying and reporting job to job 
transitions at high frequency. However, the particular structure of the SIPP makes it also 
possible to identify these two categories of job changers. I construct the category job changers 
as defined by letter b) using the variable RWKESR, which identifies the labour market state 
individual belongs to at weekly frequency. Hence, the category EE job changers is obtained by 
looking at the presence of at least one week's spell of non-employment (and no more than three 
weeks' spell of non-employment) for individuals being reported as employed in two consecutive 
months.  
As regards the construction of the category E'E' job changers as defined by letter a), fortunately, 
the SIPP provides a rich set of variables that can help in this regards. Information regarding job 
                                                          
propose both specifications to address this heterogeneity issue between these two groups of potential job 
changers. 
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changers can be obtained through three different variables: EENO,47 ESTLEMP,48 TSJDATE.49 
While the first variable identifies the Job ID of the employer, i.e., the number uniquely linking 
the worker to the employer, the second variable identifies the continuation of the job with the 
same employer as reported in the first interview in the panel, and the third variable identifies 
the starting date of a job. 
However, both the first and second variable present some shortcomings. The variable 
ESTLEMP only registers the continuation of a job with last employer, as identified at the 
beginning of each panel, and in this sense is not useful in identifying job changes that usually 
happen at higher frequency. The variable EENO, which could do a better job given its presence 
in all the waves, presents the drawback to register changes in the Job ID number (hence, it 
identifies changes in the employment relationship, with the movement of the worker from one 
employer to another one) for one month and this value is then reported in the other three months 
of the reference wave. Hence, changes can be “reasonably” observed only at the “seam” 
between two consecutive waves. This makes quite difficult to identify intra-wave changes. To 
overcome these drawbacks, I make use of the variable TSJDATE that can help to identify the 
possible job to job transitions. 
Thus, I can construct the category of workers making infra-monthly transitions without 
observing any non-employment spell (E'E' job changers) whether an individual is registered in 
                                                          
47   The variable EENO contains a 2-digits code that uniquely identifies the employer for each worker (the job ID 
code). Every time there is a match between a worker and an employer, a job ID code uniquely identifying the 
employer matched in the working relationship with the worker and it is registered in the variable EENO. 
Information on job ID is reported up to two jobs. Hence, in the dataset one finds EENO1 and EENO2. However, 
for the purpose of this study, I am only interested in the main job. This means that when I refer to the variable 
EENO, or also to other variables that identify characteristics up to the two main jobs, I will use only information 
coming from the first one. 
48   The variable ESTLEMP provides information as regards the continuation of the job with the same employer as 
registered in the first interview in the panel. 
49   The variable TSJDATE provides information as regards the starting date of a job in the format 
YYYY:MM:DD. 
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the two consecutive months as an employed, and the starting date of the job is different between 
the two months.   
I proceed by estimating both specifications for job changers using alternative models, but I 
gather together the cases defined under letter a) and b) in only one category. When one considers 
job changers as individual with one month's break in their employment history, the number of 
observations for new hires coming from unemployment, out-of-labour force and job changers 
amount respectively to 3,547 and 1,531 and 2,014. Dealing with the group of job changers as 
individuals with one week's break or a change in the job between two consecutive periods into 
employment identified by a change in the starting date of the job, I end up with 5,244 new hires 
from unemployment, 1,848 new hires from out-of-labour force and 12,539 job changers.50 
The wage equation is now specified as follows:  
 log(𝜔𝑖𝑡) = 𝜒𝑖 + 𝒙𝒊𝒕
′ 𝛽1 + 𝛾
𝑢𝑢𝑡 + 𝛾𝜓
𝑢,𝑒𝜄𝑢𝑡 + 𝛾𝜓
𝑜𝑙𝑓,𝑒𝜄𝑢𝑡 + 𝛾𝜑
𝑢,𝑒𝜄 + 𝛾𝜑
𝑜𝑙𝑓,𝑒𝜄
+ 𝛾𝜓
𝑒,𝑒𝜄𝑢𝑡 + 𝛾𝜑
𝑒,𝑒𝜄 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡 
(3) 
The only difference with respect to the previous specification is the inclusion of the terms to 
identify job changers. More precisely, the introduction of the parameters, 𝛾𝜓
𝑒,𝑒 and 𝛾𝜑
𝑒,𝑒, where 
the first term defines the extra differential in the semi-elasticity of real wages with respect to 
unemployment for job changers and the second term defines the change in the status of newly 
hired workers, i.e., the job to job transition. 
The results in Table 3.13, when I deal with the specification of job changers as workers 
“without” a monthly spell of non-employment between two consecutive periods into the 
                                                          
50  See Table 3.11 and 3.12 for a detailed description of the different groups of workers, when it is distinguished 
between ongoing workers, new hires coming from unemployment, new hires coming from out-of-labour force 
and job changers using the appropriate definitions. 
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employment state, show that the real wage for job stayers is roughly as much cyclical as the 
real wage for new hires from unemployment and less procyclical than the real wages for new 
hires coming from out-of-labour force. Indeed, I find estimates of -0.317 percentage points for 
new hires from out-of-labour force and -0.194 percentage points for new hires from 
unemployment, when I test the model using the GHT approach, and estimates of -2.222 and -
1.610 percentage points for the semi-elasticity of real wage of new hires from, respectively, 
out-of-labour force and unemployment, when I use the CGP specification. Furthermore, one 
can also observe that there is evidence of a larger procyclicality in the real wage of job changers. 
Usually, a one-point increase in the unemployment rate leads to a fall of the real wages for job 
changers of -0.373 and of -2.341 percentage points, according to the different specification 
used. Both values confirm the evidence of higher real wage cyclicality for the job changers as 
found in Gertler, Huckfeldt and Trigari (2016) and in prior works like Barlevy (2001).51 
When I use the second definition of job changers, i.e., the one defining as job changers the 
workers who experiment a monthly spell of non-employment between two periods into the 
employment status, I find that the real wages of job changers show only a slightly lower change, 
with values roughly equal to -0.344 and -2.291 percentage points. Nevertheless, the real wage 
of new hires from out-of-labour force is still more procyclical than that of new hires from 
unemployment. 
 [INSERT TABLE 3.13 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                          
51  The coefficient for the incremental effect of the semi-elasticity of real wage for new hires from out-of-labour 
force is significant at the 5%, while the coefficient for the incremental effect of the semi-elasticity of real wage 
for newly hired worker from unemployment is not significant. The coefficient for the incremental effect of the 
semi-elasticity of real wage for job changers and the coefficient for the semi-elasticity of real wage for job 
stayers are both significant at the 1%. 
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3.3.4   A Sensitivity Test for the New Approach: The Response of Real Wages to Labour 
Productivity  
An alternative approach focusing on a different aggregate cyclical indicator, in order to 
further test the validity of previous observed results, is proposed in this section. I estimate the 
elasticity of the real wage for new hires with respect to the aggregate labour productivity. The 
idea is to compare these results with the findings in Haefke, Sonntag and Van Rens (2013), 
even if these authors use a different methodology and dataset from ours.  
I adopt, as a measure for the aggregate labour productivity, the monthly Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) for U.S. in the non-farm private sector.52 
Results are reported in the Table 3.14. One can observe that, using the GHT specification, a 
one-point percentage increase in the aggregate labour productivity raises the real wages for job 
stayers by 0.887 percentage points, and by 0.941 percentage points when I use the CGP 
specification. However, when one points to the values for the incremental effect of real wages 
I have that the additional effect for newly hired workers coming from unemployment is a value 
close to zero, while it is a positive value for new hires coming from out-of-labour force, 
confirming the basic intuition of our previous results, i.e., the heterogeneity in the cyclicality 
of real wages for the two groups of newly hired workers.  
                                                          
52 Data for the GDP of the U.S. are not usually available at monthly frequency, but only at quarterly frequency. 
This makes any attempt to measure the monthly elasticity of real wages for new hires quite challenging. In 
order to provide robust results from this test, I use data describing the monthly series of GDP in the private 
sector for U.S., using the index constructed by Macroeconomic Advisers. The Index has been developed using 
data from National Income and Production Account (NIPA). The series are deflated by using the Price 
Consumption Expenditure (PCE) Index, transformed in per-capita terms by dividing the real term series by the 
CPS total population series, and finally are logged and de-trended using the HP-filter, with smoothing 
parameter 129,000, as suggested by Ravn and Uhlig (2002). 
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Indeed, findings reported in Table 3.1453 show that the elasticity of real wages of newly hired 
workers from unemployment is equal to 0.945 and for the newly hired workers coming from 
out-of-labour force is equal to 1.006, for the GHT specification, while it is equal to 0.991 and 
1.055 for, respectively, newly hired workers from unemployment and out-of-labour force, with 
the CGP model. However, even in this case, when it is used as a cyclical indicator the aggregate 
labour productivity it can be seen how the job changers represent the group with a more 
procyclical wage. Indeed, I obtain the following findings, according to the different model 
specification: 1.013 and 1.118.54 
Comparing these results to those in Haefke, Sonntag and Van Rens (2013), where the elasticity 
for newly hired workers is a value around 0.8-0.9, one can observe that the estimates from the 
present model are slightly higher. However, it should be noticed how Haefke, Sonntag and Van 
Rens (2013) use a different procedure to identify the group of new hires, impose some 
restrictions about the sample investigated (the employable prime age sample is dropped) and 
employ a different estimation methodology. As an interesting point, I find that results in this 
study are very close to the findings obtained in Carneiro, Guimares and Portugal (2012), where 
the authors report a value for the elasticity of real wages for newly hired workers equal to 1.06. 
[INSERT TABLE 3.14 ABOUT HERE] 
                                                          
53 Table 3.14 shows only estimates from the model defined by equation (3) and with job changers identified as 
workers making a job to job transition without a monthly spell of non-employment, since results from the FE 
and the FD estimator with job changers identified as individuals with one month's break are not significant 
different.  
54  The coefficient for the incremental effect of the semi-elasticity of real wage for new hires from out-of-labour 
force is significant at the 10%, while the coefficient for the incremental effect of the semi-elasticity of real 
wage for newly hired worker from unemployment and job changers is not significant. The coefficient for the 
semi-elasticity of real wage job stayers is significant at the 1%. 
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3.4  Assessment of the Empirical Evidence of New Hires from Out-of-Labour 
Force 
A true concern in this investigation is represented by the rationalisation of the very large 
flow of individuals from out-of-labour force to employment using the economic theory. What 
could the economic theory tell us in order to explain the observed transitions of workers 
between out-of-labour force and employment? 
Several studies, such as Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005), emphasize the relevance of the time-
aggregation procedure as a feature that should inform the movements from inactivity to 
employment. The out-of-labour force to employment worker flow is, in other words, a statistical 
illusion. In reality, according to this view, individuals tend to make a “compulsory” transition 
from inactivity to unemployment before finding a job, but this movement is not spotted in the 
standard statistical models dealing with the measurement of worker flows because of the small 
interval of time that characterizes this transition, compared to the monthly statistical survey 
used to measure worker flows. 
However, the unique structure of the SIPP in terms of data collection procedure comes to our 
aid allowing to overcome this critique since it permits to identify the labour market state each 
individual belongs to in very small time intervals. Indeed, as explained in the previous sections, 
the SIPP records the labour market state individuals are registered to at different frequencies, 
and among them, it uses weekly frequencies as well. This implies I am able to identify worker 
flows between out-of-labour force and employment at a very high frequency. Thus, even if the 
investigation is based on a monthly estimation, it has been provided for a correction procedure 
that restricts the identification of newly hired workers from out-of-labour force making use of 
the weekly values to identify the labour market state the individuals belong to. Moreover, even 
if results are not reported in this work, I have further restricted this benchmark criteria and I 
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have controlled for all the individuals that do not show any weekly movement into 
unemployment from the inactivity state before transitioning into the employment state, in order 
to make the estimates more robust. Results still confirm the presence of a large number of 
individuals transitioning directly from out-of-labour force to employment.55 
Supported by the empirical evidence described above, how can one justify the presence of such 
a large group of newly hired workes from out-of-labour force? What might the economic theory 
tell us about this large flow? It seems quite obvious to try to think how in everyday's life 
individuals into the inactivity state can find a job. Statistical methods tend to define the inactive 
workers as those who are neither looking for a job nor on layoff. More precisely, the Current 
Population Survey, which is the main reference for the official measurement involving most of 
the labour market variables, defines the out-of-labour force workers as those individuals 
searching passively for a job. Such activity implies, for example, the attendance of a job training 
program or course, or merely reading about job openings that are posted in newspapers or on 
the Internet. In other words the passive methods of job search do not possess the potential to 
connect job finding workers with potential employers.56 Moreover, the results from the use of 
time in the American Time Use Survey shows that the time devoted to passive search is positive, 
even if it is quite lower compared to the time devoted to the same activity by unemployed 
individuals yet. Thus, the question still needs to be answered. 
I believe that the more fruitful approach lies in linking the presence of large outflows from 
inactivity to employment with that strand of the literature focusing on the role of social 
                                                          
55 Results obtained through the estimation of a model with this further restriction in terms of identification of the 
newly hired workers from out-of-labour force are not significantly different from those obtained using the 
benchmark model in this chapter. 
56 In contrast, the CPS defines as active searching the following activities: Contacting an employer directly or 
having a job interview, contacting a public employment agency, contacting a private employment agency, 
contacting friends or relatives, contacting a school or university employment center, submitting resumes or 
filling out applications, placing or answering job advertisements, checking union or professional registers. 
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networks in labour markets. The seminal papers of Montgomery (1991), Granovetter (1995) 
and, more recently, Kramarz and Skans (2014), are all contributions dealing with the role of 
social networks in determining labour market outcomes in developed economies. 
The theory behind this approach is focused on highlighting the role played by social structures, 
i.e., using Montgomery's (1991) words: “the pattern of social ties between individuals”, in 
shaping labour market outcomes. Montgomery (1991) in his work reports how previous studies 
have shown that roughly 50 percent of all the matches between workers and firms are created 
through a process involving generally the participation of friends and relatives. The presence 
of the informal hiring channel is not a feature neglected to economists. The role of friends and 
relatives as a source of information to find a job or the use of employee referrals have been 
extensively examined as search methods used by applicants. However, the point needs a further 
clarification. Indeed, the CPS considers contacting friends and relatives as an active searching 
method. Nevertheless, it makes sense to consider the fact that social networks are not 
necessarily assumed to play a passive role in the job seeker-social network relationship as 
regards the hiring channel. Social networks are social structures where the individuals interact 
each other and they play the role to let people stay connected in an environment where the 
concentration of information is determined as a by-product of social ties. In this sense, social 
networks might be considered as an environment where information determing labour market 
outcomes is free and is shared by all the participants, without the need of paying any specific 
cost or involving the implementation of any specific “active” action to obtain the same.  
Kramarz and Skans (2014) investigate the effects of social networks on youth labour market 
entry distinguishing between strong ties and weak ties.57 They find that the presence of strong 
                                                          
57 The difference between strong and weak ties stems from the presence or not of a family link. In the first case, 
the parents are the agents of the match for the son/daughter and they offer and receive information from and to 
the son/daughter that help to determine a positive labour market outcome. In the latter case, family does not 
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ties brings to a large impact on the graduate's job-finding success, especially in the presence of 
weak positions, i.e., individuals with low education or in a period of high unemployment. 
Kramarz and Skans (2014) find that the presence of strong ties produces an increase of roughly 
10 percentage points in the probability of a low-educated individual to work in a specific plant. 
Caliendo, Schmidl and Uhlendorff (2010) find that individuals with larger networks show a 
preference for informal search methods than formal search methods, where the latter method is 
more related to the idea of active searching, while the first one is defined in terms of searching 
through friends and relatives. Even if their analysis is focused on search methods for 
unemployed, the authors find surprisingly a strong effect in terms of substitution of the formal 
passive search with searching through social networks, with an increase in one point of the 
social network indicators to produce a fall of 4-5 percentage points in the use of passive search. 
This result tends to confirm the linkage between passive search and informal channels in job 
searching through social networks. Indeed, the two options are considered as very close 
substitute in the probability of getting a job offer.  
Thus theory and empirical analysis seem to support the idea that passive searching can also 
come by searching through social networks. In this sense, it does justice to the possibility people 
can experience a poor performance in terms of search intensity, but still they can be successful 
to find a job when a scenario with an informal approach to job searching, like the one with 
social networks, is taken into account.  
 
                                                          
play this role, but a different set of variables like environment, location, and other minor variables is taken into 
account. 
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3.5 Conclusions 
The objective of this study is to measure the sensitivity of the real wages for different 
groups of workers: job stayers, newly hired workers coming from unemployment, newly hired 
workers coming from out-of-labour force and job changers. Thus, I use a model allowing for 
direct transitions between labour market states. When I estimate the baseline model, with all 
newly hired workers aggregated into a single workforce, the so-called non-employment group, 
I obtain results for the semi-elasticity of wages for job stayers that are close to those found in 
earlier studies, but the semi-elasticity of wages for newly hired workes is somewhat slightly 
lower in contrast with the results found in previous papers like Carneiro, Guimares and Portugal 
(2012) or Martins, Solon and Thomas (2012). 
However, when I introduce the out-of-labour force, as a separated labour market state from 
unemployment, using empirical evidence about the out-of-labour force to employment flow, I 
can confirm real wage for newly hired workers coming from unemployment is more procyclical 
than the real wage of job stayers, but the real wage for newly hired workers coming from out-
of-labour force are more procyclical than the real wage of new hires from unemployment.  
Following the critique formulated by Gertler, Huckfeldt and Trigari (2016), I also take into 
account the possibility of cyclical job-upgrading introducing job to job transitions in our model, 
using different specifications to make this exercise more robust. I find that the semi-elasticity 
of real wage for job changers is larger than that of new hires from unemployment and new hires 
from out-of-labour force. But the difference between the semi-elasticity of real wages for new 
hires from unemployment and the real wage for new hires from out-of-labour force still persists 
and it is significant. 
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Finally, I also find evidence of the larger values for the elasticity of the real wages for the newly 
hired workers coming from out-of-labour force compared to that of newly hired from 
unemployment, when I use the aggregate labour productivity as cyclical indicator.  
These findings bring us back to the initial question asked in Section 3.1, i.e., whether the 
Mortensen-Pissarides model with only two labour market states (employment and 
unemployment) is a good picture of the dynamics of the labour market. Additionally, a further 
question set in this work needs to be answered: can the representative agent model be 
considered as a good fit for replicating the labour market dynamics yet or it is the heterogeneous 
agents  model a more appropriate setup to study the behaviour of labour market facts? 
The results showed in this study seem to clearly reject a positive answer to both questions. The 
standard Mortensen-Pissarides model with only two labour market states tends to misspecify 
the empirical analysis of labour market dynamics because of the exclusion of out-of-labour 
force workers and their direct transition into the employment state. Moreover, the representative 
agent model does not seem to be a good fit for describing the labour market facts. 
In particular, results from the full-specified model in Table 3.13, as regards the sensitivity of 
the real wages to unemployment rate, make it clear that the real wage for newly hired workers 
coming from unemployment is less procyclical than that for newly hired workers coming from 
out-of-labour force. These findings, highlighting the existence of a relevant form of 
heterogeneity between new hires coming from unemployment and new hires coming from out-
of-labour force, are ultimately confirmed when I use the labour productivity as the cyclical 
indicator to test the robustness of these results.  
To conclude, what implications from this investigation can be drawn for the unemployment 
volatility puzzle? Unfortunately, it is quite hard to provide a final word. Indeed, the empirical 
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presence of the unemployment volatility puzzle should be tested making use of a three-state 
labour market model with heterogeneous agents. Computational difficulties and the lack of a 
clear model specifying the hiring criteria used by firms in filling vacancies with different 
workers (i.e., sorting between unemployed and inactive workers or segmentation between the 
two groups or else?) do not ensure a consistent analysis of the Shimer's puzzle.  
In Chapter 2 of this PhD thesis, it is considered the above framework with heterogeneous agents 
and direct flows between the three labour market states, using the segmented labour markets 
hypotheses, i.e., unemployed and inactive workers search for a job in segmented and separated 
sub-markets. I find that such a model can explain a large part of the volatility of labour market 
variables without necessarily relying on the presence of a rigid real wage for new hires. 
However, further research on this issue is largely hoped for to shed more light on this crucial 
feature affecting the validity of the search and matching model.  
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Table 3.1 
Summary Statistics: Job stayers, Newly hired workers from Unemployment and Out-of-labour 
force and Job Changersa 
 
 
Job stayers NHW UE NHW OLFE Job Changersa  
# Observations 2,478,106 5,244 1,848 12,539 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sex: Male 51.88% 57.49% 46.21% 54.32%  
[0.50] [0.50] [0.50] [0.54] 
Age 36.77  32.90 28.02 31.03  
[12.35] [12.03] [11.11] [11.69] 
Labour market experience  17.32  13.96 9.03 11.95  
[12.33] [12.07] [10.92] [11.53] 
Marital status: Married 52.02% 40.56% 31.81% 38.21%  
[0 .50]  [0.49] [0.46] [0.48] 
-“-: Widowed/separated/divorced 14.66% 14.51% 8.54% 13.53%  
[0.35] [0.35] [0.28] [0.34] 
-“-: Single 33.30% 44.92% 59.63% 48.25%  
[0.47] [0.50] [0.49] [0.50] 
Ethnic group: White 83.35% 83.73% 84.90% 83.72%  
 [0.37] [0.37] [0.36] [0.37] 
-“-: Black 11.00% 11.76% 9.68% 10.74%  
[0.31] [0.12] [0.29] [0.31] 
-“-: Asian 2.09% 1.33% 1.67% 1.91%  
[0.14] [0.11] [0.13] [0.14] 
-“-: Other 3.54% 3.16% 3.73% 3.61%  
[0.18] [0.17] [0.19] [0.19] 
Education: University  16.03% 8.21% 10.01% 11.47%  
[0.37] [0.27] [0.30] [0.32] 
-“-: Less than University 36.06% 34.17% 37.33% 35.34%  
[0.48] [0.47] [0.48] [0.48] 
-“-: High School 33.32% 38.08% 32.09% 33.85%  
[0.47] [0.48] [0.47]  0[.47] 
-“-: Less than high school 14.58% 19.52% 20.56% 19.32%  
[0.35] [0.40] [0.40] [0.39] 
(Hourly) Real wagea   8.21  6.84  6.22 6.82  
[0.51] [0.45] [0.46] [0.48] 
Notes: Averages and standard deviations for selected variables from SIPP 1996-2013. The variables included 
in the summary statistics are usually observed in each panel, and each panel runs between 36 and 60 months. 
The real wage is computed in real terms at 1995 prices. The Price Consumption Expenditure Index (PCE) is 
used to deflate its nominal value. The variable NHW UE indicates the newly hired workers coming from the 
unemployment state, the variable NHW OLFE indicates the newly hired workers coming from the out-of-
labour force state, the variable Job Changersa indicates the group of individuals with a weekly non-employment 
spell between two consecutive monthly spells of employment or the presence of a new starting date for the 
present job, and the variable Job stayers indicates ongoing workers. The variable real wagea indicates a 
correction procedure takes place in order to impute the correct wage to job changers with a weekly break in 
their employment spell. Given that the variable reporting the hourly wage is obtained for the last month in a 
wave and then the values are reported for all other months in the reference wave, I impute for all individual 
making a job to job transition  the wage reported in the last month of the previous reference wave.    
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Table 3.6 
Correlation matrix 
 
Log(Real wages) Log(Real wagesa) Sex: Male Age Labour market 
experience 
Marital status: 
Single 
Race: 
White 
Education: 
Universiy 
Education: 
Less than 
university 
Education: 
High school 
Job stayers New hired UE New hired OLFE Job 
Changers 
Log(Real 
wages) 
1              
Log(Real 
wagesa) 
0.99* 1             
Sex: Male 
0.18* 0.18* 1            
Age 
0.32* 0.32* -0.02* 1           
Labour 
market 
experience 
0.26* 0.26* -0.02* 0.98* 1          
Marital 
status: 
Single 
-0.30* -0.30* 0.06* -0.61* -0.59* 1         
Race: White 
0.08* 0.08* 0.04* 0.02* -0.01* -0.09* 1        
Education: 
Universiy 
0.27* 0.27* -0.02* 0.10* -0.01* -0.07* 0.02* 1       
Education: 
Less than 
university 
0.05* 0.05* -0.05* 0.03* -0.02* -0.02* 0.01 -0.31* 1      
Education: 
High school 
-0.09* -0.09* 0.03* 0.05* 0.08* -0.05* -0.01* -0.29* -0.50* 1     
Job stayers 
0.04* 0.04* -0.01* 0.05* 0.04* -0.03* -0.01* 0.01* 0.00* -0.01 1    
New hired 
UE 
-0.02* -0.02* 0.01* -0.01* -0.01* 0.01* 0.00 -0.01* 0.01* 0.01* -0.44* 1   
New hired 
OLFE 
-0.02* -0.02* -0.01* -0.02* -0.02* 0.02* 0.00 -0.01* 0.01* -0.01* -0.26* -0.01* 1  
Job 
Changers 
-0.03* -0.03* 0.01* -0.04* -0.04* 0.03* 0.00 -0.01* 0.01* 0.01* -0.85* 0.52* 0.16* 1 
Notes: Correlations for selected variables from SIPP 1996-2013. The variables included in the summary statistics are usually observed in each panel, and each panel runs 
between 36 and 60 months. The real wage is computed in real terms at 1995 prices. The Price Consumption Expenditure Index (PCE) is used to deflate its nominal value. 
The variable New hired UE indicates the newly hired workers coming from the unemployment state, the variable New hired OLFE indicates the newly hired workers coming 
from the out-of-labour force state, the variable Job Changers indicates the group of individuals making a job to job transition that experiments a weekly spell of non-
employment between two consecutive periods in the employment state or a different starting date for a job between two consecutive periods into employment, and the 
variable Job stayers indicates ongoing workers. The variable Real wagesa indicates a correction procedure takes place in order to impute the correct wage to job changers 
with no break in their employment spell. Values for this variable are taken in logs. 
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Table 3.7 
Job stayers and Newly hired workers from Non-employment 
Year Job Stayers New Hires 
1996 205,215 637 
1997 199,674 1,427  
1998 190,344 1,413 
1999 177,667 1,152 
2000 36,783 - 
2001 171,237 743 
2002  150,617 1,231 
2003 147,907  683 
2004 196,593 754 
2005 183,859 1,407 
2006 127,408  788  
2007 62,713 340 
2008 82,889 31 
2009  133,745  868 
2010 123,476 818  
2011  115,859 759 
2012  108,896  720 
2013  70,759 349  
Notes: Values are computed using variables from SIPP 1996-2013. The variable New Hires indicates the newly 
hired workers coming from a large non-employment (NE) state, the variable Job stayers indicates ongoing 
workers.  
 
 135 
 
Table 3.8 
Sensitivity of Real Wage to Unemployment Rate with Job stayers and Newly hired from Non-
employment 
 
Dependent Variable: Log hourly real wage 
 
                          (γu)                         (γψne)
 
Estimation method Job stayers Incremental effect New Hires 
Fixed-Effects estimator with six-
month lag in unemployment rate 
-0.202*** 
[0.0028] 
-0.025 
[0.026]    
Fixed-Effects estimator with one-
year lag in unemployment rate 
-1.452*** 
[0.0140] 
-0.252 
[0.163]    
First-Difference estimator with 
six-month lag in unemployment 
rate 
-0.182*** 
[0.0023] 
-0.141 
[0.030] 
   
First-Difference estimator with 
one-year lag in unemployment 
rate 
-1.211*** 
[0.0132] 
-0.149 
[0.147] 
#Observations 2,490,645 14,120 
Notes: The number of observations are reported for the Fixed-effects estimator. The wage is computed in real 
terms using the Price Consumption Expenditure Index (PCE) as deflator for nominal values at 1995 prices. 
Values are in dollars. (i) The duration of the non-employment spell is in the monthly interval [1,9] for all the 
cases.   *** indicates a significant level of 1 percent.  ** indicates a significant level of 5 percent. * indicates a 
significant level of 10 percent. Robust standard errors are in brackets and are clustered at the individual level. 
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Table 3.9 
Job stayers, Newly hired workers from Unemployment and Out-of-labour force 
Year Job Stayers New Hires UE New Hires OLFE 
1996 205,215 484 153 
1997 199,674 1,041 386 
1998  190,342 993 422 
1999 177,666 756 397 
2000 36,783 -  - 
2001  171,235 523  222 
2002 150,615 838 395 
2003 147,906  498  186 
2004 196,592 525  230 
2005 183,855 977 434 
2006 127,407 594 195  
2007 62,713 239 101 
2008  82,889  27   4 
2009 133,744 724 145 
2010 123,476 647 171  
2011 115,859 606 153 
2012 108,896 568  152 
2013 70,759 269 80 
Notes: Values are computed using variables from SIPP 1996-2013. The variable New Hires UE indicates the 
newly hired workers coming from the unemployment state, the variable New Hires OLFE indicates the newly 
hired workers coming from the out-of-labour force state and the variable Job stayers indicates ongoing workers. 
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Table 3.10 
Sensitivity of Real Wage to Unemployment Rate with Job stayers, New hired from unemployment 
and New hired from Out-of-labour force 
Dependent Variable: Log hourly real wage 
                                                               (γu)                                     (γψu,e)                                   (γψolf,e) 
Estimation method Job stayers 
Incremental effect New 
Hires from 
Unemployment 
Incremental effect New 
Hires from OLF 
Fixed-Effects estimator 
with six-month lag in 
unemployment rate 
-0.204*** 
[0.0024] 
0.010 
[0.026] 
-0.124*** 
[0.027] 
    
Fixed-Effects estimator 
with one-year lag in 
unemployment rate 
-1.452*** 
[0.0140] 
-0.121 
[0.183] 
-0.747*** 
[0.163] 
    
First-Difference 
estimator with six-month 
lag in unemployment  
rate 
-0.192*** 
[0.0025] 
0.003 
[0.024] 
-0.109*** 
[0.022] 
    
First-Difference 
estimator with one-year 
lag in unemployment 
rate 
-1.242*** 
[0.0138] 
-0.102 
[0.153] 
-0.411*** 
[0.159] 
    
#Observations 2,490,645 10,300 3,820 
Notes: The number of observations are reported for the Fixed-effects estimator. The wage is computed in real 
terms using the Price Consumption Expenditure Index (PCE) as deflator for nominal values at 1995 prices. 
Values are in dollars. (i) The duration of the non-employment spell is in the monthly interval [1,9] for all the 
cases.   *** indicates a significant level of 1 percent.  ** indicates a significant level of 5 percent. * indicates a 
significant level of 10 percent. Robust standard errors are in brackets and are clustered at the individual level. 
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Table 3.11 
Job stayers, Newly hired workers from Unemployment and Out-of-labour force and Job Changersa 
Year Job Stayers New Hires UE New Hires OLFE Job Changersa  
1996 203,574 242 76 1,960 
1997 198,457  570 209  1,865 
1998 189,314 524 234 1,685 
1999 176,617 439 202  1,561 
2000 36,674  -  - 109 
2001  170,040 256 101 1,583 
2002 150,110 415 167 1,158 
2003 147,482 265  65 778 
2004 195,227 231 117 1,772 
2005 183,027 514 219 1,507 
2006 126,807 324 103 962 
2007 62,444 122 47 440 
2008 82,256 13 2 649 
2009 133,301 320 66 926 
2010 123,193 301 78 722 
2011 115,512 289 65 752 
2012 108,551 282 60 723 
2013 70,516  137 37 418 
Notes: Values are computed using variables from SIPP 1996-2013. The variable New Hires UE indicates the 
newly hired workers coming from the unemployment state, the variable New Hires OLFE indicates the newly 
hired workers coming from the out-of-labour force state, the variable Job Changersa indicates the group of job 
changers that does not experiment a transition between two consecutive periods in the employment state (i.e. 
individuals without a monthly break between two consecutive periods into the employment state) and the 
variable Job stayers indicates ongoing workers.  
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Table 3.12 
Job stayers, Newly hired workers from Unemployment and Out-of-labour force and Job Changersb 
Year Job Stayers New Hires UE New Hires OLFE Job Changers b 
1996 205,534  118  56 144 
1997 200,322 385 172  222 
1998 190,999 358 199 201 
1999 178,178  318 178 145 
2000 36,783  - - - 
2001 171,623 141  80 136 
2002 151,266 298 147 137 
2003 148,260 183 60 87 
2004 196,999 126 89 133 
2005 184,533  340  184 209 
2006 127,769 228 78 121 
2007 62,884 88 37 44 
2008 82,905 1  - 14 
2009 134,227 220 52 114 
2010  123,915 223 64 92 
2011 116,264 215  57 82 
2012 109,274  199 46 97 
2013 70,934 106 32 36 
Notes: Values are computed using variables from SIPP 1996-2013. The variable New Hires UE indicates the 
newly hired workers coming from the unemployment state, the variable New Hires OLFE indicates the newly 
hired workers coming from the out-of-labour force state, the variable Job Changersb indicates the group of job 
changers that does experiment a non-employment spell (i.e., a monthly break) between two consecutive periods 
into the employment state and the variable Job stayers indicates ongoing workers.  
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Table 3.13 
Sensitivity of Real Wage to Unemployment Rate with Job stayers, New hired from Unemployment, 
New hired from Out-of-labour force and Job Changers 
Dependent Variable: Log hourly real wage 
                                                  (γu)                           (γψu,e)                          (γψolf,e)                            (γψe,e) 
Estimation method Job stayers 
Incremental effect 
New Hires from 
Unemployment 
Incremental effect 
New Hires from 
OLF 
Increment 
Incremental effect 
Job changersa    
Fixed-Effects 
estimator with six-
month lag in 
unemployment rate 
-0.205*** 
[0.0024] 
0.011 
[0.034] 
-0.112** 
[0.057] 
-0.168*** 
[0.027] 
     
Fixed-Effects 
estimator with one-
year lag in 
unemployment rate 
-1.501*** 
[0.0159] 
-0.109 
[0.180] 
-0.721** 
[0.353] 
-0.841*** 
[0.132] 
     
First-Difference 
estimator with six-
month lag in 
unemployment rate 
-0.190*** 
[0.0023] 
0.009 
[0.021] 
-0.089** 
[0.051] 
-0.133*** 
[0.019] 
     
First-Difference 
estimator with one-
year lag in 
unemployment rate 
-1.394*** 
[0.0129] 
-0.089 
[0.104] 
-0.583* 
[0.318] 
-0.696*** 
[0.119] 
     
#Observations 2,478,106 5,244 1,848 12,539 
     
                                       (γu)                           (γψu,e)                          (γψolf,e)                            (γψe,e) 
 
Job stayers 
Incremental effect 
New Hires from 
Unemployment 
Incremental effect 
New Hires from 
OLF 
Incremental effect 
Job changersb 
Fixed-Effects 
estimator with six-
month lag in 
unemployment rate 
-0.201*** 
[0.0023] 
0.029 
[0.036] 
-0.118** 
[0.052] 
-0.143*** 
[0.047] 
Fixed-Effects 
estimator with one-
year lag in 
unemployment rate 
-1.501*** 
[0.0150] 
-0.229 
[0.233] 
-0.751** 
[0.345] 
-0.790** 
[0.386] 
First-Difference 
estimator with six-
month lag in 
unemployment rate 
-0.194*** 
[0.0023] 
0.025 
[0.034] 
-0.103** 
[0.050] 
-0.113*** 
[0.042] 
First-Difference 
estimator with one-
year lag in 
unemployment rate 
-1.339*** 
[0.0129] 
-0.114 
[0.214] 
-0.511** 
[0.326] 
-0.568* 
[0.328] 
     
#Observations 2,488,631 3,547 1,531 2,014 
Notes: Notes Table 3.9 hold. Furthermore, the superscript (a) for job changers denotes the individuals with one 
week’s break in their employment history or individuals making job-to-job transitions into one month since the 
starting date of a job is posterior with respect to that indicated in the prior month. The superscript (b) for job 
changers denotes the individuals with one month’s break in their employment history 
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Table 3.14 
Sensitivity of Real Wage to Labour Productivity with Job stayers, New hired from Unemployment, 
New hired from Out-of-labour force and Job Changers  
Dependent Variable: Log hourly real wage 
                                                 (γu)                            (γψu,e)                          (γψolf,e)                            (γψe,e) 
Estimation method Job stayers 
Incremental effect 
New Hires from 
Unemployment 
Incremental effect 
New Hires from 
OLF 
Incremental effect 
Job changersa 
Fixed-Effects 
estimator with six-
month lag in the 
GDP  
0.887*** 
[0.0462] 
0.058 
[0.0413] 
0.119* 
[0.0662] 
0.126 
[0.264] 
     
Fixed-Effects 
estimator with one-
year lag in the 
GDP  
0.931*** 
[0.0483] 
0.060 
[0.0432] 
0.124* 
[0.0695] 
0.187 
[0.278] 
     
First-Difference 
estimator with six-
month lag in the 
GDP 
0.842*** 
[0.0401] 
0.053 
[0.0404] 
0.105* 
[0.0555] 
0.113 
[0.236] 
     
First-Difference 
estimator with one-
year lag in the 
GDP  
0.930*** 
[0.0453] 
0.057 
[0.0406] 
0.114* 
[0.0602] 
0.154 
[0.236] 
#Observations 2,478,106 5,244 1,848 12,539 
Notes: The number of observations are reported for the Fixed-effects estimator. The wage is computed in real 
terms using the Price Consumption Expenditure Index (PCE) as deflator for nominal values at 1995 prices. 
Values are in dollars. (i) The duration of the non-employment spell is in the monthly interval [1,9] for all the 
cases. The superscript (a) for job changers denotes the individuals with one week’s break in their employment 
history or individuals making job-to-job transitions into one month since the starting date of a job is posterior 
with respect to that indicated in the prior month. *** indicates a significant level of 1 percent.  ** indicates a 
significant level of 5 percent. * indicates a significant level of 10 percent. Robust standard errors are in brackets 
and are clustered at the individual level. 
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Appendix A: Construction of the category Recall  
Fujita and Moscarini (2013) show in their paper that in the dynamics concerning worker 
transitions, a key role is played by “recalls”. The notion of recalls refers to the case where 
workers have previously separated from their last employer/job, but they are finally recalled by 
the same employer/for the same job. Usually these workers are identified as individuals that are 
on temporary layoff. According to the definition provided by the CPS, laid off individuals are 
either workers who have been provided with a date for returning to the job or workers expecting 
to return to the same job by six months.  
Based on some evidence provided by data sets like SIPP, CPS and Quarterly Workforce 
Indicators (QWI), Fujita and Moscarini (2013) show that recalls are quite pervasive in the U.S. 
economy. The authors state that 40 percent of all the cases of temporary layoffs end up with a 
recall, and this value is even higher for individuals who do not move into out-of-labour force 
after the separation but remain in the unemployment state. Moreover, Fujita and Moscarini 
(2013) also show that recalls are not only related to workers on temporary layoff, but they are 
also observed for individuals who have separated from previous job and have spent a long 
period of time in the non-employment state (individuals who result with a separation period 
longer than six months and without the provision of any date for a possible return to the same 
job). In their calculations, Fujita and Moscarini (2013) show that 20 percent of overall recalls 
can be attributed to these “permanently separated” individuals. 
However, identifying recalls in the SIPP is not an easy task. Information about a potential recall 
might be obtained using the variable EENO. When there is a break in a spell of employment 
(i.e., the break in the spell of employment creates two consecutive employment spells spaced 
out by a spell of non-employment), if the job ID code registered in the second spell of 
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employment is kept the same as the one in the first spell, this would imply that there is not a 
new employer for the worker, but it is just a recall from the last one.58 
Luckily, the SIPP uses a particular procedure for assigning or keeping the job ID value. Indeed, 
if the individual presents a spell of non-employment that does not cover an entire wave, i.e., the 
individual is not in the non-employment status for the consecutive four months composing a 
wave,59 the job ID does not change if the individual has returned to work for the same last 
employer/job.60 Hence, it is possible to infer about the presence or not of recalls just looking at 
the value for the variable EENO. However, if the individual spends a spell of non-employment 
covering the entire wave, the SIPP procedure provides for automatically assigning a new job 
ID even if the worker returns to the previous job with the same employer, apart from the case 
when the worker is on temporary layoff, since in this last case the existence of a full wave spent 
into non-employment does not produce any change in the job ID.  
This mismeasurement issue can be fixed in the SIPP panels for the period before the 1996 panel. 
Indeed, to obtain consistent job IDs a procedure using administrative data concerning the 
employer can be implemented and correct job IDs are derived.61 Unfortunately, the same 
procedure is not feasible for the panels after 1996. This implies that there is no consistency in 
the job ID codes for post-1996 observations. As a direct effect of this problem in reporting the 
correct job ID, it might be possible to end up with large misclassifications. Indeed, changes 
                                                          
58   However, this value is obtained only for one month in a wave and then it is reported for the other three months 
in the four-month wave. This means that the job ID does not change over the months grouped in a reference 
wave. Hence, it is not possible, in principle, to classify the case of individuals experimenting in the same wave 
two consecutive periods of employment (E) and non-employment (NE), such as NE-E-NE-E, as recalls. Thus, 
the only change in its value, in principle, is observable at the “seam” between different waves. 
59  The SIPP still keeps track of the job ID in the case the spells of non-employment are even longer than four 
months, but they are not concentrated in an entire wave. 
60  The job ID changes, of course, whether the individual moves into a new job/new employer. 
61   For the panels 1990-1991-1992-1993, using additional data on firms coming from administrative records, it is 
possible to overcome the problem of new assignment of job ID with the same employer by imputing the correct 
job ID code for each worker. Stinson (2003) provides a clear explanation of the procedure to be followed. 
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over time in the job ID would be usually recorded as new hires, while they are recalls finally.62 
In other words, the effect of this mismeasurement is the underestimation of the number of 
recalls in the post-1996 panels.   
Fujita and Moscarini (2013) propose to solve this problem by using an imputation procedure, 
based on the sample 1990-1993, which gives the possibility to correct the values of the job ID.  
The results seem to be consistent in terms of comparability of recall rates before and after 1996. 
However, this procedure is based on a small sample for a very short period of time (a period 
with only a mild recession) compared to the 1996-2013 period, where the US economy faced 
two substantial downturns such as the dotcom bust and the Great Recession.  
Since the investigation in this chapter is based on the post 1996 sample, I fully bear the burden 
to produce the correct job ID code for the variable EENO.  
Following the procedure used by Gertler, Huckfeldt and Trigari (2016), in order to detect the 
cases of recalls, I exploit the unique feature of the SIPP to collect a large set of information on 
the labour market history of the workers. More precisely, I make use of the information on the 
job starting date (i.e., I make use of the variable TSJDATE).63 Facing the problem of identifying 
recalls, I use the following procedure:  
1) In the case there is a break in the spell of employment that does not cover an entire wave 
there is no assignment of a new job ID to the worker for the potential new employer. The job 
ID is retained. Thus, I make use of the variable EENO. If the value for the variable EENO does 
                                                          
62  It is also possible that recalls are classified as job to job transitions instead of new hires, if one allows for the 
alternative definition of job changers, i.e., the one considering a worker experimenting a job to job transition 
as someone that spends a spell of one month in the non-employment status, in between 2 consecutive months 
in employment. 
63  Even in this case, I use only the variables TSJDATE1 identifies the main (first) job. 
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not change when the spell of employment presents an interval with some months spent in 
unemployment or out-of-labour force, then it means there is a recall.64    
2) In the case ther is a break in the spell of employment that covers an entire wave, a new job 
ID is assigned to the worker. To identify the presence of recalls, I use the variable TSJDATE. 
If the date in the variable TSJDATE, for the first period in employment after the spell of non-
employment, either corresponds to the date describing the starting date of the job with the 
former employer before the separation or it is prior to the date at which the worker appears to 
make the employment to non-employment movement, then it can be inferred that the transition 
E-NE-E can be considered as a recall. Indeed, in this case the presence of a different value for 
the variable EENO together with the presence of a starting date for the new job (TSJDATE) 
that is prior to the reference month the new job has started, does not bring to classify the 
individual as a new hired.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
64  The only exception to this rule might come from the presence of a different value for the variable TSJDATE 
compared to the date registered before the individual started her spell into non-employment. In this case it 
might be assumed that the worker has made a transition from the former employer to a new one. However, I 
do stick to the initial criteria relying on the variable EENO. 
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Appendix B: Construction of the category Newly Hired Workers  
As regards the procedure followed in this chapter to identify newly hired workers, it consists of 
labelling as such all the individuals that, after a spell of non-employment,65 spend at least four 
consecutive months in the employment state. To construct this variable I could in principle 
adopt a procedure that basically makes use of the information obtained through the variable 
RMESR, which identifies, at a monthly frequency, the labour market state an individual belongs 
to. More precisely, this variable recodes at the monthly level the weekly employment status of 
each individual. It takes values ranging from 1, defining a worker with a job the entire month 
and working all weeks, to 8, defining a worker with no job all month, who never looked for a 
job or was on layoff in the same period.  
Thus, I could construct the category newly hired workers by looking at individuals that for four 
consecutive months take values 1 or 2 in the variable RMESR.  
However, the variable RMESR does not specify “uniquely” the labour market state. Indeed, the 
variable RMESR, together with values 1 and 2, that define an individual as employed, values 6 
and 7, that define an individual as an unemployed and value 8, that defines an individual as out-
of-labour force worker, can also take values 3, 4 and 5, that define the cases where individuals 
spend only a fraction of monthly time into employment (respectively, from 1 to 4 weeks due to 
layoff, from 2 to 4 weeks with no time spent looking for a job or on layoff, from 2 to 4 weeks 
                                                          
65  I deal with different time specifications for the spell of non-employment, in a range between one and nine 
monthly spells. This interval is chosen since it is usually assumed that a period of non-employment larger than 
nine months is related to long-term non-employment and as such identifying individuals subject to different 
incentives and withdifferent preferences. However, estimates from a larger interval do not show significant 
differences from the results obtained in this study.  
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with time spent on layoff or looking for a job). Thus, it is possible to have workers classified at 
weekly level in different labour market states in the same month.   
Moreover, the identification in the SIPP of the labour market state the individual belongs to 
using the variable RMESR is not fully consistent with the definition of the analog in the Current 
Population Survey, which is the official reference source in providing the labour market 
statistics. The classification of individuals in the different labour market states in the CPS is 
achieved by looking at the answer of each respondent in the interview which is usually made 
the week including the 12th of each month. In this occasion, it is asked to the respondent to 
report her employment status in the reference week.   
Thus, the time structure of the interviewing process in the CPS implies that the relevant labour 
market state is defined by looking at the value obtained in either the second or the third week 
of each month.  
An additional issue, arising from the methodological difference between SIPP and CPS, for the 
registration of the information regarding the identification of the individual’s labour market 
state, is that related to the measurement of the unemployment rate. It can be observed that the 
unemployment rate is officially obtained through data from CPS, but due to the different labour 
market force classification of the individuals in the two surveys, it derives that the 
unemployment rate computed by CPS might be different from that computed by SIPP.  
In order to overcome these problems and to make the labour market classification in the SIPP 
consistent with that in the CPS, a correction procedure is implemented. 
In theory, my procedure could be structured such that one would end up with identifying the 
labour market state for the individuals in the SIPP, relying only on the individuals’ weekly 
records. This solution is feasible with the SIPP by using the variable RWKESR. This variable 
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reports recoded values for the employment status for each week: RWKESR1, RWKESR2, 
RWKESR3, RWKESR4, and, according to the length of the month, sometimes RWKESR5. 
Thus, it provides information, at a weekly frequency, as regards the labour market state the 
individual belongs to. This is not the approach followed in this chapter. However, I still make 
use of the weekly information on the labour market state the individual is classified at to identify 
the labour market state the individuals belong to. Thus, the information collected in the variable 
RWKESR is somewhat crucial since information contained in the variable RMESR does not 
always allow us to uniquely identifying the monthly labour market state the individual is 
classified at.  
To perform this adjustment procedure I drift apart from a full abidance to the values reported 
in the variable RMESR. Precisely, I adjust the labour market status, as defined in the variable 
RMESR, according to the value registered in the reference week (second or third week of each 
month, as it holds for the CPS) using the variable RWKESR.66 
This is not an issue for the cases RMESR =1 or RMESR =2 because these values are linked to 
the event that the individuals spend the full month into employment. Nor it is the case for 
RMESR = 6 or RMESR =7 or RMESR =8, because I refer to events identifying individuals 
spending all their time into a non-employment state. The problem rises, as explained above, for 
the cases RMESR = 3, RMESR = 4 and RMESR = 5. Indeed, in these latter cases, individuals 
are registered at a weekly level in different labour market states. In order to provide a “unique” 
labour market state classification, I look at the values for RWKESR in the CPS reference week 
and I assign the value RMESR=1 (employment) if RWSWRK = 1 or 2, and RMESR=6 
(unemployment) if RWKESR = 3 or 4 (despite the presence of some weeks in a month with a 
                                                          
66 This allows us to estimate the model consistently with the aggregate cyclical variable I use for our empirical 
investigation, i.e, the unemployment rate derived from CPS. 
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job, but not in the CPS reference week). Finally, in the case in the CPS reference week one 
finds a value for RWKESR = 5, I can classify the individual as out-of-labour force or 
RMESR=8, if the individual is reporting to have been not looking for a job or on layoff the 
previous 4 weeks, because to be classified as out-of-labour force the CPS requires the individual 
must spend four consecutive weeks without looking for a job or on layoff. In the case the 
individual has spent one of the previous weeks looking for a job or on layoff or working in a 
job, as it is the case for a value of RMESR included in the range 3-5, then the individual cannot 
be classified as included in the out-of-labour force state, but as an unemployed (i.e., 
RMESR=6).  
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Appendix C: Additional Tables  
Table 3.2 
Summary Statistics: Job stayers and Newly hired workers from Non-employment 
  
Job stayers NHW NE 
# Observations 2,490,645 14,120 
 
(1) (2) 
Sex: Male 51.91% 53.86% 
 [0.49] [0.49] 
Age 36.74 31.42     
 [12.35] [11.89] 
Labour market experience 17.30 12.48 
 [12.33] [11.90] 
Marital status: Married 51.95% 38.25% 
 [0.49]  [0.48] 
-“-: Widowed/separated/divorced 14.66% 12.19% 
 [0.35] [0.32] 
-“-: Single 33.37% 49.55% 
 [0.47] [0.49] 
Ethnic group: White 83.36% 83.00% 
 [0.37] [0.37] 
-“-: Black 11.00% 11.65% 
 [0.31] [0.32] 
-“-: Asian 2.08% 1.65% 
 [0.14]  [0.12] 
-“-: Other 3.54% 3.69% 
 [0.18] [0.18] 
Education: University  16.01% 8.91% 
 [0.36] [0.28] 
-“-: Less than University 36.05% 35.60% 
 [0.48] [0.47] 
-“-: High School 33.32% 35.51% 
 [0.47] [0.47] 
-“-: Less than high school 14.60% 19.96% 
 [0.35] [0.39] 
(Hourly) Real wage 8.21 6.65 
 [0.50] [0.45] 
Notes: Averages and standard deviations for selected variables from SIPP 1996-2013. The variables included 
in the summary statistics are usually observed in each panel, and each panel runs between 36 and 60 months. 
The real wage is computed in real terms at 1995 prices. The Price Consumption Expenditure Index (PCE) is 
used to deflate its nominal value. The variable NHW NE indicates the newly hired workers coming from a 
large non-employment (NE) state, the variable Job stayers indicates ongoing workers. 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 151 
 
Table 3.3 
Summary Statistics: Job stayers, Newly hired workers from Unemployment and Out-of-labour 
force 
  
Job stayers NHW UE NHW OLFE 
# Observations 2,490,645 10,300  3,820 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Sex: Male 51.90% 56.98% 45.47% 
 [0.49]  [0.49]   [0.49]   
Age 36.74 32.57 28.29 
 [12.35]  [12.04] [10.89] 
Labour market experience 17.30 13.66 9.29 
 [12.33]    [12.07] [10.79]  
Marital status: Married 51.95% 40.19% 32.93% 
 [0.49] [0.49] [0.47] 
-“-: Widowed/separated/divorced 14.66% 13.53% 8.57% 
 [0.35] [0.34] [0.28] 
-“-: Single 33.37% 46.27% 58.49% 
 [0.47] [0.49] [0.49] 
Ethnic group: White 83.36% 83.23% 82.38% 
 [0.37]   [0.37]   [0.38] 
-“-: Black 11.00% 11.76% 11.34% 
 [0.31]   [0.32] [0.31]  
-“-: Asian 2.08% 1.53% 1.96% 
 [0.14]   [0.12] [0.13] 
-“-: Other 3.54% 3.46% 4.31% 
 [0.18] [0.18] [0.20] 
Education: University  16.01% 8.34% 10.42% 
 [0.36] [0.27] [0.30] 
-“-: Less than University 36.05% 34.90% 37.42% 
 [0.48] [0.47] [0.48]  
-“-: High School 33.32% 36.79% 32.07% 
 [0.47] [0.48] [0.46] 
-“-: Less than high school 14.60% 19.96% 20.07% 
 [0.35] [0.39]  [0.40] 
(Hourly) Real wage  8.21 6.83  6.23  
[0.50] [0.45] [0.45] 
Notes: Averages and standard deviations for selected variables from SIPP 1996-2013. The variables included 
in the summary statistics are usually observed in each panel, and each panel runs between 36 and 60 months. 
The real wage is computed in real terms at 1995 prices. The Price Consumption Expenditure Index (PCE) is 
used to deflate its nominal value. The variable NHW UE indicates the newly hired workers coming from the 
unemployment state, the variable NHW OLFE indicates the newly hired workers coming from the out-of-
labour force state and the variable Job stayers indicates ongoing workers. 
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Table 3.4 
Summary Statistics: Job stayers, Newly hired workers from Unemployment and Out-of-labour 
force and Job Changersb 
 
 
Job stayers NHW UE NHW OLFE Job Changersb 
# Observations 2,488,631 3,547 1,531 2,014 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sex: Male 51.90 57.65 45.46 56.00  
[0.50] [0.50] [0.50] [0.50] 
Age   36.73 33.04  27.94  31.93  
[12.36] [12.11] [11.05] [11.89] 
Labour market experience 17.28 14.18 8.99  12.85  
[12.34] [2.14] [10.92]  [11.88] 
Marital status: Married 51.92 39.36 31.16 41.81  
[0.50] [0.49]  [0.46] [0.49] 
-“-: Widowed/separated/divorced 14.66 14.38 8.55 13.80  
[0.35] [0.35] [0.28] [0.34] 
-“-: Single 33.42 46.26 60.29 44.39  
[0.47] [0.50] [0.49] [0.50] 
Ethnic group: White 83.36 83.22 85.24 84.55  
[0.37] [0.37] [0.35] [0.36] 
-“-: Black 11.00 12.07 9.73 10.87  
[0.31] [0.32] [0.30] [0.31] 
-“-: Asian 2.09 1.58 1.56 1.04  
[0.14] [0.12] [0.12] [0.10] 
-“-: Other 3.55 3.13 3.46 3.52  
[0.18] [0.17] [0.18] [0.18] 
Education: University  15.99 7.89 9.27 9.63  
[0.37] [0.27] [0.29] [0.29] 
-“-: Less than University 36.05 33.60 38.27 34.95  
[0.48] [0.47] [0.49] [0.48] 
-“-: High School 33.33 37.92 32.13 37.39  
[0.47] [0.48] [0.47] [0.48] 
-“-: Less than high school 14.62  20.58 20.31 18.02  
[0.35] [0.40] [0.40] [0.38] 
(Hourly) Real wagea  8.21  6.81  6.22  7.07  
[0.51] [0.45] [0.45] [0.48] 
Notes: Averages and standard deviations for selected variables from SIPP 1996-2013. The variables included 
in the summary statistics are usually observed in each panel, and each panel runs between 36 and 60 months. 
The real wage is computed in real terms at 1995 prices. The Price Consumption Expenditure Index (PCE) is 
used to deflate its nominal value. The variable NHW UE indicates the newly hired workers coming from the 
unemployment state, the variable NHW OLFE indicates the newly hired workers coming from the out-of-
labour force state, the variable Job Changersb indicates the group of individuals that does experiment a monthly 
spell of unemployment between two consecutive periods into the employment state, and the variable Job stayers 
indicates ongoing workers. The variable real wagea indicates a correction procedure takes place in order to 
impute the correct wage to job changers with one month’s break in their employment spell. Given that the 
variable reporting the hourly wage is obtained for the last month in a wave and then the values are reported for 
all other months in the reference wave, I impute for all individual making a job to job transition  the wage 
reported in the last month of the previous reference wave.    
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Table 3.5 
Summary statistics for unemployed and out-of-labour force individuals 
     
Panel A: Mean values for unemployed and out-of-labour force workers for different gender groups 
 U OLF U OLF 
# Observations 123,328 186,926 107,309 343,859 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Age 33.26 23.25 33.73 29.34 
Labour market experience 14.31 5.02 14.64 10.50 
Marital status: married 35.46% 12.96% 36.61% 47.00% 
-''-: 
Widowed/separated/divorced  11.78% 4.03% 18.71% 6.93% 
-''-: Single 52.75% 83.00% 44.67% 46.07% 
Ethnic group: White 77.64% 77.89% 72.53% 79.36% 
-''-: Black 15.22% 13.47% 20.40% 12.60% 
-''-: Asian 2.87% 3.12% 3.07% 3.56% 
-''-: Other 4.26% 5.51% 4.00% 4.48% 
Education: University 12.89% 8.08% 14.20% 14.74% 
-''-: Less than University 28.71% 28.10% 32.65% 31.12% 
-''-: High school 34.72% 22.97% 31.15% 25.85% 
-''-: Less than high school 23.66% 40.83% 22.00% 28.28% 
     
Panel B: Mean values for unemployed and out-of-labour force workers for different age groups 
 U OLF U OLF 
# Observations 75,738 294,161 154,899 236,624 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Sex: Male 55.90% 47.79% 52.28% 19.59% 
Age 19.86 18.84 40.14 37.59 
Labour market experience 1.65 0.99 20.74 17.98 
Marital status: married 8.03% 6.64% 49.66% 70.27% 
-''-: 
Widowed/separated/divorced  2.09% 1.14% 21.32% 11.83% 
-''-: Single 89.88% 92.20% 29.00% 17.89% 
Ethnic group: White 74.83% 77.66% 75.48% 80.31% 
-''-: Black 18.71% 14.36% 17.10% 11.10% 
-''-: Asian 2.49% 2.96% 3.19% 3.96% 
-''-: Other 3.96% 5.01% 4.22% 4.62% 
Education: University 4.46% 3.71% 17.92% 23.20% 
-''-: Less than University 25.13% 27.93% 33.19% 32.70% 
-''-: High school 35.79% 22.02% 31.72% 28.35% 
-''-: Less than high school 34.61% 46.34% 17.15% 15.75% 
     
PPanel C: Mean values for unemployed and out-of-labour force workers for different occupation and 
inndustry groups 
 U OLF U OLF 
# Observations 105,899 75,706 106,121 75,809 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Occup.: Skilled non-manual 11.09% 10.68% - - 
-''-: Skilled manual 14.07% 8.09% - - 
-''-: Unskilled non-manual 26.95% 33.69% - - 
-''-: Unskilled manual 47.88% 47.53% - - 
Industry: Agric., Forest., Fish. - - 2.62%          2.08% 
-''-: Mining - - 0.42%          0.26% 
-''-: Utilities - - 0.26% 0.19% 
-''-: Construction - - 11.96% 6.00% 
-''-: Manufacturing - - 12.57% 8.20% 
-''-: Wholesale Trade - - 2.89% 2.38% 
-''-: Retail Trade - - 15.88% 20.66% 
Table 3.5 continued in next page 
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Table 3.5 continued from last page 
-''-: Transport. & Warehous. - - 3.53% 2.04% 
-''-: Information - - 2.45% 2.40% 
-''-: Finance and Insurance - - 2.78% 2.86% 
-''-: Real Estate and Rental                 - - 1.39% 1.49% 
-''-: Prof., Scient. & Techn. - - 4.24% 4.15% 
-''-: Mgmt of Companies             - - 0.01% 0.15% 
-''-: Admin & Mgmt Waste 
Services 
- - 10.05% 6.98% 
-''-: Educational Services - - 1.57% 2.56% 
-''-: Health Care and Assist. - - 6.65% 8.27% 
-''-: Arts & Entertainment - - 2.29% 3.98% 
-''-: Accomm. & Food Serv. - - 14.26% 20.59% 
-''-: Other Services - - 3.89% 4.60% 
-''-: Public Administration - - 0.21% 0.27% 
Notes: Averages from SIPP 1996-2013. Panel A reports values for unemployed and out-of-labour force workers 
for different gender groups. Column (1) and (2) refer to male gender, while columns (3) and (4) refer to female 
gender. Panel B reports values for unemployed and out-of-labour force workers for different age groups. 
Column (1) and (2) refer to age below or equal to 24 years, while columns (3) and (4) refer to group of 
individuals aging 25-64. Panel C reports values for unemployed and out-of-labour force workers for different 
occupations and industries. Column (1) and (2) refer to occupations, while column (3) and (4) refer to industry.  
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4.1 Introduction 
Over the last decade, following the rise of the Shimer's puzzle (2005),67 several studies 
have been actively contributing to the debate on the ability of the search and matching model 
to replicate the empirical moments of the labour market variables such as vacancy, job-finding 
rate and unemployment.68 However, less attention has been devoted to the dynamics of the 
labour market transitions. Indeed, the most relevant works in this field have focused on 
replicating empirical worker flows by embedding either a home productivity idiosyncratic 
shock (e.g., Garibaldi and Wasmer, 2005, Haefke and Reiter, 2006) or a market productivity 
idiosyncratic shock (e.g., Pries and Rogerson, 2009) into a frictional labour market model.69 
Nevertheless, results have not been very satisfactory, especially when a framework with three 
labour market states: employment, unemployment and out of labour force, is taken into account. 
In this direction, models have struggled in replicating quantitatively the worker flows between 
inactivity and the other labour market states. 
Furthermore, these investigations have been carried out by using very parsimonious models, 
which entail little room for any additional variable to substantially contribute to the explanation 
of the empirical worker flows. In this sense, wealth and its role in the individuals' choice 
                                                          
67  The Shimer's puzzle is usually defined in terms of the failure of a standard search and matching model, à la 
Mortensen and Pissarides, to replicate the empirical volatilities for the unemployment rate and other labour 
market-related variables such as vacancies, labour market tightness and job finding rate. In details, following 
a labour productivity shock, the baseline search model lacks an amplification mechanism able to reproduce the 
observed second moments in the variables above mentioned. Shimer (2005) identifies the large volatility of 
real wage as the crucial variable explaining the poor performance of such models. With Nash bargaining 
process, wages are flexible to labour productivity shock and this implies that wages capture a large part of the 
productivity shock, leaving firms unwilling to advertise new vacancies. This effect reduces both volatilities of 
vacancies, job-finding rate and labour market tightness, together with little changes in the unemployment rate.   
68  The literature on the unemployment volatility puzzle is very extensive. After the seminal papers of Shimer 
(2005), and Costain and Reiter (2008), a very incomplete list of notably contributions includes Hall (2005), 
Hagedorn and Manovski (2008), Hall and Milgrom (2008), Pissarides (2009) and Kennan (2010). All of these 
studies have focused on data from the U.S. economy. 
69  A partially different approach is followed by Krusell, Mukoyama, Rogerson and Sahin (2016), who build up a 
model to replicate the gross worker flows using both standard labour supply features and search frictions. 
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concerning labour market transitions have been largely neglected. The research in this field has 
primarily focused on an environment where agents have preferences defined in terms of linear 
utility and are income maximization, but this specification implies that there is no room for 
precautionary saving since there are no risk aversion motives. Thus, little progress has been 
observed regarding the analysis of the role of wealth in affecting the worker flows between the 
three labour market states.  
Broadly speaking, developing a labour market transition model using the standard search and 
matching theory implies that the movements from the employment state to the non-employment 
states need to be seen as a new searching process following a separation between workers and 
firms. Moreover, transitions between unemployment and inactivity, the two non-employment 
states, should be considered as changes in the search intensity. Indeed, data from the American 
Time Use Survey (ATUS) show that agents from both groups devote a positive amount of time 
to searching.70  In both cases, the search activity of the individuals suggests an important role 
for time. It takes time for the firms searching for the worker who represents a desirable fit for 
the vacancy that has been advertised and it takes time for the workers to find a suitable job and 
being hired. Thus, if searching is a process which requires time and (monetary) resources, a 
reasonable question is: how is searching financed? A quite obvious answer would be that 
individuals in the unemployment state can rely on public transfers from the government, 
especially in the form of unemployment benefits. However, any monetary support is typically 
for a limited amount of time and is subject to a large variability in its amount. Individuals in the 
out-of-labour force state face an even worse situation, since they do not typically enjoy such 
monetary support from the government.71 Thus, abstracting from a careful investigation of the 
                                                          
70  Data from ATUS show that unemployed individuals tend to spend around 23 minutes per day in their search 
activity, while out of labour force individuals show a lower propensity to search, with less than one minute per 
day devoted to this activity. 
71  The literature has not adequately discussed, at the moment, the realistic possibility for individuals to finance 
searching in the non-employment state via a risk-sharing mechanism at the household level, which could 
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role of individual wealth in describing the dynamics of labour market transitions might be a 
reasonable assumption in a set-up like the one proposed by the standard search and matching 
model, in which the primary focus is on the non-employment to employment transition (i.e., 
the hiring activity), since this is usually considered as a process in which individuals accept 
each job that is offered to them and the key variable is the choice of the firm.72 However, this 
assumption does not hold in the opposite scenario, the one in which it is investigated the worker 
flows from the employment to the non-employment states, or even between the non-
employment states. In such cases, it is reasonable to think of wealth like a key feature that can 
affect the decisions made by individuals in their choices about their transitions between labour 
market states.73 
Furthermore, a major drawback of a few previous contributions on the relationship between 
wealth and labour market transition, has been the strong focus on a framework in which only 
two labour market states are identified: employment and unemployment. Empirically, the role 
of wealth has usually been captured in terms of the decision of workers regarding the transition 
from employment to unemployment and in terms of unemployment duration. In this direction, 
for example, Algan, Cheron, Hairault and Langot (2003) show that (i) workers with a higher 
level of wealth have a higher probability to quit the job and move from employment to 
                                                          
involve a role for the partner's income, or via financial support from parents. This issue will be empirically 
investigated in this study.  
72  Bloemen and Stancanelli (2001) have proposed a different approach to this issue still using the search and 
matching model. Indeed, they have studied how wealth can affect the reservation wages, the unemployment 
duration and the job acceptance rate, conditional on the job offer made by the firm. In this sense, workers are 
given the opportunity to accept or refuse a received job offer, whose probability is characterized in terms of a 
stochastic wage-offer distribution. They find that wealth affects positively the reservation wage and the 
unemployment duration and negatively affects the probability of transition into employment. In this study, I 
do not follow this approach, but I embrace the original version of the search and matching model assuming all 
workers are job-finders and they are willing to accept every job that is offered to them. This is based upon the 
standard condition that the value function of being employed is larger or equal to the value function of being 
unemployed. 
73  Some scattered attempts to moving to a deeper investigation of the interaction between the choice of agents in 
terms of labour market transitions and their wealth level have been proposed, but substantially disregarded. 
Relevant contributions are those by Danforth (1979), Blundell, Magnac and Meghir (1997), Bloemen and 
Stancanelli (2001), Bloemen (2002) and Algan, Cheron, Hairault and Langot (2003). 
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unemployment and (ii) workers with a higher level of wealth have a higher probability to remain 
in the state of unemployment.   
Thus, the main issue investigated in the previous studies was related to the possibility of using 
wealth to finance spells of active searching (i.e., unemployment).74 Surprisingly, an analysis 
related to the possibility of using asset holdings to finance searching when individuals transition 
into the out-of-labour force state has not been carried out, and in this sense no answer has been 
provided to the question: does wealth finance spells of passive searching (i.e., out-of-labour 
force)? Indeed, if wealth plays the role to finance searching, it would make sense to observe, in 
the case of a positive idiosyncratic shock to individual wealth, a movement from employment 
to out-of-labour force rather than from employment to unemployment, because rational wealthy 
agents would face a loosening job-searching constraint.75 
Moreover, it would be also expected that any change in the level of wealth should be perceived 
as an incentive for the workers, when non-employed, to optimally re-formulate their searching 
decisions. For example, in the case of negative (positive) idiosyncratic shock to wealth, it would 
be expected individuals formulate their rational decisions to increase (decrease) their search 
intensity and in this way moving from out-of-labour force (unemployment) to unemployment 
(out-of-labour force).  Thus, the wealth variable would play a role not only in the decisions of 
agents to move from employment to non-employment, but also in their decisions to move 
                                                          
74  The only exceptions to this standard framework are Blundell, Magnac and Meghir (1997), who propose a 
theoretical formal model investigating the relationship between savings and labour market transition with the 
presence of a third labour market state, and Krusell, Mukoyama, Rogerson and Sahin (2016), who investigate 
the role of search and wage frictions in order to replicate the gross worker flows between all labour market 
states. 
75   In different terms, it can be stated that, assuming individuals choose optimally between the search activity and 
leisure, and considering both variables as normal goods, it should be observed that a higher level of wealth 
might work as an incentive for agents to enjoy an even larger fraction of their time in leisure when their wealth 
experiences a large positive change after an idiosyncratic shock. In this case, it is claimed that the substitution 
effect is smaller than the income effect, i.e., following an increase in wealth, agents are more willing to move 
into passive searching activity rather than into active searching activity, and thus enjoying a large fraction of 
time devoted to leisure. 
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between unemployment and out-of-labour force. In fact, while this is an often ignored fact, the 
two worker flows, i.e., the unemployment to out-of-labour force flow and the out-of-labour 
force to unemployment flow, are quite volatile and persistent.    
An appropriate investigation of these issues requires an adequate theoretical context and, in this 
sense, it seems that the search and matching model would provide a substantial and reliable 
model for this analysis. However, one of the most recurrent observations in the search literature 
points out to the irrelevance of the distinction between unemployment and out-of-labour force, 
since the out-of-labour force state is seen as essentially playing a subordinate role to the 
unemployment state in the dynamics of the worker flows.76  
However, as suggested in Chapter 3of this thesis, this assumption is  not correct. For example, 
based on data from the Survey of Income and Programme Participation (SIPP), in Chapter 3 it 
has been investigated the cyclical behaviour of real wages for new hires coming from either 
unemployment or out-of-labour force and it has been found evidence of the existence of a 
substantial flow of newly hired workers moving directly from out-of-labour force, and not only 
from unemployment, into employment, thus questioning the insignificance of the out-of-labour 
force state. Furthermore, it has been found that the real wage of newly hired from out-of-labour 
force shows a different cyclicality compared to the real wage of newly hired from 
unemployment. This result is robust to different specifications of the model. This implies the 
                                                          
76  An example of this view is the usual statement regarding the possibility to have transitions from inactivity to 
employment only by a movement through the unemployment state, discarding the possibility for a direct flow 
from out-of-labour force to employment. An exception to this view is represented in the literature by some 
papers (e.g., Garibaldi and Wasmer, 2005) in which the issue of the presence of worker flows into employment 
from these two different groups, unemployment and out-of-labour force, is tackled by considering individuals 
who are not looking for a job (and as such they are considered as out-of-labour force), but are ready to accept 
one if an offer comes to them, as a slacked labour market attached group. They are defined as discouraged 
workers and they are lumped together with the unemployed individuals. 
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existence of a certain degree of heterogeneity between unemployed and out-of-labour force 
individuals moving into employment.  
Another critique concerning the consistency of any investigation linked to the relationship 
between wealth and worker flows is that related to the relevance of the wealth variable in 
affecting the labour market transitions, since the distribution of wealth in the developed 
countries is dramatically skewed.77 Thus, it can be claimed that a very large part of the overall 
population in the developed countries does not hold a positive level of wealth (Chetty, 2008). 
As a logical consequence, it is expected that wealth cannot play a relevant role in labour market 
transitions, especially for people spending a large fraction of their time in either the 
unemployment or the out-of-labour force state, since it is reasonable to argue that the 
individuals in these two latter labour market states would make up the bulk of the unwealthy 
people. Hence, any study examining the relationship between labour market transitions and 
wealth would be questionable. However, contrary to this remark, empirical evidence produced 
in this study shows that this critique is inaccurate. Indeed, a substantial fraction of individuals 
spending time into unemployment and/or out-of-labour force hold significant amounts of 
wealth that can reasonably play a role in their decisions as concern labour market transitions. 
Based on data from the sample used for our investigation, one can see that individuals moving 
into out-of-labour force have a level of liquid wealth (e.g., bonds, stocks and other liquid wealth 
assets) that is just 15 percent lower than that of individuals moving into unemployment. When 
                                                          
77  Using the data from Saez and Zucman (2014) for the U.S. wealth distribution in 2012, one can see that the 
bottom 90 percent of households hold a total net wealth of 23 percent. The next 9 percent of households own 
35 percent of total net wealth and the top 1 percent of households hold 22 percent of total net wealth, i.e., 
roughly the same amount held by the bottom 90 percent. The same pattern holds for other developed countries. 
Moreover, using Registry data from the Norway's Household Income Statistics (an accurate dataset avoiding 
or minimising non-response, attrition and measurement errors) it is observed that the bottom 90 percent of 
households own slightly less than 50 percent of the total net wealth, with the bottom 10 percent holding more 
than half of the overall net wealth. Looking at the wealthiest households at the top 1 percent of the wealth 
distribution in the U.S., it is shown that households in the last percentile hold 22 percent of the overall net 
wealth. This figure is replicated by the data for Norway with the top 1 percent households holding 21 percent 
of the total net wealth. 
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one considers a more aggregated wealth value, one can observe how the wealth level for 
individuals moving into out-of-labour force is roughly equal to that of individuals moving into 
unemployment.  
The findings in this chapter show that wealth exerts a statistically significant impact on the 
individuals’ probability of transitioning to out-of-labour force or unemployment. This result 
holds even when different specifications for the wealth variable are used. Moreover, these 
results are robust to a rich series of different controls. Building upon the transitory-permanent 
decomposition of wealth effect, I am able to identify a significant positive effect of a transitory 
increase in wealth on the probability to transitioning to out-of-labour force and unemployment, 
while the impact on the transition probabilities is negative when I deal with a permanent 
increase in wealth.  
A possible explanation for the positive transitory effect of wealth, as resulting from the 
willingness of the individuals to transition in the non-employment states (i.e. starting a search 
activity), can be found in the fact that the change in wealth is temporary and it does not affect 
the consumption profile. Thus, the increase in wealth, in this case, can be considered as a buffer 
stock useful to look for a better job that can guarantee individuals transitioning in the non-
employment states a higher wage profile, a feature present in the empirical evidence on the life-
cycle paths of wage dynamics, and consequently satisfying the permanent income hypothesis. 
Hence, a transitory increase in wealth can bring individuals to start a new search in order to 
exploit labour market opportunities allowing for higher future wage profiles.  
On the other side, the negative permanent effect of an increase in wealth on the transition 
probabilities could be explained by the fact that the increase in wealth would play the role of a 
close substitute to the labour income flow. In this sense, the permanent increase in wealth 
disincentives individuals from starting a new search in order to find a high-paying job since it 
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allows for a permanent effect on consumption. Thus, it makes sense to observe a drop in the 
transition probabilities of individuals, as regards the movements into out-of-labour force and 
unemployment, since one can assume it is operating a sort of “income effect”. 
However, the estimated impact of wealth is larger for the probability of transitioning to out-of-
labour force rather than for the probability to transitioning to the unemployment state. Indeed, 
a well-established result across the different model specifications is that a temporary increase 
of $ 100,000 dollars in wealth leads, on average, to an increase of 50 percent in the probability 
of transitioning to out-of-labour force, but it increases the probability of becoming unemployed 
only by 30 percent. On the other hand, a permanent increase in wealth decreases the probability 
to transitioning into out-of-labour force by roughly 50 percent, and that to unemployment by 
30 percent.  
Thus, these findings reveal the presence of differences in the behaviour of agents when their 
transition into the non-employment states, i.e., the “exit margin”, is examined. 
Therefore, one can argue that the currently developments of theoretical models not including 
the presence of the out-of-labour force workers or lumping them together with unemployed 
workers into a large non-employment state are at odds with the empirical findings found in this 
study.   
The reminder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 provides a review of the 
literature. Section 4.3 discusses the empirical strategy used to estimate the model. Section 4.4 
describes the dataset and provides descriptive statistics. Section 4.5 presents and discusses 
results. Section 4.6 develops some sensitivity analysis. Finally Section 4.7 concludes.   
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4.2 Background and Hypotheses 
The literature on labour market transitions is quite widespread. Classical references such 
as Blanchard and Diamond (1990) and Mortensen (1994) come along with more recent 
advancements on this matter like Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005), Pries and Rogerson (2009), 
Krusell, Mukoyama, Rogerson and Sahin (2016). At the same time, the concept of wealth has 
attracted the interest of scholars with reference to its role in enhancing entrepreneurship or the 
transition into self-employment.78 Surprisingly, the researchers have devoted little attention to 
the relationship between worker flows and wealth, with just a limited number of studies directly 
dealing with this matter. 
The seminal paper, regarding the relationship between wealth and labour market transitions, is 
by Danforth (1979). The author investigates the job search activity in an environment in which 
agents are allowed to make decisions conditional to the level of asset holdings. He shows that 
there is a negative correlation between asset holdings and the job acceptance rate, i.e., a higher 
level of wealth would result in a lower acceptance probability. However, the presence of 
decreasing absolute risk aversion and the individual maximization as a function of consumption 
are crucial assumptions in the choice of agents between labour market states.   
Blundell, Magnac and Meghir (1997) investigate the relationship between savings and labour 
market transitions in a discrete dynamic model of expected life time utility maximization, in 
which the utility does not depend only on consumption but also on labour market transition as 
well. They introduce a job offer as a random process and allow for risk of layoff. Under the 
                                                          
78   On entrepreneurship, see Hurst and Lusardi (2004), Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), Hvide and Panos (2014), and 
Sauer and Wilson (2016), and on self-employment, see Lindh and Ohlsson (1998), Carrasco (1999) and 
Zissimopoulos and Karoly (2007). 
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assumption that leisure is a normal good, they derive a negative relationship between wealth 
and the probability of staying or becoming employed.      
Algan, Cheron, Hairault and Langot (2003) show that, in an environment with only two labour 
market states, i.e., employment and unemployment, wealth plays a substantial role in 
determining the employment to unemployment labour market transition and the unemployment 
duration. Indeed, the authors find that the probability of a voluntarily movement from 
employment to unemployment increases with the level of wealth and that wealthier unemployed 
individuals show a longer unemployment duration.  
Using data from the Dutch Socio-Economic panel (SEP), Bloemen and Stancanelli (2001) 
empirically investigate the relationship between financial wealth, reservation wage, and labour 
market transitions, namely between employment and unemployment. Based on the job search 
model put forward by Danforth (1979), they specify a simultaneous equations model with a 
wealth equation, an employment transition equation and a reservation wage equation, and show 
that financial wealth has a significant positive effect on the reservation wage. Moreover, a 
higher reservation wage produces a lower employment probability, even if this effect is quite 
small.  
Finally, Bloemen (2002) analyses the relationship between savings and the employment 
probability and his results confirm the existence of a negative relationship between these two 
variables.   
4.3 Empirical Strategy 
In order to investigate the relationship between wealth and movements into non-
employment labour market states, transition probabilities are estimated. I use a random-effects 
probit model to estimate the probability of transitioning to out-of-labour force (at time t+1) from 
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either employment or unemployment (at time t) and the probability of transitioning to 
unemployment (at time t+1) from either employment and out-of-labour force (at time t).  
In general terms, a standard probit model to estimate this relationship could be written as 
follows:   
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1[𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡]   
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑁;   𝑡 = 1,2, … , 𝑇 
(2) 
with 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1    𝑖𝑓    𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ > 0 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 0   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
(3) 
where i is the individual index and t is the time index. Let the observed dependent variable yit 
be defined as a binary variable taking value one if the individual i makes a transition to out-of-
labour force, between time t and t+1, from either employment or unemployment, or to 
unemployment, between time t and t+1, from either employment or out-of-labour force, and 
zero otherwise. Let 1[.] be the indicator variable. Let  𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗  be the latent variable (the 
unobservable individual probability of transitioning to a non-employment state, at time t+1). 
The latent variable is assumed to be linear in the observed, xit , and unobserved, uit , variables, 
with β to be interpreted as a vector of coefficients associated with the vector of the explanatory 
variables. Let uit denote the error term with standard normal distribution uit ~N (0, 𝜎𝑢
2), i.e., with 
mean zero79 and constant finite variance, 𝜎𝑢
2 < ∞.  
                                                          
79  It is assumed strict exogeneity for the error term, E(uit| Xit)=0, i.e., the error term is stochastically independent 
from the regressors for all i and t. 
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Given the panel structure of our dataset, labour market transitions can be observed for the time 
period  t=1,2,...,Ti-1, since the presence of an unbalanced panel.  
However, the presence of individual-specific effects has implications for the binary choice 
model that it is used. Indeed, individual-specific effects are usually specified either as fixed 
parameters (fixed-effects model) or as random error components, independently and identically 
distributed over time (random-effects model). While unobserved heterogeneity specified with 
fixed effects model is a suitable procedure since it allows the individual effects to be correlated 
with the independent variables, it also incurs in the incidental parameter problem.80 
Thus, the random-effects model seems more appropriate for a large sample with many 
individuals having few observations over time.81   
Hence, in this investigation I make use of the random-effects model, with both observed and 
unobserved individual-specific effects, given the relatively short average length of each panel 
(approximately 4 years).  
The unobserved variable is then decomposed to a time-invariant and a time-variant variable 
𝑢𝑖𝑡 =  𝛾𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4) 
and the equation is written as follows:  
                                                          
80  I.e., the maximum likelihood estimation is inconsistent. See Verbeek (2007). 
81  It is known that the random-effects model, differently from the fixed-effects model, requires the extra condition 
of specifying a functional distribution of the unobserved individual heterogeneity. Moreover, it requires the 
assumption of zero correlation (independence) between the random error components and the explanatory 
variables (but this is something that must hold for the regular error terms as well) and that the correlation of 
the combined residuals over time (via the random effects) is the same for all the individuals. However, the 
random-effects estimator is more efficient than the fixed-effects estimator when the distributional assumptions 
about the parameters in the model are satisfied. The random-effects model contrarily to the fixed-effects model 
allows to estimate time-invariant characteristic variables that can play a role in the analysis such as gender or 
race. 
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𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ =  𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                  
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑖 = 1,2, . . , 𝑁;   𝑡 = 1,2, . . , 𝑇 
(5) 
where γi is the vector of unobserved time-invariant individual-specific random effect and 𝜀it is 
the time-variant unobservable term (i.e., the shock), which is independently and identically 
normal distributed, εit ~ N IID (0, 𝜎𝜀
2) and the 𝜀𝑖𝑡 are independent of the 𝑥𝑖𝑡
  for all i and t. The 
binary decision is then consistent with the following equation:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1(𝑥𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡)    𝑖𝑓    𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ > 0 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 0   𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 
(6) 
It is assumed that, γi~N IID (0, 𝜎𝛾
2), and that there is independence between unobserved 
individual effects and the observable covariates, xit, and between unobservable individual 
effects and the idiosyncratic random effect, εit. Finally, the correlation of the composite error 
term, γi + εit, is given by corr (uit, uis), i.e.,  ρ = 
𝜎𝛾
2
(𝜎𝛾
2 + 𝜎𝜀
2)
 , for t,s=1,2,..T and t≠s, which represents 
the proportion of the overall error variance explained by the the individual effect. 
However, as described above, incorporating unobserved individual-specific effects requires two 
main assumptions being satisfied: 1) independence of individual heterogeneity with the 
covariates and 2) strict exogeneity of the error term, conditional on the individual heterogeneity 
component. 
The failure of just one of the two assumptions produces inconsistently estimated coefficients 
(i.e., the estimated coefficients will pick up some of the effects of the unobservable random 
error term, 𝜀𝑖𝑡). 
In order to remove this problem, I follow the approach popularized by Mundlak (1981) and 
Chamberlain (1984), which allows for a correlated random-effects probit model. Thus, I allow 
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for the correlation between individual unobserved effects and the observable time-varying 
regressors. 
Following Mundlak (1981), I formulate the dependence between 𝑥𝑖𝑡 and 𝛾𝑖 by assuming that 
the time-invariant individual unobserved effects are a linear function of the average of all time-
variant covariates, that is:  
𝛾𝑖 =  ?̅?𝑖
′𝜃 +  𝛼𝑖 (7) 
where ?̅?𝑖
′ denotes the time average of the vector 𝑥𝑖𝑡 = (𝑥𝑖𝑙𝑡,…,𝑥𝑖𝑀𝑡)′ containing the M elements 
of 𝑥𝑖𝑡 describing the time-varying covariates for the individual i over time t, and with 𝛼𝑖~N IID 
(0, 𝜎𝛼
2) and independent of the 𝑥𝑖𝑡 and the 𝜀𝑖𝑡 for all i,t. 
Thus, eq.(5) can be rewritten as   
𝑦𝑖𝑡
∗ =  𝑥′𝑖𝑡𝛽 +  ?̅?𝑖
′𝜃 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (8) 
 
4.4 The Data 
4.4.1   The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) 
The data used for the analysis in this chapter stems from the Survey of Income and 
Program Participation (SIPP), which is maintained by the U.S. Census Bureau. The SIPP is a 
longitudinal survey of household that are interviewed every four months. Its longitudinal design 
allows to keep track of all the individuals into the household and to collect information, on each 
member of the household, related to a large set of variables.  
The SIPP consists of a collection of panels and each panel consists of a new random sample. 
Within each panel, all the sampled individuals are interviewed every four months. The SIPP 
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divides each panel into four sub-samples and each sub-sample is referred to as a rotation group. 
These four rotation groups enter the SIPP survey at different points in time.82 Respondents 
provide information about their lives during the previous four months, which are referred to as 
the reference months.83  
The SIPP collects information using two different modules: the core wave files and the topical 
module files.84  
The core module files are run each four months and they provide information on employment 
status, earnings/income, demographic characteristics, participation to public programs 
supporting household’s income and other additional variables.85  
Information on the labour market state the individuals belong to is collected at a higher 
frequency, usually weekly or monthly, compared to other datasets. However, for some variables 
information is collected for one month and then the value is reported for the other three months 
forming a wave.  
Topical module files contain extra questions that are asked for each reference wave (four-month 
period) to the same respondent. Information collected in the topical module files is related, 
broadly, to the following categories: assets and liabilities, well-being expenses, material 
hardship measures, fertility history, medical expenses, retirement plan, children support, 
welfare reforms, disability statistics and other minor variables. However, these are variables for 
                                                          
82  For example, for the 2008 SIPP panel, the entry months for these rotation groups are, respectively, May, June, 
July and August 2008, respectively. 
83  This implies that the collection of information is made retrospectively, a feature that helps to somewhat 
overcome the problem of left-censoring. The information provided for the four months is thus contained in 
what is called a reference wave. 
84  For the sake of completeness, it must be reported how the SIPP offers a third type of file as well, the longitudinal 
research file, which contains information on all the waves of a panel. 
85  Regarding labour market data, information on occupation, industry, employer identification, starting and 
ending date for the job, up to two main jobs, is collected as well. 
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which the values are not collected subsequently in all the waves. Indeed, topics vary across 
waves. Hence, the values are collected at a lower frequency, usually yearly, i.e., every three 
waves, and for only one out of four months in a wave.  
The advantage of the SIPP over similar data sources, such as the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID), National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NYLS) and British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS), is that the questionnaires collect a broader range of information 
concerning labour market history and asset holdings.   
The primary focus of our investigation is on the Assets and Liabilities topical module file, since 
it provides information on the balance sheet of observed units. The Assets and Liabilities topical 
module file is particularly well-suited for studying the effects of wealth on labour market 
transitions, because the objective of this study is to investigate the relationship between the 
“individual” labour market transitions and the “individual” wealth and the Asset and Liabilities 
topical module collects very reliable information on assets/wealth and liabilities at the 
individual level.86  
The topical module files contain information on liquid assets such as shares, stocks, bonds, 
saving accounts, pension plans such as IRA, 401 k and KEOG, together with information on 
more illiquid assets such as real estate property, business equity and life insurance policies. 
Information is also collected on household liabilities with data on mortgages, financial debt, 
credit cards debt and loans related to the ownership of vehicles and businesses.  
                                                          
86  Information on assets and liabilities is collected at the household level as well. However, for variables reporting 
assets and liabilities owned jointly by the married couple, the SIPP provides individual values by dividing the 
overall value by two and then imputing to each individual her own fraction. For the other variables not involved 
in such imputation procedure, in order to exploit them for the investigation I carry out in this chapter, I follow 
the same procedure used by SIPP and specified above, but with a further correction. The values of the variables 
at the household level will be recast at the individual level by dividing the overall value by the number of 
individuals that are potentially involved in the ownership of the asset, who are once again the two married 
persons if this is the case, or the single individual if there is no presence of a marriage. 
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For the investigation in this study, I focus on the period 1996-2012 because the structure of the 
SIPP panels has incurred in a major change after the review of the collection process, which 
took place in 1995. The original design for administrating SIPP provided for a set of continuous 
panels, running for three years, with a new panel starting each year and a sample of roughly 
20,000 households interviewed. Post 1996 panels exhibit a larger and increasing sample.87 
Moreover, the design of the panels has moved towards a structure avoiding any kind of 
overlapping, which was an underlying feature of the previous panels. After the change in 1996, 
the new structure of the SIPP provides for the start of a new panel after the end of the previous 
one. Furthermore, the panels are spanning a longer period of time and this implies the increase 
of person-months observations. 
Regarding the Assets and Liabilities topical module files, the interviews were initially planned 
to be conducted in the third, the sixth, the ninth and the twelfth wave for each panel. 
Nevertheless, only the 1996 panel was successfully fully completed, while in the 2001 panel 
the last wave (the twelfth wave) is missing. In the 2004 panel only data for the first two waves 
were collected, i.e., the third and the sixth, because of a lack of funding. In the 2008 panel, data 
have been only collected in the fourth, seventh and tenth wave.88  
Hence, from 1996 to 2013, there are four panels: 1996, 2001, 2004 and 2008, and I use data 
from 12 waves: 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011.  
The sample selection procedure adopted in the study restricts the final sample to individuals 
between the age of 18 and 65, and that are not included in one of the following categories: 1) 
                                                          
87  The sample interviewed has steadily increased from 40,183 households in the 1996 panel to 52,013 households 
in the 2008 panel. 
88  While most of the households included in the first wave of the Asset and Liabilities topical module file are re-
interviewed in the other waves of the same panel, as being part of the same representative randomly drawn 
sample, a few households were not observed in the subsequent sample. The number is quite small and this 
should not affect our results. Moreover, I take into account only individuals present in all the topical waves for 
each panel. 
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disabled individuals, 2) individuals with health problems, 3) individuals in armed force, 4) 
retired individuals, 5) individuals that are owners of one or more businesses and 6) individuals 
working in other than the private non-charitable and not family managed firms sector. All 
individuals in the sample are observed in all the waves for each panel in which they are 
included. This implies that individuals, with missing values in one or more waves of the panel 
they belong to, are dropped.   
Employed individuals are identified using the methodology of the Current Population Survey 
(CPS). This means all individuals who report to be in the employment status in the week 
including the 12th day of each month are considered employed. Unemployed individuals are 
defined as those not working during the week of the interview. Out-of-labour force workers 
(i.e., inactive workers) are those neither having a job nor reporting being on layoff or looking 
for one during the week of the interview and during the past three weeks. All variables are 
expressed in levels, but age, labour market experience, household size, wage and spouse’s wage 
are defined in log terms.   
The quality of wealth data in the Asset and Liabilities topical module file has been under 
scrutiny, by researchers and data-users as government organizations, for a long time. The reason 
for this in-depth analysis of the SIPP data concerning individuals and households' wealth stems 
from the specific goal of the survey itself. The SIPP dataset has been constructed in order to 
study the implementation of the participation  to social programs. This makes the low-income 
(and usually low-wealth) individuals as the natural target of the program. However, 
oversampling low-income households may produce discrepancies in the representativeness of 
the wealth data in the SIPP compared to the population wealth. In this sense, the analysis of 
wealth data has usually been carried out by using data from the Survey of Consumer Finances 
(SCF), which offers a more detailed micro-level information about households' wealth holdings 
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and presents the interesting characteristic to oversampling high-income households that 
enhances the representativeness of the right tail of the distribution of wealth.  
However, the investigations on the quality of SIPP wealth data conducted by, firstly, Czajka, 
Jacobson and Cody (2003) and, secondly, by Eggleston and Klee (2015), comparing wealth 
estimates in SIPP and SCF, show that the level and distribution of wealth in the SIPP replicates 
quite well that of SCF.89 Czajka, Jacobson and Cody (2003) study the wealth estimates for 
Wave 9 of the 1996 SIPP panel and compare the results to the estimates for SCF for the same 
period.90 They find that SIPP estimates of aggregate net worth, aggregate assets and aggregate 
debts are 75 percent, 80 percent and 101 percent of their SCF analogs. Comparisons show that 
the SIPP data represent well the debt categories, together with 401 k and thrift accounts, and 
real estate values related to primary home. 
Eggleston and Klee (2015) replicate the same investigation using the 2008 SIPP panel, 
concerning the period September and December 2010 and compare it with the analog from 
SCF. This analysis followed the previous study of Czajka, Jacobson and Cody (2003) in order 
to evaluate the implementation of a set of suggestions formulated by the authors devoted to get 
a better representativeness of the SIPP wealth data.  
New results show that the median net worth for SIPP is now about 84 percent of the SCF 
estimate, the mean of aggregate wealth in SIPP being 75 percent of the SCF and the SIPP 
estimate of the 75th percentile being 87 percent of the SCF counterpart. Finally, Eggleston and 
                                                          
89  This result is evident for the study of Eggleston and Klee (2015), while it holds only for the group excluding 
the wealthiest households for the study of Czajka, Jacobson and Cody (2003). This last group is defined in 
these studies as being represented by households with a level of wealth above two million dollars. The 
proportion of this group in SCF to the same group in SIPP is equal to 2.66, since in SIPP it is reported 550 
unweighted high wealth households against 1,082 in the SCF sample, upon 6,942 and 33,795 households 
interviewed in, respectively, the SCF and SIPP. The difference between the two results is due to the 
implementation of some measures suggested by Czajka, Jacobson and Cody (2003) after their study to improve 
the reliability of data from wealthiest households. 
90  Precisely, the studies refer to the period between the end of 1998 and the beginning of 1999. 
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Klee (2015) find the SIPP estimate of asset mean is 89 percent of the SCF analog, while there 
is an estimate close to 100 percent for the debt average for both datasets. These results show a 
dramatic improvement in the representativeness of the SIPP wealth data since they refer to the 
full sample, i.e., the sample including the wealthiest group.91   
4.4.2     Sample Descriptive Statistics 
A description of the characteristics of the sample in terms of the main variables is 
provided in Table 4.1.  As discussed in the previous section, the sample includes all individuals 
in the SIPP with age above 18 and below 65. However, I drop all the observations related to 
individuals with mental and physical disabilities, retired, in armed forces, running one or more 
business and working in the public sector or charitable organizations.92 I also drop all the 
observations for individuals that are not present in the relevant waves of the topical module for 
each panel. To be more precise, there is not a balanced panel since the number of individuals 
vary among the panels, but it is required that individuals observed in each panel do not have 
any break in their records. Panel A of Table 4.1 reports individual characteristics related to 
demographics, labour market status, education, and other variables. Panel B of Table 4.1 
exhibits summary statistics for financial variables, e.g. asset holdings and liabilities, total 
income and salary income. While in Panel A the table displays the mean for these non-financial 
variables,93 Panel B reports both the mean and standard deviations for the financial variables. 
                                                          
91  Furthermore, Eggleston and Klee (2015) suggest that existing discrepancies in the estimates between SIPP and 
SCF might stem from differences in question text wording. Indeed, it seems that the difference between SIPP 
and SCF ownership rates for some assets and liabilities stems from the larger list of examples of that class of 
assets and liabilities produced in the SCF compared to that in the SIPP. Moreover, the authors find evidence 
that small differences in the wording produce large variability in the answers, with the final outcome affecting 
the estimates of assets and liabilities. 
92  With this sample selection procedure I drop 124,666 observations. 
93  Tables including standard deviations for the demographic variables are available from the author upon request. 
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In Table 4.1 are reported summary statistics for the pooled sample, the individuals who 
transition into out-of-labour force and the individuals who transition into unemployment in 
column 1, column 2 and column 3, respectively. Then in column 4 are reported averages for the 
sample of individuals who do not show any labour force movement. The t-statistics (with 
asterisks denoting significance levels) are provided in columns 5, 6 and 7, comparing across 
distinct sub-samples. 
The statistics presented in Table 4.1 indicate that in the pooled sample the distribution between 
employed, unemployed and out-of-labour force workers shows a large proportion of the 
employed (75 percent of the overall sample) with respect to out-of-labour force workers (only 
20 percent), compared to their empirical values (roughly 60 percent for unemployed and 35 
percent for out-of-labour force agents). Moreover, part-time workers are more likely to 
transition out-of-labour force rather than to unemployment (40 percent and 26.10 percent). 
On average, the summary statistics also show that individuals transitioning into out-of-labour 
force, compared to those transitioning into unemployment, are younger (31 years old in the first 
case and 33 years old in the second one) and more likely to be females (66 percent vs 50 
percent). As it might be expected, individuals who transition into unemployment have a higher 
labour market experience (14 years vs 11 years).94 As regards the variable race, one can see that 
the blacks are the group of individuals more likely to transitioning into unemployment and less 
likely to transitioning into out-of-labour force. On average, individuals with higher education 
levels are more likely to transitioning into out-of-labour force rather than into unemployment, 
with people having less than high school education representing the 22.5 percent of individuals 
                                                          
94  Labour market experience is measured using age minus six years related to the pre-school period and minus 
the time spent in schooling. 
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moving into unemployment against the 18.70 percent of individuals with less than high school 
transitioning into out-of-labour force.  
In Panel B of Table 4.1 are reported the summary statistics for the financial variables. One can 
firstly observe that individuals not making any labour market transition result with the highest 
values for liquid and illiquid financial assets, wages and income. Looking at the individuals 
making a labour market transition, it can be observed that individuals transitioning into 
unemployment have larger wealth values compared to those transitioning into out-of-labour 
force, with a value for liquid assets (stocks, shares, bonds, and other liquid wealth variables) 
which is roughly 20 percent higher. The same result holds for the individual’s wage, with 
individuals transitioning into unemployment displaying a wage which is 30 percent larger than 
that of the individuals transitioning into out-of-labour force. Interestingly, partner's wage is 
larger for the latter group than for the former one. However, the overall level of wealth for the 
two groups of individuals does not show a significant difference. This result is due to the 
rebalancing role of the illiquid assets.  
[INSERT TABLE 4.1 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 4.2 presents the correlation matrix for the key variables of interest.  Unsurprisingly, one 
can see that the correlations between the two different forms of wealth (liquid wealth and total 
wealth) and all other variables are very similar, with the largest differences observed in the 
correlation with the variable single for the marital status (-0.14 for liquid wealth and -0.24 for 
total wealth) and household size (-0.03 for liquid wealth and -0.11 for total wealth). Furthemore, 
it is found that wealth is positively correlated with the highest education level (i.e., university), 
even if the coefficient is not significant, and significantly and negatively correlated with the 
two lowest levels of the same variable. Among the other variables, one can observe how age, 
labour market experience and household income are strongly positively correlated with wealth 
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and all significant. This outcome is somewhat expected since wealth tends to increase with a 
longer duration of the employment relationship and/or over the life-cycle of an individual. 
However, the largest positive correlation is found between wealth and wage, with values for 
the two types of wealth of 0.42 and 0.46 (while the correlation between wealth and spouse’s 
wage is still positive and significant, but with a value around 0.10), suggesting that changes in 
individual’s wage are largely mirrored by changes in wealth in the same direction. Finally, it 
can be noted how the correlation is positive between wealth and the no transition variable, while 
it is negative for the other two transition variables (i.e., transition into inactivity and into 
unemployment), even if the correlation coefficients are low.    
[INSERT TABLE 4.2 ABOUT HERE] 
4.4.3    Definition of Wealth 
Given the goal of this chapter to study the relationship between wealth and labour market 
transitions, a preliminary question to be addressed is that concerning the definition of wealth to 
be used. In principle, the relevant wealth variable for our investigation should include any type 
of accumulated savings that can be used to finance consumption (i.e., search activity). However, 
it has been often claimed that wealth can be differentiated in terms of liquidity and risk, and it 
has been remarked that not all the forms of wealth can be gathered together in order to construct 
a general variable wealth. Real estate property, life insurance or business equity play a different 
role from bonds, shares, saving accounts in the decision of agents. Algan, Cheron, Hairault and 
Langot (2003) empirically show that only the most liquid form of wealth plays a role in the 
choice of agents to transition from employment to unemployment. Bloemen and Stancanelli 
(2001) show that only liquid form of wealth affects the decision of individuals to accept a job 
offer. Thus, this empirical evidence points out to sustain a narrowed definition of wealth to be 
identified as precautionary savings. 
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In other words, wealth should be identified as precautionary saving that allows workers to move 
between labour market states without large fluctuations in consumption (i.e., allowing search 
activity).95  Thus, I deal with  definition of wealth that includes the most liquid wealth 
aggregates such as savings accounts, shares, bonds and stocks. 
4.4.4    Definition of the Dependent Variable 
The SIPP provides information at a very high frequency on whether an individual can be 
classified as employed or in a non-employment state, i.e., either unemployed or inactive. The 
individuals are considered as employed if they are recoded at the monthly level in the 
employment state. I use the variable RMESR, that identifies, at a monthly frequency, the labour 
market state for each individual included in the dataset.  It takes values ranging from 1, defining 
a worker with a job the entire month and working all weeks, to 8, defining a worker with no job 
all month, who never looked for a job or was on layoff in the same period  
Thus, I can classify workers as employed, if they take values 1 or 2 in the variable RMESR, as 
unemployed, if they take values 6 and 7, and finally as inactive, if they take value 8.  
However, the variable RMESR does not specify “uniquely” the labour market state. Indeed, 
this variable can also take values 3, 4 and 5, that define the cases where individuals spend only 
a fraction of monthly time into employment (respectively, from 1 to 4 weeks due to layoff, from 
2 to 4 weeks with no time spent looking for a job or on layoff, from 2 to 4 weeks with time 
spent on layoff or looking for a job). Thus, it is possible to have workers classified at weekly 
level in different labour market states in the same month.   
                                                          
95  Algan, Cheron, Hairault and Langot (2003) concentrate on assets truly used as a buffer stock against 
idiosyncratic labour market risks. According to the authors, these assets should increase with employment 
spells, as workers are willing to hedge against future income risks, and should decrease with unemployment 
spells. 
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To overcome this problem and to make the classification of individuals in different labour 
market states fully consistent with the definition of the analogs in the Current Population 
Survey, I look at the value taken by the variable RMESR on the week including the 12th of 
each month, as explained in section 4.4.1.  
Through this information collected in the dataset, I am able to construct the two transition 
probabilities: the probability of transitioning to unemployment and the probability of 
transitioning to out-of-labour force, since in this work I am interested in examining the “exit 
margin”.  
In theory, two possible approaches can be followed in the construction of the dependent 
variable. Either considering only the transition from employment to the two non-employment 
states or a broader definition including the overall transition into each of the two non-
employment states from the two left labour market states, i.e., the transition of individuals from 
employment and unemployment to out-of-labour force and the transition of individuals from 
employment and out-of-labour force to unemployment. 
I follow, in this study, the specification embraced by the second definition. 
Furthermore, it is needed to clarify the time dimension of the dependent variable. In this respect, 
I define the transition probability according to the following criteria: an individual is denoted 
as entering the unemployment state (out-of-labour force state) whether she is employed or 
unemployed (employed or inactive) during the current period and inactive (unemployed) in the 
subsequent period. 
As it can be observed from the summary statistics, the sample presents 7,063 observations for 
the transition into out-of-labour force and 5,271 observations for the transition into 
unemployment. 
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Since the pooled sample consists of 276,686 observations, the transitions into out-of-labour 
force represent roughly 3 percent of full sample, while the transitions into unemployment 
represent 2 percent of the full sample. 
4.5 Results 
Results reported for different specifications of the model are obtained using the random-
effects probit estimator with Mundlak terms. I produce marginal effects coefficient estimates 
(level and averages effects) for the explanatory variables.96 Furthermore, I also provide the 
permanent effect coefficients obtained through a test on the estimated joint effects of the mean 
and level terms of the variables.97  
Besides the wealth variable, the baseline estimation contains binary variables for gender, race 
(3), marital status (3), education (3), year (10), U.S. states (50), along with variables expressed 
in logs such as age, labour market experience and household size,98 and in column (5) and (6), 
the initial labour market state as well.   
The dependent variables are, respectively, the probability of transitioning into out-of-labour 
force (OLFt+1) and the probability of transitioning into unemployment (Ut+1). Columns (1) and 
(2) report estimates for the transition probabilities with liquid wealth as the main regressor. 
Columns (3) and (4) report estimates for the transition probabilities with total wealth as the 
main regressor. Using liquid wealth as the main regressor, in column (5) are reported estimates 
for the probability of becoming out-of-labour force, conditional on transitioning from 
                                                          
96   The marginal effects compute the probability of a positive outcome assuming that the random effect is zero. 
97  More precisely the joint effect is estimated by imposing the condition of strict equality in the linear constraint 
on the difference between each separated Mundlak term and level variable. Following Panos, Pouliakas and 
Zangelidis (2014), I obtain the coefficients and standard errors of the permanent effects using a test for the 
linear constraint under the hypothesis that the summation of the mean and level terms of the variables are equal 
to zero (e.g., 𝛾𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ + 𝜗𝑤𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑡ℎ = 0).  
98   In different model specifications, I also include and express in log terms the wage and spouse’s wage. 
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unemployment, with employment as the reference category, while in column (6) are reported 
estimates for the probability of becoming unemployment, conditional on transitioning from out-
of-labour force, still using employment as the reference category.99  
In Table 4.3, columns (1) and (2), are reported the coefficients obtained using the benchmark 
definition of wealth, as the main regressor. Indeed, as explained in Section 4.3, since I am 
investigating how wealth can affect the “exit margin” in the labour market transition 
probabilities, it makes sense to assume that using the variable wealth, defined as the summation 
of all liquid and illiquid assets, would not represent the more appropriate definition for the 
explanatory variable in our analysis. I then rely on a definition of wealth closely related to the 
concept of precautionary saving, as the relevant form of wealth that can finance searching. 
Thus, I use as main regressor a definition of wealth denoting the sum of market values for IRA 
accounts, KEOGH100 accounts, 401k, 403k and thrift plans, face value of U.S. saving bonds, 
estimates of non-interest checking accounts and interest accounts, amount of bonds/U.S. 
securities and net value of vehicles. Hence, I define this variable as “liquid wealth” since it 
represents the largest aggregated form of liquid wealth in the SIPP.101   
                                                          
99  The estimation procedure includes the state dummy variable with the reference category state1 (Arizona).  
However, the coefficients for the state dummy variables are not reported in the tables, but are available upon 
request. The reference category for gender, race, marital status, education and year are, respectively, male, 
white, single, university, 1997 and 2011. The variable education is defined from the lowest level to the highest 
as 1) less than high school, 2) high school, 3) less than university. The variable marital status defined for 
married people includes both cases with and without the spouse in the household. 
100  The KEOGH is an employer-funded, tax-deferred retirement plan designed for unincorporated businesses or 
self-employed people. 
101  Despite being denoted only as liquid wealth, it must be stressed how the value is defined in net terms, i.e., it is 
computed as net of “liquid” debts.  
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However, to compare results through different specifications of the wealth variable, I also 
introduce a more illiquid wealth variable as the main regressor (i.e., the variable total wealth102) 
in the columns (3) and (4), and I express it as the summation of liquid and illiquid wealth.  
 [INSERT TABLE 4.3 ABOUT HERE] 
Results in Table 4.3, columns (1) and (2), show that a transitory increase in wealth exerts a 
positive impact on the probability of transitioning to out-of-labour force and the probability of 
transitioning to unemployment. However, the magnitude of the coefficients for the two 
transition probabilities is quite different, with the former value being twice as large as the latter.  
One can also observe that the level effect for females is negative in column (1) but positive in 
column (2), making this group of individuals, compared to men, less likely to make a transition 
into out-of-labour force and more likely to move into unemployment. The level effect for age 
and labour market experience shows a negative sign. This makes less likely the probability to 
transitioning into the two non-employment states. This result might be interpreted as confirming 
the standard view seeing employed with a temporary increase in job experience as individuals 
more attached to their labour market state and non-employed as individuals less likely to re-
adjust their inter-temporal choice between leisure and searching. However, the sign for labour 
market experience becomes positive when one considers the permanent effect. This last effect 
could be interpreted in the context of growing earnings linked to experience. A permanent 
change in labour market experience should bring the individuals, having gained a higher level 
of skills, to look for a higher wage. In this sense, one would expect to see individuals 
experiencing a spell of search in their labour market history, making them more likely to move 
either in the unemployment or in the out-of-labour force state, to look for a better and high-
                                                          
102  The variable total wealth is also defined in net terms. 
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paying job. Finally, while the transitory effect for household size is negative, suggesting 
individuals living in households with “new arrivals” tend to be less likely to transitioning into 
the non-employment states, one finds that the temporary effects for education are positive and 
decreasing with the increase in the levels (i.e., years) of education, with the value for the 
transition probability to out-of-labour force larger than those for transitioning to 
unemployment. The permanent effect for education shows the same sign, but values are smaller. 
Interestingly, it must be noted how the permanent effect of an increase in wealth on both 
transition probabilities is negative, with the coefficient for the transition probability to out-of-
labour force much larger than that for the transition probability to unemployment. 
Using the values for the marginal effects together with the predicted probability values of labour 
market transitions (which are computed for each individual and then averaged over all 
individuals), that are equal to 0.0255 for the transition probability into out-of-labour force and 
to 0.019 for the transition probability into unemployment, one can see that a transitory increase 
in individual wealth by $ 100,000 dollars increases by 50 percent the probability of transitioning 
to out-of-labour force and by 30 percent the probability of transitioning to unemployment. On 
the contrary, a permanent increase in individual wealth by $ 100,000 dollars decreases by 60 
percent the probability of transitioning to out-of-labour force and by 40 percent the probability 
of transitioning to unemployment.  
In columns (3) and (4) a broader definition of wealth (including all other forms of wealth 
reported in the dataset such as real estate property assets, life insurance policies and equity 
business) is used. Looking at the values for the controls, one can see that females are still, 
compared to males, more likely to make a transition into unemployment and less likely to 
transitioning into out-of-labour force. The signs for age, labour market experience, household 
size and education are not significantly different from those reported in columns (1) and (2).  
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Furthermore, the estimates confirm that a transitory increase in wealth exerts a positive impact 
on the probability of transitioning to out-of-labour force and unemployment, while the sign is 
reversed for the permanent effect. However, coefficients are now lower than in the case with 
liquid wealth as main regressor.  
Using the values for the marginal effects together with the predicted probability values of labour 
market transitions, it is found that a transitory increase in individual wealth would increase the 
probability of transitioning to unemployment by 18 percent and the probability of transitioning 
to out-of-labour force by 16 percent, while a permanent increase in wealth decreases by 21 
percent the former and by 19 percent the latter transition probability.  
Finally, in columns (5) and (6), it can be observed that using as main regressor the benchmark 
definition of wealth, together with the inclusion of the current labour market states as further 
controls in the estimation of the model, produces results in line with those obtained in columns 
(1) and (2).  
An interesting feature in this estimation is the different set of results obtained from the 
transitory-permanent decomposition. Indeed, it can be observed a positive impact of a transitory 
increase in wealth in the transition probabilities, while the sign is negative when the effect of a 
permanent increase in the same variable is taken into account. Rationalizing this difference in 
the signs of the marginal effects (estimated and computed) is quite challenging, but it would 
make sense to interpret the decision of the individuals to start a new search, when there is a 
transitory increase in wealth (positive sign for the coefficient of transition probability in 
unemployment and out-of-labour force), as a mechanism related to the empirical evidence on 
the life-cycle wage dynamics.  
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More specifically, one may think of individuals as making transitions into the non-employment 
state (i.e., starting a new search) when they look for a better job that can guarantee them a higher 
wage profile over their life-cycle period. Hence, a transitory increase in wealth does not play 
any role in terms of providing a permanent higher level of labour income since it does not 
represent a permanent change. However, it can allow people to start a a new search (i.e, 
financing a new search) in order to exploit opportunities present in the labour market and in this 
way to match with a high-paying job (a feature reflected in the empirical path of the individual's 
life-cycle wage dynamics). In this sense, it is also possible to rationalize the negative impact of 
a permanent increase in wealth on the transition probabilities. Indeed, wealth could play the 
role of a close substitute of labour income flows. More precisely, the permanent increase in 
wealth relaxes the need for a new search for the worker in order to find a job allowing for 
smoothing the life-cycle consumption profile. Then, the resulting low willingness of individuals 
to quit the present job to start a new search.     
 While this explanation is quite intuitive, more challenging is to rationalize the higher positive 
value for the probability of transitioning into out-of-labour force (around 60 percent) compared 
to the probability of transitioning into unemployment (around 40 percent) when the case of a 
transitory increase in wealth is taken into account. The same issue raises also for the case with 
a permanent shock to wealth, where it is more likely to observe a transition into unemployment 
rather than into out-of-labour force.  
However, it is possible to rationalize even these effects using the above mentioned approach 
based on the concepts of life-cycle wage dynamics and consumption smoothing. 
Indeed, the presence of a transitory shock to wealth makes individuals more willing to search 
for a new high-paying job. Nevertheless, a movement into unemployment (rather than into out-
of-labour force) would make this event less likely because unemployment is a labour market 
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state that is considered populated by more employment attached individuals, i.e., the 
unemployment state allows for individuals to enjoy a higher probability to find a job in a shorter 
period of time. Basically, following a transitory wealth shock, workers transitioning into 
unemployment would be going to return soon into the employment state and receive a wage 
quite similar to their last one, since labour market conditions do not dramatically change in 
short period of times. Thus, the choice of individuals to transitioning into the out-of-labour 
force state makes it evident the desire for a higher-paying job that normally requires a long 
search and changes in labour market conditions. 
The same argument holds in the case of a permanent shock to wealth. In this event, it is likely 
for individuals showing a preference for a movement into unemployment rather than into out-
of-labour force in order to find a new job shortly. Indeed, agents such may want to return on 
the previous consumption path after the permanent shock (or they are less willing to spend time 
looking for a high-paying job if inactive workers) since new higher levels of consumption are 
guaranteed by the permanent increase in wealth, without relying on looking for a better paid 
job. 
While the above explanation can work well when one refers to transitions between employment 
and non-employment states, it might be questioned when the additional flows unemployment 
to out-of-labour force and out-of-labour force to unemployment are also considered. Does the 
previous explanation fit with the empirical results for the transition probabilities for these two 
additional margins? 
It can be claimed that the larger value for the probability of transitioning from unemployment 
to out-of-labour force compared to the one for the probability of transitioning from out-of-
labour force to unemployment might be still rationalized using the same arguments. Indeed, it 
is possible to state that the transitory increase in wealth relaxes the intensity of the search 
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activity for individuals. Then, what is observed in the estimates is the prevailing of the 
movement from unemployment to out-of-labour force rather than the one from out-of-labour 
force to unemployment.  
In Table 4.4 are reported the results for the model with three different but insightful 
specifications for the wealth variable. Precisely, while the results in Table 4.3 are obtained 
through what can be defined as the benchmark “linear” model in wealth, in Table 4.4, columns 
(1) and (2), are reported results using a “non-linear” model, expressed as a fifth-order 
polynomial in wealth.103 In columns (3) and (4) I report results using the wealth percentiles as 
the main regressor and, finally, in columns (5) and (6) I present results from a model with wealth 
expressed in logs and with a dummy variable controlling for not strictly positive wealth values.   
[INSERT TABLE 4.4 ABOUT HERE] 
As expected, it is found that the values for all the control variables show no significant 
differences from those in Table 4.3. Thus, I point to analyse the impact of wealth on the 
transition probabilities. Results from the model specification including the fifth order 
polynomial term are not significantly different from those reported in the benchmark case using 
a linear term in wealth as main regressor. However, it must be highlighted that the wealth 
parameters estimated are all significant only for the probability of transitioning into 
unemployment, while only the coefficient defining the linear relationship between wealth and 
transition probabilities is significant in column (1). Results in columns (3) and (4) show that a 
                                                          
103  Testing the relationship between wealth and labout market transitions by introducing a fifth order polynomial 
in wealth follows from the recent contribution of Lusardi and Hurst (2004) showing that a higher order  
polynomial in wealth can capture well the relationship between wealth and the probability of becoming 
entrepreneur. This result would stem from the observation that wealth data include a very large fraction of 
individuals concentrated in the tails of its distribution, i.e., a large number of individuals, holding very 
negligible or very large amounts of wealth, are concentrated in the tails. Strictly speaking, it can be argued that 
Hurst and Lusardi’s work and the present one are investigating two different relationships. Thus, the use of the 
fifth order polynomial should be taken into account with some degrees of freedom. However, I still believe this 
exercise is worth to be performed for comparative reasons. 
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transitory increase in wealth makes individuals more likely to transitioning to the non-
employment states. More specifically moving upward in each percentile makes individuals 
more likely to transitioning into out-of-labour force and unemployment by 0.39 percent and 
0.52 percent, respectively. The effect is reversed for the permanent effect, with values of -1.18 
percent for the former and -1.58 percent for the latter. The impact of an increase in wealth on 
the transition probabilities is smoother for the case where the wealth variable is expressed in 
logs, but the signs are not different from those discussed for the other specifications. 
4.6 Robustness Analysis 
Previous results were obtained based on a definition of wealth strictly related to the idea 
of precautionary saving. In this section, I still stick to this assumption, but in the model are 
introduced some further controls to check the robustness of the results. Firstly, one might think 
different indicators of more illiquid forms of wealth can still affect the agents' choice of 
transitioning between labour market states. A remarkable advantage of the SIPP is that this 
survey contains very detailed information on assets and debts related to real estate property, 
especially primary home. Thus, a baseline model including as additional controls home 
ownership, mortgage debts and other rental properties is estimated. Whether individuals are 
able or not to borrow money against accumulated housing wealth, identified by these variables, 
to financing search can be regarded as a controversial issue. However, empirical evidence 
seems to support this hypothesis, especially for the U.S. economy, where housing property 
appears to play the role of an alternative source of income used to finance consumption. 
Case, Quigly and Shiller (2005), using a panel of developed countries (U.S. and OECD 
countries) find that the housing wealth effect is larger than the stock market wealth effect. In 
their estimates a 1 percentage point increase in housing wealth increases consumption by 
roughly 11 percentage points.  Bostic, Gabriel and Painter (2009), using a matched sample of 
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household data from the Survey of Consumer Finance and the Consumer Expenditure Survey, 
find that the estimated elasticity of consumption spending with respect to housing wealth is in 
the range 0.06-0.08 over the 1989-2001 period, while for financial wealth is close to 0.02.104 
From results reported in Table 4.5, it can be observed how a transitory increase in home 
ownership and mortgages makes individuals more likely to transitioning into both 
unemployment and out-of-labour force. However, the permanent effect of these variables on 
the transition probabilities is generally negative, with the only exception of the positive values 
for home ownership as regards the transition probability into out-of-labour force. 
Looking at the estimates for wealth, one can find that there are not substantial changes from 
results obtained in the benchmark case. Thus individuals are more likely to transitioning into 
out-of-labour force and unemployed after a transitory increase in wealth and less likely to 
transitioning into out-of-labour force and unemployed after a permanent increase in wealth.  
Hence, controlling for the variables related to housing wealth shows there are not substantial 
differences in the impact of wealth on the transition probabilities.  
[INSERT TABLE 4.5 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 4.6 reports results for a model including the labour income flows. 
More precisely, personal wage and households' income, together with government transfers and 
parental support, are used as further controls.  The inclusion of household’s income in the model 
specification should account for the potential role this variable can play as a source of additional 
                                                          
104  It must be stressed that the results reported above are not conclusive on the relevance of the housing wealth in 
terms of impact on consumption. Indeed, it has been observed how the relationship between housing wealth 
and consumption should be interpreted not as a causal link since housing wealth could not be purely exogenous. 
Thus, what is basically observed might be only a comovement between housing wealth and consumption, 
reflected by common factors driving both variables. 
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income at the household level, since household income could be seen as a tool providing a risk-
sharing mechanism against labour income fluctuations and consequently allowing for labour 
market transitions. The same role can be avowed to government transfers and parental support.  
Findings for households’ income are provided in columns (1) and (2), and estimates for the 
variable wage are included in columns (3) to (6), with the presence in the last two columns of 
estimates for government transfers and parental support as well. 
The marginal effects for the controls show that a transitory increase in households’ income and 
own individuals wage makes agents more likely to transitioning into inactivity and 
unemployment, while the effect is reversed for the case of a permanent increase in these 
variables. The interpretation of these effects follows the basic discussion in section 4.3. It 
appears that a transitory increase in variables reflecting a rise in the income flow, such as 
households’ income, is an incentive for individuals to start a new search, while a permanent 
increase produces a sort of “income effect” for the individual, who is now less willing to search 
again for a new job. 
As concerns the role of government transfers one can observe that a transitory increase is 
significant only for the probability to transitioning into out-of-labour force, while a permanent 
increase exerts a negative impact for the probability to transitioning into out-of-labour force 
and a positive impact for that into unemployment.  
Estimates reported for the variable wealth confirm the standard qualitative results with the 
positive impact of a transitory increase in wealth on the probability of becoming inactive and 
unemployed, and a negative impact for the case of the permanent increase in wealth. 
However, it can be seen that quantitatively the effect of wealth is now quite different from 
previous results. Indeed, I find in columns (3) to (6) that a transitory increase in wealth increases 
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the probability to transitioning into out-of-labour force only by 20 percent, and the probability 
to transitioning into unemployment by roughly 12 percent. The values are negative and much 
lower for the permanent effect, i.e., 12 percent and 4 percent. 
A possible explanation for the striking divergence in the values of the transition probabilities 
found in this section can be linked to the role of the labour income variable in the searching 
choice of individuals`. A more detailed discussion on this point will be presented in the 
Conclusions. 
 [INSERT TABLE 4.6 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 4.7 reports, in columns (1) and (2), results for a model including as a further control the 
partner's wage (together with individual’s own wage, home ownership and mortgages). Then, 
in columns (3) to (6) I control for gender. The differentiation by gender is proposed as a further 
robustness check since in the literature on labour economics it has often been assumed that 
females are a slacked labour market attached group, representing individuals making labour 
market transitions driven by particular reasons. Attanasio, Low and Sanchez-Marcos (2005) 
investigate the role of female labour supply as an insurance mechanism against idiosyncratic 
labour income risks within the household. They find mixed results on this relationship. 
However, there is still some consensus that the female labour market participation would be 
driven by increasing individual’s labour income uncertainty at the household level and 
consequently the female labour supply would be affected by other forms of risk-sharing 
mechanism or insurance policies such as unemployment benefits or other public insurance 
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substitutes. Hence, it would make sense to investigate only the role of males in the relationship 
between wealth and labour market transition probabilities.105  
Looking at the estimates, one can observe that  the marginal effects for wage are all significant 
and similar to those reported in Table 4.6, while the marginal effect for spouse’s wage is small 
and often not significant. Examining the transitory and the permanent effects for wealth, only 
mildly higher values are found compared to those in Table 4.6 (where the model specification 
includes wage as a control variable), but still significantly lower than those obtained with the 
benchmark model in Table 4.3. Taking into account the  linear predicted transition probabilities 
differentiated by gender, it can be observed that wealth has a larger level effect for males than 
females when we consider the probability of transitioning into out-of-labour force, while the 
effect is smaller and not significant for the transition into unemployment. When the permanent 
effect of wealth is examined, it is found that female are less likely to transitioning into the two 
non-employment states compared to males. 
[INSERT TABLE 4.7 ABOUT HERE] 
As a final robustness check, occupation and industry variables are used as controls, together 
wih part-time working activity and union membership. So far, I have assumed a large 
homogeneity in the characteristics of individuals when they transition into out-of-labour force 
or unemployment. However, this can be the product of a selection bias across the workers. That 
is, the transition probabilities can be affected by the occupation or the industry sector. If some 
occupations or industries are more prone to changes in the business cycle, labour market 
conditions can deteriorate for these occupations/industries and producing a rise in the transition 
                                                          
105  A further widespread claim is that stressing the importance to investigate only males' transition probabilities 
because of the low number of females making labour market transitions in available data. However, this is not 
the case in our sample, where females' labour market transitions are quite large. 
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probabilities of individuals linked to them. I investigate the role of these variables in a model 
with a more detailed classification of occupations and industries by making use for the first 
variable of the SOC90 (3-digits code) classification system for occupations and for the latter of 
the NAICS97 (3-digits code) classification code for industry. As concerns the use of the SOC90 
system, it is well-known the fact that the occupational system using the three-digit Census code 
has been modified over time. In particular, in the period 1979-2015 it has faced four major 
changes. Furthermore, it has to be stressed how the adjustments in the occupational codes have 
been carried out in a period of high technology transformation. This has produced obvious 
implications in terms of missing data (some occupations have disappeared over time) with the 
usual problem of relying on the imputation procedure.106 The same problems are present for the 
NAICS97 system.  
Table 4.8 reports estimates. Columns (1) and (2) provide results for the case with part-time as 
additional control, columns (3) and (4) include union membership, while estimates in columns 
(5) and (6) are related to a model including three dummy variables to control for occupation 
and twenty dummy variables to control for the industry sector.  
It can be observed a positive level effect for both part-time and union membership, while the 
permanent effect is negative. For the three variables related to the occupation category, the level 
effect shows that individuals working in the each of the three categories are, compared to the 
reference category,  less likely to transitioning to unemployed, while the coefficients for the 
transitioning probability to out-of-labour force are not significant. However, looking at the 
permanent effect, one can observe that the sign is positive for the transition probability into out-
of-labour force as regards unskilled non-manual and manual, while the coefficients are not 
                                                          
106  A possible alternative to the three-digit code would be the two-digit code. However, this procedure code groups 
together distinct occupation. Moreover, the SIPP adopts the three-digit occupation classification. 
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significant for the transition into unemployment, apart from the unskilled manual, which is 
positive. 
The results for the effects of wealth on the transition probabilities do not show significant 
differences compared to previous findings. The model with the three variables defining the 
occupation variable (i.e., skilled manual, unskilled non-manual and unskilled manual, with 
skilled non-manual use as the reference category) replicates previous results as concerns the 
impact of a transitory and permanent increase in wealth.  
[INSERT TABLE 4.8 ABOUT HERE] 
4.7 Conclusions 
This chapter investigates the impact of wealth on the probability to transitioning either 
into out-of-labour force or unemployment. The analysis is carried out making use of 
longitudinal data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation, for the U.S. economy, 
over the period 1996-2013. To the best of my knowledge this is the first study trying to 
investigate this relationship making use of information collected in the SIPP. Indeed, previous 
studies have either focused only on a framework with two labour market states (employment 
and unemployment) or addressed the issue without developing any empirical analysis.  
In performing this exercise, I take advantage of the special features of the SIPP. This Survey, 
composed by a very large sample (more than 50,000 households per panel), is able to provide 
quite accurately information as concerns assets and liabilities at the individual level, together 
with high-frequency collected information on the labour market history of individuals.     
The results in this chapter show that wealth exerts a statistically significant impact on the 
probability of transitioning to out-of-labour force or unemployment for all the different 
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specifications of the wealth variable and it is still robust to a rich series of different controls. 
More precisely, building upon the transitory-permanent decomposition of wealth effect, I am 
able to identify a significant positive effect of a transitory increase in wealth on the probability 
to transitioning to out-of-labour force and unemployment, while a negative statistically 
significant effect on the transition probabilities is observed for the case with a permanent 
increase in wealth.  
The positive transitory effect of wealth could be explained by the willingness of the individuals 
to make labour state transitions (i.e. starting a search activity) when they look for a better job 
that can guarantee them a higher wage profile, a feature present in the empirical evidence on 
the life-cycle paths of wage dynamics, and consequently satisfying the permanent income 
hypothesis. Thus, a transitory increase in wealth can allow individuals to start a new search in 
order to exploit labour market opportunities allowing for consumption smoothing over the life-
cycle.  
On the other side, the negative permanent effect on the transition probabilities of an increase in 
wealth could be explained by the fact that the increase in wealth would play the role of a close 
substitute to the labour income flow. In this sense, the permanent increase in wealth 
disincentives individuals from starting a new search in order to find a better job. Then, the 
resulting drop in the transition probabilities as concerns the movements into out-of-labour force 
and unemployment. 
However, the estimated impact of wealth is larger for the probability of transitioning to out-of-
labour force than for the probability to transitioning to the unemployment state. Indeed, a well-
established result across the different model specifications is that a temporary increase of $ 
100,000 dollars in wealth leads, on average, to an increase of 50 percent in the probability of 
transitioning to out-of-labour force, but  it increases the probability of becoming unemployed 
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only by 30 percent. On the other hand, a permanent increase in wealth decreases the probability 
to transitioning into out-of-labour force by roughly 60 percent, and that to unemployment by 
40 percent.  
Thus, these findings reveals the presence of differences in the behaviour of agents when one 
examines their transitions into the non-employment states, i.e., the “exit margin”. 
Therefore, it is possible to argue that a theoretical model not including the presence of the out-
of-labour force workers or lumping them together with employed workers into a large non-
employment state, as it is currently done in the literature, is not supported by the empirical 
findings.  
However, one more point needs to be discussed. Indeed, it is also found in the results that the 
quantitative impact of wealth on the transition probabilities falls by two-third when the model 
specification includes the labour income variable. This result does not rule out the qualitative 
difference in terms of different effects produced by a change in wealth on the transition 
probabilities. However, it substantially affects the magnitude of the estimated values. I believe 
that this puzzling result can be rationalized if the relationship between wealth and wage is 
described as a convex combination, i.e., agents are at an interior point when we consider a 
positive amount of both variables. Looking at the correlation matrix, it can be observed how 
the correlation between the two variable is a figure around 40 percent. Hence, one can consider 
wage as a variable relaxing the binding constraint on wealth in terms of financing search, 
providing a further margin affecting the individuals’ decision to transition into the two non-
employment states.    
Finally, while these findings cannot be compared with previous literature given the novelty of 
this work as concerns the impact of wealth on the probability to becoming either inactive or 
 198 
 
unemployed, it is anyway possible to compare them with results from the probability to 
becoming an entrepreneur. For example, Hurst and Lusardi (2004) use a methodology similar 
to the one used in this study and in this sense one can try to somewhat outline some similarities. 
They find, using U.S. data, that an increase in wealth of $ 100,000 dollars would increase the 
probability of business ownership by 10 percent.107   
Thus, It would be possible to claim that wealth greatly affects the different choice of agents 
between starting a new searching or moving towards the self-employment state. Indeed, it 
would appear that wealth plays a much effective role in determining the probability of 
transitioning to out-of-labour force or unemployment, compared to its impact on the probability 
of becoming self-employed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
107  Sauer and Wilson (2016) propose a similar test for female entrepreneurship using UK data and they find that 
an increase in £1,000 pounds in liquidity raises the probability of starting a business by 8.5 percent relative to 
the sample mean. However, their results are largely affected by the particular sample composition and the 
personal wealth measures and entrepreneurship indicators used. 
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Notes: Averages (and standard deviations for selected variables) from SIPP 1996-2013. The variables included in 
the summary statistics are usually observed once per year in each panel, and each panel runs between 36 and 60 
months. Furthermore, the topical module registers it only for the fourth month of the reference wave. However, 
not all the panels start to collect data in the same month, thus the time interval between the observations in two 
Table 4.1 
Summary Statistics 
 
Pooled 
Sample 
OLFt+1 Ut+1 
No 
Transition 
(2) vs. (3) (2) vs. (4) (3) vs. (4) 
# Observations 276,686 7,063 5,271 264,352 
   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
    Panel A 
Employed 75.01% 74.78% 68.62% 75.14% 7.57*** -0.69 -10.83*** 
Unemployed 5.84% 25.22% 0.00% 5.44% 42.15*** 69.92*** -17.42*** 
Out of labour force 19.15% 0.00% 31.38% 19.42% -56.83*** -41.25*** 21.66*** 
Part-time employed 21.18% 40.01% 26.14% 20.58% 16.24*** 39.62*** 9.87*** 
Sex: male 48.56% 34.40% 50.10% 48.90% -17.75*** -24.09*** 1.73* 
Age 35.99 30.57 33.31 36.19 -13.12*** -38.54*** -17.13*** 
Labour market experience 16.37 11.38 14.24 16.54 -13.9*** -35.58*** -13.75*** 
Marital status: married 52.96% 43.08% 38.61% 53.51% 5.00*** -17.35*** -21.5*** 
-''-: Widowed/separated/divorced  13.06% 9.68% 14.80% 13.12% -8.71*** -8.46*** 3.58*** 
-''-: Single 33.98% 47.23% 46.59% 33.37% 0.70 24.35*** 20.14*** 
Household size 3.47 3.76 3.58 3.46 5.79*** 15.12*** 5.29*** 
Ethnic group: White 81.75% 77.16% 73.69% 82.03% 4.46*** -10.50*** -15.58*** 
-''-: Black 11.59% 14.97% 19.22% 11.35% -6.26*** 9.42*** 17.74*** 
-''-: Asian 2.72% 3.19% 3.04% 2.70% 0.47 2.49** 1.49 
-''-: Other 3.94% 4.69% 4.06% 3.92% 1.67* 3.28*** 0.53 
Education: University 20.14% 13.80% 13.30% 20.45% 0.81 -13.71*** -12.78*** 
-''-: Less than University 34.27% 34.53% 30.28% 34.34% 4.99*** 0.33 -6.16*** 
-''-: High school 31.94% 33.00% 34.02% 31.87% -1.18 2.01** 3.3*** 
-''-: Less than high school 13.64% 18.66% 22.41% 13.33% -5.12*** 12.94*** 19.09*** 
    Panel B 
Homeowner 66.79% 62.96% 56.90% 67.09% 6.83*** -7.29*** -3.65***  
[0.47] [0.48] [0.50] [0.47] 
   
Mortgaged home 49.80% 45.84% 39.94% 50.10% 6.56*** -7.07*** -12.65***  
[0.50] [0.50] [0.49] [0.50] 
   
Other rental property 2.83% 1.91% 1.67% 2.87% 1.00 -4.80*** -12.58***  
[0.17] [0.14] [0.13] [0.17] 
   
Stocks 1,926.1 1,148.7 1,267.5 1,960.0 -0.61 -4.98*** -8.55***  
[13,515.3] [8,480.5] [13,053.1] [16,362.4] 
   
Cash wealth 15,960.5 7,327.6 8,910.7 16,331.8 -3.26*** -17.78*** -13.5***  
[41,848.0] [23,396.6] [30,538.3] [42,386.7] 
   
Liquid wealth 17,880.8 8,476.37 10,178.17 18,285.64 -3.11*** -17.64*** -17.61***  
[45,961.3] [26,226.24] [34,507.86] [46,531.43] 
   
Real estate property  30,546.7 27,411.99 22,888.60 30,783.13 4.87*** -4.21*** -4.50***  
[66,060.9] [53,046.89] [48,258.35] [66,667.58] 
   
Insurance policy 64,123.5 33,069.61 37,563.01 65,482.76 -2.29** -18.14*** -5.47***  
[147,824.7] [101,673.09] [115,868.47] [149,285.73] 
   
Total wealth 110,416.6 68,365.53 69,571.14 112,354.53 -0.51 -20.95*** -6.45***  
[173,778.9] [124,240.68] [137,171.99] [175,317.98] 
   
Wage 1,882.0 1,029.42 1,311.84 1,916.13 -8.40*** -27.82*** 9.89***  
[2,640.0] [1,595.73] [2,138.15] [2,666.21] 
   
Spouse's wage 654.8 646.99 423.55 659.62 7.45*** -0.58 1.03  
[1,790.9] [1,864.96] [1,299.85] [1,797.02] 
   
Household equalized income 4,547.5 4,206.69 3,479.49 4,577.94 9.62*** -6.97*** -4.92***  
[4,408.0] [4,510.55] [3,623.33] [4,416.49] 
   
Government transfers income 58.06 82.01 92.15 56.73 -2.20** 8.15*** -6.92***  
[215.4] [252.6] [255.2] [257.5] 
   
Parental support income  1.17 0.58 2.09 1.17 -1.89* -0.77 -4.52***  
[63.49] [19.52] [63.54] [64.26] 
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consecutive panels might be larger or smaller than one year. All financial values are in real terms at 1995 prices. 
The Price Consumption Expenditure Index (PCE) is used to deflate the nominal values. Liquid wealth and Total 
wealth are defined in net terms.*** indicates a significant level of 1 percent.  ** indicates a significant level of 5 
percent. * indicates a significant level of 10 percent.  
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Table 4.2 
Correlation matrix 
 
Transition 
Inactivity 
   
Transition 
Unemployment 
No 
transition   
Sex: 
Male 
Age Labour 
market 
exper. 
Marital 
status: 
Single 
Household 
size 
Race: 
White 
Education: 
Universiy 
Education: 
Less than 
university 
Education: 
High 
school 
Education: 
Less than 
high school 
Liquid 
Wealth 
Total 
Wealth 
Wage Spouse’s 
wage 
Hhold’s 
Income 
Transition 
Inactivity 
1                  
Transition 
Unemp. 
-0.02* 1                 
No 
transition   
-0.74*  -0.64*   1                
Sex: Male 
-0.04* 0.01* 0.03* 1               
Age 
-0.07*  -0.03* 0.08* 
--
0.02* 
1              
Labour 
market 
exper 
-0.06*  -0.02* 0.07* -0.02* 0.98* 1          
   
Marital 
status: 
Single 
0.04*   0.03* -0.06* 0.07* -0.57* -0.56* 1         
   
Household   
size 
0.02*   0.01* -0.03* -0.02* -0.19* -0.16* -0.01* 1           
Race: White 
-0.01*  -0.02* 0.03* 0.04* 0.04* 0.04* -0.12* -0.11* 1          
Education: 
Universiy 
-0.02*  -0.02* 004* 0.02* 0.11* -0.01* -0.10* -0.05* 0.01* 1         
Education: 
Less than 
university 
0.01 -0.01* 0.01* -0.04* -0.03* -0.05* 0.03* 0.02* -0.01* -0.34* 1     
   
Education: 
High school 
0.01 0.01* -0.01* 0.01* -0.02* 0.01* 0.01* 0.17* -0.03* -0.20* -0.29* 1       
Education: 
Less than 
high school 
0.02*   0.03* -0.04* 0.02* -0.05* 0.07* 0.04* -0.08* 0.09* 0.28 -0.04* -0.11* 1   
   
Liquid 
Wealth 
-0.03*  -0.02* 0.04* 0.10* 0.27* 0.22* -0.14* -0.03* 0.10* 0.32 -0.028 -0.12* -0.17* 1  
   
Total 
Wealth 
-0.03*  -0.03*  0.05* 0.14* 0.24* 0.19* -0.24* -0.11* 0.08* 0.32 -0.05* -0.11* -0.15* 0.42* 1 
   
Wage 
0.05* 
 
0.03* 
 
0.05* 
 
0.22* 
 
0.24* 
 
0.18* 
 
-0.19* 
 
-0.11* 
 
0.08* 
 
0.32* 
 
-0.04* 
 
-0.11* 
 
-0.15* 
 
0.42* 
 
0.46* 
 
1 
  
Spouse’s 
wage -0.00* 
 
-0.01* 
 
0.01* 
 
-0.13* 
 
0.11* 
 
0.08* 
 
-0.22* 
 
0.01* 
 
0.06* 
 
0.13* 
 
-0.01* 
 
-0.04* 
 
-0.07* 
 
0.08* 
 
0.12* 
 
0.04* 
 
1 
 
Hhold’s 
Income -0.01* 
 
-0.03* 
 
0.03* 
 
0.05* 
 
0.05* 
 
0.01* 
 
-0.05* 
 
0.11* 
 
0.09* 
 
0.26* 
 
0.00 
 
-0.11* 
 
-0.15* 
 
0.29* 
 
0.36* 
 
0.57* 
 
0.35* 
 
1 
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Table 4.3 
Benchmark model 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 
Panel A: Calculations 
      
Predicted  probability 0.0255 0.0190 0.0255 0.0190 0.0255 0.0190 
% Level wealth effect 49.8% 30.0% 16.5% 18.4% 49.8% 29.8% 
% Permanent wealth effect -58.0% -42.1% -18.8% -21.1% -46.3% -38.4% 
Panel B: Level Effects 
      
Liquid Wealth                                                   0.0127*** 0.0057*** ― ― 0.0127*** 0.0056*** 
                                                          [0.0018] [0.0014]   [0.0018] [0.0014] 
Total Wealth                                                   ― ― 0.0042*** 0.0035*** ― ― 
                                                            [0.0004] [0.0003]   
Labour Market State: Employed                           ― ― ― ― {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Unemployed                           ― ― ― ― 0.0439*** ― 
                                                              [0.0008]  
-''-: Out of labour force ― ― ― ― ― 0.0111*** 
                                                               [0.0006] 
Female                                                    -0.0146*** 0.0013*** -0.0137*** 0.0022*** -0.0153*** 0.0033*** 
                                                          [0.0006] [0.0005] [0.0006] [0.0005] [0.0006] [0.0005] 
Ethinc group: White {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Black                                               0.0033*** 0.0086*** 0.0029*** 0.0081*** -0.0001 0.0084*** 
                                                          [0.0009] [0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0002] 
-''-: Asian                                               0.0029 0.0011 0.0023 0.0005 0.0012 0.0002*** 
                                                          [0.0017] [0.0015] [0.0017] [0.0015] [0.0017] [0.0015] 
-''-: Other                                               0.0026 0.0008 0.0024* 0.0005 0.0022 0.0002 
                                                          [0.0014] [0.0013] [0.0014] [0.0013] [0.0014] [0.0013] 
Log(Age)                                                  -0.0718*** -0.0523*** -0.0727*** -0.0539*** -0.0703*** -0.0497*** 
                                                          [0.0065] [0.0057] [0.0065] [0.0057] [0.0063] [0.0057] 
Log(Labour market experience)                             -0.0038*** -0.0020*** -0.0038*** -0.0020*** -0.0037*** -0.0020*** 
                                                          [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] 
Marital Status: Single {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Married  -0.0034 -0.0021 -0.0035 -0.0022 -0.0032 -0.0027 
                                                          [0.0029] [0.0026] [0.0029] [0.0026] [0.0029] [0.0026] 
-''-: Widowed/Divorced/Separated                                0.0055 -0.0026 0.0056 -0.0028 0.0047 -0.0026 
                                                          [0.0038] [0.0032] [0.0038] [0.0032] [0.0038] [0.0033] 
Log(Household size)                                       -0.0119*** -0.0033*** -0.0123*** -0.0037*** -0.0121*** -0.0036 
                                                          [0.0019] [0.0016] [0.0018] [0.0016] [0.0018] [0.0016] 
Education: University {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Less than university                                0.0378*** 0.0265*** 0.0384*** 0.0268*** 0.0403*** 0.0242*** 
                                                          [0.0040] [0.0037] [0.0040] [0.0036] [0.0039] [0.0037] 
-''-: High school                                    0.0709*** 0.0399*** 0.0717*** 0.0405*** 0.0724*** 0.0375*** 
                                                          [0.0046] [0.0043] [0.0046] [0.0043] [0.0045] [0.0043] 
-''-: Less than high school                          0.1121*** 0.0692*** 0.1133*** 0.0701*** 0.1164*** 0.0652*** 
                                                          [0.0054] [0.0050] [0.0054] [0.0050] [0.0053] [0.0043] 
Panel C: Mean Effects       
Liquid Wealth                                                   -0.0275*** -0.0137*** ― ― -0.0245*** -0.0129*** 
                                                          [0.0025] [0.0018]   [0.0024] [0.0018] 
Total Wealth                                                   ― ― -0.0090*** -0.0075*** ― ― 
                                                            [0.0005] [0.0004]   
Log(Age)                                                  0.0481*** 0.0448*** 0.0501*** 0.0479*** 0.0475*** 0.0428*** 
                                                          [0.0067] [0.0059] [0.0067] [0.0058] [0.0065] [0.0059] 
Log(Labour market experience)                             0.0040*** 0.0032*** 0.0040*** 0.0031*** 0.0037*** 0.0036*** 
                                                          [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0004] 
Table 4.4 continued in next page 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 
Marital Status: Single {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Married  0.0029 -0.0055** 0.0037 -0.0047* 0.0048 -0.0050* 
                                                          [0.0030] [0.0027] [0.0030] [0.0027] [0.0030] [0.0027] 
-''-: Widowed/Divorced/Separated                                -0.0079 0.0032 -0.0079* 0.0034 -0.0073* 0.0037 
                                                          [0.0041] [0.0034] [0.0040] [0.0034] [0.0040] [0.0034] 
Log(Household size)                                 0.0181*** 0.0039 0.0193*** 0.0050*** 0.0177*** 0.0031* 
                                                          [0.0020] [0.0017] [0.0020] [0.0017] [0.0020] [0.0017] 
Education: University {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Less than university                                -0.0362*** -0.0257*** -0.0379*** -0.0274*** -0.0385*** -0.0232*** 
                                                          [0.0040] [0.0037] [0.0040] [0.0037] [0.0040] [0.0037] 
-''-: High school                                    -0.0708*** -0.0359*** -0.0733*** -0.0385*** -0.0735*** -0.0334*** 
                                                          [0.0047] [0.0043] [0.0047] [0.0043] [0.0046] [0.0043] 
-''-: Less than high school                          -0.1099*** -0.0602*** -0.1138*** -0.0642*** -0.1170*** -0.0573*** 
                                                          [0.0056] [0.0051] [0.0056] [0.0051] [0.0054] [0.0051] 
Panel D: Calculated Permanent Effects      
Liquid Wealth                                                   -0.0148*** -0.0080*** ― ― -0.0118*** -0.0073*** 
                                                          [0.0014] [0.0010]   [0.0014] [0.0010] 
Total Wealth                                                   ― ― -0.0048*** -0.0040*** ― ―  
  [0.0003] [0.0003]   
Log(Age) -0.0236*** -0.0075*** -0.0226*** -0.006*** -0.0228*** -0.0069***  
[0.0015] [0.0013] [0.0015] [0.0013] [0.0015] [0.0013] 
Log(Labour market experience) 0.0003* 0.0012*** 0.0002* 0.0012*** 0.0001 0.0016***  
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] 
Marital Status: Single {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Married with/without Spouse -0.0006 -0.0077*** 0.0002 -0.007*** 0.0017** -0.0078***  
[0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0009] [0.0008] 
-''-: Widowed/Divorced/Separated -0.0024** 0.0006 -0.0023** 0.0006 -0.0026*** 0.0011  
[0.0012] [0.0010] [0.0012] [0.0010] [0.0012] [0.0010] 
Log(Household Size) 0.0062*** 0.0006 0.007*** 0.0013** 0.0055*** -0.0004  
[0.0007] [0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0006] 
Education: University {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Less than university                                0.0016* 0.0008 0.0005 -0.0006 0.0018** 0.001 
                                                          [0.0010] [0.0008] [0.0010] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0008] 
-''-: High school                                    0.0001 0.004*** -0.0016 0.002** -0.0011 0.0041*** 
                                                          [0.0010] [0.0009] [0.0010] [0.0009] [0.0010] [0.0009] 
-''-: Less than high school                          0.0022* 0.009*** -0.0005 0.006*** -0.0006 0.0079*** 
                                                          [0.0012] [0.0010] [0.0012] [0.0010] [0.0012] [0.0010]        
#Observations 276,686 276,686 276,686 276,686 276,686 276,686 
Log-likelihood -29,862.6 -24,031.1 -29,773.5 -23,906.4 -28,564.1 -23,880.4 
χ2 4,750.6*** 3,098.5*** 4,863.5*** 3,228.5*** 7,187.7*** 3,378.0*** 
 
Notes: Each column presents marginal effects and robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level [in brackets] 
from a random effects probit model. Wealth and all financial values are in $100,000 and in real terms at 1995 prices. 
The Price Consumption Expenditure (PCE) Index is used to deflate the nominal values. The specification also includes 
50 state dummy variables. The asterisks denote the following level of significance: *** <1%, ** <5%, and * <10%.  
 
 
 
 
 
 204 
 
Table 4.4 
Robustness in terms of alternative specifications 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 
Panel A: Calculations 
     
Predicted  probability 0.0255 0.0190 0.0255 0.0190 0.0255 0.0190 
% Level wealth effect     41.2%     -28.2% 0.39% 0.52% 11.4% 8.9% 
% Permanent wealth effect -48.4% -29.4% -1.18% -1.58% -12.3% -19.5% 
Panel B: Level Effects 
     
Liquid wealth 0.0557*** 0.0373*** ― ― ― ― 
                                                          [0.0101] [0.0072]     
(Liquid wealth)2                                                 -0.0254 -0.0325*** ― ― ― ― 
                                                          [0.0216] [0.0096]     
(Liquid wealth)3                                                 -0.0086 0.0127*** ― ― ― ― 
                                                          [0.0184] [0.0046]     
(Liquid wealth)4                                                0.0072 -0.0023*** ― ― ― ― 
                                                          [0.0064] [0.0008]     
(Liquid wealth)5                                                 -0.0010 0.0001*** ― ― ― ― 
                                                          [0.0007] [0.0001]     
Liquid wealth percentile                                ― ― 0.0001*** 0.0001*** ― ― 
                                                            [0.0001] [0.0001]   
Log(Liquid wealth)                                              ― ― ― ― 0.0029*** 0.0017*** 
                                                              [0.0004] [0.0003] 
Missing liquid wealth dummy                                                ― ― ― ― 0.0168*** 0.0106*** 
                                                              [0.0033] [0.0028] 
Female                                                    -0.0144*** 0.0016*** -0.0146*** 0.0017*** -0.0144*** 0.0018*** 
                                                          [0.0006] [0.0005] [0.0006] [0.0005] [0.0006] [0.0005] 
Ethnic group: White {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Black                                               0.0025*** 0.0076*** 0.0018** 0.0068*** 0.0019** 0.0070*** 
                                                          [0.0009] [0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0007] 
-''-: Asian                                               0.0027 0.0008 0.0028 0.0007 0.0028 0.0007 
                                                          [0.0017] [0.0015] [0.0017] [0.0015] [0.0017] [0.0015] 
-''-: Other                                               0.0023* 0.0005 0.0025* 0.0004 0.0024* 0.0004 
                                                          [0.0014] [0.0013] [0.0014] [0.0013] [0.0014] [0.0013] 
Log(Age)                                                  -0.0745*** -0.0546*** -0.0726*** -0.0533*** -0.0729*** -0.0534*** 
                                                          [0.0065] [0.0057] [0.0065] [0.0057] [0.0065] [0.0057] 
Log(Labour market experience)                             -0.0037*** -0.0020*** -0.0038*** -0.0020*** -0.0038*** -0.0020*** 
                                                          [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] 
Marital Status: Single {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Married with/without Spouse                               -0.0031 -0.0018 -0.0031 -0.0018 -0.0032 -0.0019 
                                                          [0.0029] [0.0026] [0.0029] [0.0026] [0.0029] [0.0026] 
-''-: Widowed/Divorced/Separated                                0.0057 -0.0023 0.0058 -0.0023 0.0058 -0.0024 
                                                          [0.0038] [0.0032] [0.0038] [0.0032] [0.0038] [0.0032] 
Log(Household size)                                       -0.0122*** -0.0035** -0.0127*** -0.0037** -0.0127*** -0.0037** 
                                                          [0.0018] [0.0016] [0.0019] [0.0016] [0.0019] [0.0016] 
Education: University {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Less than university                                0.0380*** 0.0266*** 0.0381*** 0.0269*** 0.0380*** 0.0265*** 
                                                          [0.0040] [0.0037] [0.0040] [0.0037] [0.0040] [0.0036] 
-''-: High school                                    0.0714*** 0.0401*** 0.0715*** 0.0406*** 0.0715*** 0.0402*** 
                                                          [0.0046] [0.0043] [0.0046] [0.0043] [0.0046] [0.0043] 
-''-: Less than high school                          0.1129*** 0.0697*** 0.1132*** 0.0703*** 0.1132*** 0.0700*** 
                                                          [0.0054] [0.0050] [0.0054] [0.0050] [0.0054] [0.0050] 
Panel C: Mean Effects 
     
Liquid wealth -0.1236*** -0.1074*** ― ― ― ― 
                                                          [0.0103] [0.0095]     
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Table 4.4 continued from last page 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 
(Liquid wealth)2                                                 0.1026*** 0.1163*** ― ― ― ― 
                                                          [0.0142] [0.0148]     
(Liquid wealth)3                                                 -0.0338*** -0.0496*** ― ― ― ― 
                                                          [0.0064] [0.0080]     
(Liquid wealth)4                                                0.0044*** 0.0088*** ― ― ― ― 
                                                          [0.0010] [0.0016]     
(Liquid wealth)5                                                 -0.0002*** -0.0005*** ― ― ― ― 
                                                          [0.0001] [0.0001]     
Liquid wealth percentile                                ― ― -0.0003*** -0.0003*** ― ― 
                                                            [0.0001] [0.0001]   
Log(Liquid wealth)                                              ― ― ― ― -0.0062*** -0.0054*** 
                                                              [0.0004] [0.0004] 
Missing liquid wealth dummy                                                ― ― ― ― -0.0369*** -0.0362*** 
                                                              [0.0041] [0.0034] 
Log(Age)                                                  0.0527*** 0.0493*** 0.0501*** 0.0484*** 0.0507*** 0.0487*** 
                                                          [0.0067] [0.0059] [0.0067] [0.0059] [0.0067] [0.0059] 
Log(Labour market experience)                             0.0039*** 0.0031*** 0.0039*** 0.0030*** 0.0039*** 0.0030*** 
                                                          [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] 
Marital Status: Single {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Married                     0.0027 -0.0055** 0.0026 -0.0055* 0.0028 -0.0053* 
                                                          [0.0030] [0.0027] [0.0030] [0.0027] [0.0030] [0.0027] 
-''-: Widowed/Divorced/Separated                                -0.0085** 0.0026 -0.0087** 0.0024 -0.0088** 0.0024 
                                                          [0.0041] [0.0034] [0.0041] [0.0034] [0.0041] [0.0034] 
Log(Household size)                                       0.0182*** 0.0039** 0.0190*** 0.0044* 0.0192*** 0.0045*** 
                                                          [0.0020] [0.0017] [0.0020] [0.0017] [0.0020] [0.0017] 
Education: University {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Less than university                                -0.0375*** -0.0269*** -0.0367*** -0.0272*** -0.0369*** -0.0273*** 
                                                          [0.0040] [0.0037] [0.0041] [0.0037] [0.0040] [0.0037] 
-''-: High school                                    -0.0728*** -0.0379*** -0.0722*** -0.0386*** -0.0724*** -0.0381*** 
                                                          [0.0047] [0.0043] [0.0047] [0.0043] [0.0047] [0.0043] 
-''-: Less than high school                          -0.1128*** -0.0632*** -0.1129*** -0.0647*** -0.1131*** -0.0647*** 
                                                          [0.0056] [0.0051] [0.0056] [0.0051] [0.0056] [0.0051] 
Panel D: Calculated Permanent Effects 
    
Liquid wealth                                                  -0.0680*** -0.0702*** ― ― ― ― 
                                                          [0.0078] [0.0055]     
(Liquid wealth)2                                                 0.0772*** 0.0838*** ― ― ― ― 
                                                          [0.0198] [0.0092]     
(Liquid wealth)3                                                 -0.0425** -0.0369*** ― ― ― ― 
                                                          [0.0180] [0.0050]     
(Liquid wealth)4                                                0.0118* 0.0066*** ― ― ― ― 
                                                          [0.0065] [0.0010]     
(Liquid wealth)5                                                 -0.0013 -0.0004*** ― ― ― ― 
                                                          [0.0008] [0.0001]     
Liquid wealth percentile                                ― ― -0.0002*** -0.0002*** ― ― 
                                                            [0.0001] [0.0001]   
Log(Liquid wealth)                                              ― ― ― ― -0.0032*** -0.0037*** 
                                                              [0.0003] [0.0002] 
Missing liquid wealth dummy                                                ― ― ― ― -0.0202*** -0.0256*** 
                                                              [0.0024] [0.0020] 
Log(Age)                                                  -0.0217*** -0.0053*** -0.0225*** -0.0048*** -0.0223*** -0.0046*** 
                                                          [0.0015] [0.0013] [0.0015] [0.0013] [0.0015] [0.0013] 
Log(Labour market experience)                             0.0002 0.0011*** 0.0002 0.001*** 0.0002 0.001*** 
                                                          [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] 
Marital Status: Single {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
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Table 4.4 continued from last page 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 
-''-: Married                     -0.0005 -0.0074*** -0.0005 -0.0074*** -0.0004 -0.0073*** 
                                                          [0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0009] [0.0008] 
-''-: Widowed/Divorced/Separated                                -0.0028*** 0.0003 -0.003*** 0.0001 -0.003** 0.0001 
                                                          [0.0012] [0.0010] [0.0012] [0.0010] [0.0012] [0.0010] 
Log(Household size)                                       0.006*** 0.0004 0.0063*** 0.0007 0.0064*** 0.0008 
                                                          [0.0007] [0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0006] 
Education: University {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Less than university                                0.0006 -0.0003 0.0014 -0.0003 0.0011 -0.0007 
                                                          [0.0010] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0010] [0.0008] 
-''-: High school                                    -0.0014 0.0022** -0.0008 0.002** -0.001 0.0016* 
                                                          [0.0010] [0.0009] [0.0010] [0.0009] [0.0010] [0.0009] 
-''-: Less than high school                          0.0001 0.0064*** 0.0004 0.0057*** 0.0001 0.0053*** 
                                                          [0.0012] [0.0010] [0.0012] [0.0010] [0.0012] [0.0010]        
#Observations 276,686 276,686 276,686 276,686 276,686 276,686 
Log-likelihood -29,789.9 -2,3934.6 -29,822.2 -23,919.7 -29,813.3 -23,906.0 
χ2 4,868.0*** 3,237.8*** 4,906.8*** 3,295.5*** 4,906.9*** 3,307.1*** 
 
Notes: Comments in Table 4.2 apply. 
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Table 4.5 
Alternative definition of illiquid wealth 
 
                                                          (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 
Panel A: Calculations 
      
Predicted probability 0.0255 0.0190 0.0255 0.0190 0.0255 0.0190 
% Level wealth effect 49.8% 29.5% 49.8% 29.5% 49.8% 28.9% 
% Permanent wealth effect -58.4% -37.9% -57.6% -37.3% -58.0% -36.8% 
Panel B: Level Effects 
      
Liquid wealth                                                   0.0127*** 0.0056*** 0.0127*** 0.0056*** 0.0127*** 0.0055*** 
                                                          [0.0019] [0.0014] [0.0019] [0.0014] [0.0019] [0.0014] 
Home owner                         0.0065*** 0.0060*** 0.0036 0.0053*** 0.0035 0.0053*** 
                                                          [0.0019] [0.0017] [0.0023] [0.0020] [0.0023] [0.0020] 
Mortgage home                  ― ― 0.0039*** 0.0009 0.0039*** 0.0008 
                                                            [0.0016] [0.0015] [0.0016] [0.0015] 
Other rental property  ― ― ― ― 0.0046 0.0065 
                                                              [0.0045] [0.0043] 
Female                                                    -0.0147*** 0.0015*** -0.0145*** 0.0015*** -0.0145*** 0.0014*** 
                                                          [0.0006] [0.0005] [0.0006] [0.0005] [0.0006] [0.0005] 
Ethnic group: White {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Black                                               0.0034*** 0.0081*** 0.0034*** 0.0080*** 0.0034*** 0.0080*** 
                                                          [0.0009] [0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0007] 
-''-: Asian                                               0.0030 0.0008 0.0029* 0.0008 0.0029* 0.0007 
                                                          [0.0017] [0.0015] [0.0017] [0.0015] [0.0017] [0.0015] 
-''-: Other                                               0.0026* 0.0005 0.0026* 0.0005 0.0026* 0.0005 
                                                          [0.0014] [0.0013] [0.0014] [0.0013] [0.0014] [0.0013] 
Log(Age)                                                  -0.0737*** -0.0541*** -0.0732*** -0.0540*** -0.0734*** -0.0543*** 
                                                          [0.0065] [0.0057] [0.0065] [0.0057] [0.0065] [0.0057] 
Log(Labour market experience)                             -0.0037*** -0.0020*** -0.0037*** -0.0020*** -0.0037*** -0.0019*** 
                                                          [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] 
Marital Status: Single {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Married                     -0.0033 -0.0019 -0.0035 -0.0019 -0.0036 -0.0019 
                                                          [0.0029] [0.0026] [0.0029] [0.0026] [0.0029] [0.0026] 
-''-: Widowed/Divorced/Separated                                0.0059 -0.0021 0.0058 -0.0021 0.0058 -0.0021 
                                                          [0.0038] [0.0032] [0.0039] [0.0032] [0.0039] [0.0032] 
Log(Household size)                                       -0.0133*** -0.0044*** -0.0133*** -0.0044*** -0.0133*** -0.0044*** 
                                                          [0.0019] [0.0016] [0.0019] [0.0016] [0.0019] [0.0016] 
Education: University {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Less than university                                0.0376*** 0.0267*** 0.0376*** 0.0268*** 0.0376*** 0.0266*** 
                                                          [0.0040] [0.0037] [0.0040] [0.0037] [0.0040] [0.0037] 
-''-: High school                                    0.0707*** 0.0402*** 0.0707*** 0.0401*** 0.0707*** 0.0401*** 
                                                          [0.0046] [0.0043] [0.0046] [0.0043] [0.0046] [0.0043] 
-''-: Less than high school                          0.1116*** 0.0695*** 0.1116*** 0.0696*** 0.1117*** 0.0695*** 
                                                          [0.0054] [0.0050] [0.0054] [0.0050] [0.0054] [0.0050] 
Panel C: Mean Effects 
      
Liquid wealth                                                  -0.0277*** -0.0128*** -0.0274*** -0.0127*** -0.0274*** -0.0126*** 
                                                          [0.0026] [0.0018] [0.0025] [0.0018] [0.0025] [0.0018] 
Home owner                         -0.0059*** -0.0095*** 0.0001 -0.0068*** 0.0001 -0.0068*** 
                                                          [0.0026] [0.0018] [0.0025] [0.0022] [0.0025] [0.0022] 
Mortgage home                  ― ― -0.0084*** -0.0038** -0.0084*** -0.0037*** 
                                                            [0.0019] [0.0017] [0.0019] [0.0017] 
Other rental property  ― ― ― ― -0.0027 -0.0093* 
                                                              [0.0051] [0.0049] 
Log(Age)                                                  0.0499*** 0.0481*** 0.0489*** 0.0478*** 0.0491*** 0.0481*** 
                                                          [0.0067] [0.0059] [0.0067] [0.0059] [0.0067] [0.0059] 
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Table 4.5 continued from last page 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 
Log(Labour market experience)                     0.0041*** -0.0031*** 0.0040*** -0.0030*** 0.0040*** -0.0030*** 
                                                          [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] 
Marital status: Single                             {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
                                                                
       -''-: Married 0.0028 -0.0057*** 0.0033 -0.0054** 0.0034*** 0.0053*** 
 [0.0030] [0.0027] [0.0030] [0.0003] [0.0031] [0.0027] 
-''-: Widowed/Divorced/Separated                                -0.0082 0.0024 -0.0080* 0.0025 -0.0080** 0.0024 
                                                          [0.0041] [0.0034] [0.0041] [0.0034] [0.0041] [0.0034] 
Log(Household size)                                       0.0193*** 0.0057*** 0.0195*** 0.0058*** 0.0195*** 0.0057*** 
                                                          [0.0020] [0.0017] [0.0020] [0.0017] [0.0020] [0.0017] 
Education: University {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Less than university                                -0.0360*** -0.0256*** -0.0362*** -0.0259*** -0.0363*** -0.0260*** 
                                                          [0.0040] [0.0037] [0.0040] [0.0037] [0.0040] [0.0037] 
-''-: High school                                    -0.0705*** -0.0363*** -0.0710*** -0.0365*** -0.0710*** -0.0365*** 
                                                          [0.0047] [0.0043] [0.0047] [0.0043] [0.0047] [0.0043] 
-''-: Less than high school                          -0.1093*** -0.0611*** -0.1101*** -0.0615*** -0.1101*** -0.0615*** 
                                                          [0.0055] [0.0051] [0.0056] [0.0051] [0.0056] [0.0051] 
Panel D: Calculated Permanent Effects 
     
Liquid wealth                                                  -0.0149*** -0.0072*** -0.0147*** -0.0071*** -0.0148*** -0.0070*** 
                                                          [0.0014] [0.0010] [0.0014] [0.0010] [0.0014] [0.0010] 
Home owner                      0.0006 -0.0035*** 0.0038*** -0.0015* 0.0038*** -0.0015* 
                                                          [0.0007] [0.0006] [0.0010] [0.0009] [0.0010] [0.0009] 
Mortgage home                   ― ― -0.0045*** -0.0029*** -0.0046*** -0.0029*** 
                                                            [0.0010] [0.0009] [0.0010] [0.0009] 
Other rental property  ― ― ― ― 0.0019 -0.0028 
                                                              [0.0023] [0.0021] 
Log(Age) -0.0239*** -0.0060*** -0.0243*** -0.0063*** -0.0244*** -0.0062***  
[0.0016] [0.0013] [0.0016] [0.0013] [0.0016] [0.0013] 
Log(Labour Market experience) 0.0003* 0.0011*** 0.0003* 0.0011*** 0.0003* 0.0011***  
[0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] 
Marital Status: Single {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Married                     0.0005 -0.0076*** 0.0002 -0.0073*** -0.0002 -0.0073*** 
                                                          [0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0009] [0.0008] 
-''-: Widowed/Divorced/Separated                                -0.0023* 0.0003 -0.0022* 0.0004 -0.0022* 0.0004 
                                                          [0.0012] [0.0010] [0.0012] [0.0010] [0.0012] [0.0010] 
Log(Household Size) 0.0061*** 0.0013** 0.0063*** 0.0013*** 0.0063*** 0.0013**  
[0.0007] [0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0006] 
Education: University {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Less than university                                0.0016 0.0008 0.0013 0.0007 0.0013 0.0007 
                                                          [0.0010] [0.0008] [0.0010] [0.0009] [0.0010] [0.0009] 
-''-: High school                                    0.0001 0.0039*** -0.0004 0.0036*** -0.0003 0.0036*** 
                                                          [0.0010] [0.0009] [0.0010] [0.0009] [0.0010] [0.0009] 
-''-: Less than high school                          -0.0023* 0.0085*** -0.0016 0.0081*** 0.0016 0.0081*** 
                                                          [0.0012] [0.0010] [0.0012] [0.0010] [0.0012] [0.0010] 
       
#Observations 276,686 276,686 276,686 276,686 276,686 276,686 
Log-likelihood                                            -29,856.8 -24,008.3 -29,843.7 -24,002.7 -29,842.8 -24,000.8 
χ2                                                        4,758.9***  3,138.3***  4,780.9***  3,146.7***  4,781.6***  3,148.6*** 
 
Notes: Comments in Table 4.2 apply. 
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Table 4.6 
Specifications using salary income 
 
                                                          (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 
Panel A: Calculations 
      
Predicted probability 0.0255 0.0190 0.0254 0.0189 0.0254 0.0189 
% Level wealth effect 42.4% 17.9% 20.9% 11.6% 20.5% 12.7% 
% Permanent wealth effect -43.5% -12.1% -13.0% -1.6% -13.0% -4.8% 
Panel B: Level Effects 
      
Liquid wealth                                                   0.0108*** 0.0034** 0.0053*** 0.0022 0.0052*** 0.0024* 
                                                          [0.0018] [0.0014] [0.0017] [0.0013] [0.0017] [0.0013] 
Home owner                       0.0010 0.0035* 0.0040* 0.0051*** 0.0042** 0.0048*** 
                                                          [0.0023] [0.0020] [0.0020] [0.0019] [0.0020] [0.0018] 
Mortgage home                   0.0033** -0.0001 0.0018 -0.0008*** 0.0017 -0.0008 
                                                          [0.0016] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0014] [0.0015] [0.0014] 
Log(Household income)                                          0.3544*** 0.3423*** ― ― ― ― 
                                                          [0.0151] [0.0141]     
Log(Wage)                                                ― ― 0.0161*** 0.0111*** 0.0162*** 0.0108*** 
                                                            [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Government transfers                                      ― ― ― ― 1.0070*** -0.9489*** 
                                                              [0.0960] [0.1179] 
Other parental support                                 ― ― ― ― -2.1398* 0.8661* 
                                                              [1.0935] [0.4589] 
Female                                                    -0.0141*** 0.0022*** -0.0053*** 0.0073*** -0.0053*** 0.0074*** 
                                                          [0.0006] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] 
Ethnic group: White {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Black                                               0.0021*** 0.0062*** 0.0022*** 0.0060*** 0.0023*** 0.0057*** 
                                                          [0.0009] [0.0007] [0.0008] [0.0007] [0.0008] [0.0007] 
-''-: Asian                                               0.0029* 0.0010 0.0008 -0.0009 0.0008 -0.0005 
                                                          [0.0017] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0014] [0.0015] [0.0014] 
-''-: Other                                               0.0024* 0.0001 0.0003 -0.0014 0.0002 -0.0012 
                                                          [0.0014] [0.0013] [0.0013] [0.0012] [0.0013] [0.0012] 
Log(Age)                                                  -0.0749*** -0.0546*** -0.0817*** -0.0655*** -0.0820*** -0.0648*** 
                                                          [0.0065] [0.0056] [0.0056] [0.0050] [0.0056] [0.0050] 
Log(Labour market experience)                             -0.0038*** -0.0020*** -0.0037*** -0.0020*** -0.0037*** -0.0020*** 
                                                          [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] 
Marital Status: Single {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Married                     -0.0040 -0.0028 -0.0042 -0.0033 -0.0038 -0.0037 
                                                          [0.0029] [0.0026] [0.0026] [0.0024] [0.0026] [0.0023] 
-''-: Widowed/Divorced/Separated                                0.0074* -0.0013 -0.0017 -0.0061*** -0.0028 -0.0052* 
                                                          [0.0038] [0.0032] [0.0034] [0.0029] [0.0034] [0.0029] 
Log(Household size)                                       -0.0197*** -0.0101*** -0.0033* 0.0010 -0.0035*** 0.0013 
                                                          [0.0019] [0.0016] [0.0017] [0.0015] [0.0017] [0.0015] 
Education: University {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Less than university                                0.0399*** 0.0291*** 0.0414*** 0.0325*** 0.0415*** 0.0323*** 
                                                          [0.0040] [0.0036] [0.0034] [0.0032] [0.0034] [0.0032] 
-''-: High school                                    0.0727*** 0.0429*** 0.0708*** 0.0443*** 0.0710*** 0.0438*** 
                                                          [0.0046] [0.0043] [0.0040] [0.0037] [0.0040] [0.0037 
-''-: Less than high school                          0.1147*** 0.0728*** 0.1092*** 0.0730*** 0.1092*** 0.0725*** 
                                                          [0.0054] [0.0050] [0.0046] [0.0043] [0.0046] [0.0043] 
Panel C: Model Average Effects 
      
Liquid wealth                                                   -0.0219*** -0.0056*** -0.0087*** -0.0025 -0.0084*** -0.0033* 
                                                          [0.0025] [0.0018] [0.0022] [0.0016] [0.0022] [0.0017] 
Home owner                       0.0033 -0.0041* -0.0019 -0.0079*** -0.0022 -0.0075*** 
                                                          [0.0025] [0.0022] [0.0022] [0.0020] [0.0022] [0.0020] 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 
Mortgage home                   -0.0056*** 0.0008 -0.0031 0.0011 -0.0031* 0.0011 
                                                          [0.0019] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0016] [0.0017] [0.0016] 
Log(Household income)                                          -0.5117*** -0.6149*** ― ― ― ― 
                                                          [0.0207] [0.0207]     
Log(Wage)                                                ― ― -0.0217*** -0.0159*** -0.0219***  -0.0155*** 
                                                            [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] 
Government transfers                                      ― ― ― ― 0.2659 -2.0189* 
                                                              [0.6330] [1.1107] 
Other parental support                                 ― ― ― ― -1.3279*** 1.6066*** 
                                                              [0.1651] [0.0919] 
Log(Age)                                                  0.0514*** 0.0486*** 0.0667*** 0.0639*** 0.0673*** 0.0625*** 
                                                          [0.0067] [0.0058] [0.0058] [0.0052] [0.0058] [0.0052] 
Log(Labour market experience)                             0.0038*** 0.0028*** 0.0047*** 0.0037*** 0.0048*** 0.0036*** 
                                                          [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] 
Marital Status: Single {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Married                     0.0036 -0.0041 0.0046* -0.0022 0.0040 -0.0015 
                                                          [0.0030] [0.0027] [0.0027] [0.0025] [0.0027] [0.0024] 
-''-: Widowed/Divorced/Separated                                -0.0107*** 0.0005 0.0021 0.0087*** 0.0037 0.0070*** 
                                                          [0.0040] [0.0033] [0.0036] [0.0031] [0.0036] [0.0030] 
Log(Household size)                                       0.0278*** 0.0140*** 0.0043** -0.0029* 0.0047*** -0.0034*** 
                                                          [0.0020] [0.0017] [0.0018] [0.0016] [0.0018] [0.0016] 
Education: University {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Less than university                                -0.0401*** -0.0310*** -0.0397*** -0.0321*** -0.0396*** -0.0322*** 
                                                          [0.0040] [0.0037] [0.0035] [0.0032] [0.0035] [0.0032] 
-''-: High school                                    -0.0753*** -0.0430*** -0.0708*** -0.0415*** -0.0710*** -0.0413*** 
                                                          [0.0046] [0.0043] [0.0040] [0.0037] [0.0040] [0.0037] 
-''-: Less than high school                          -0.1163*** -0.0700*** -0.1118*** -0.0697*** -0.1117*** -0.0695*** 
                                                          [0.0055] [0.0050] [0.0048] [0.0044] [0.0048] [0.0044] 
Panel D: Calculated Permanent Effects 
     
Liquid wealth -0.0111*** -0.0023** -0.0033*** -0.0003 -0.0033*** -0.0009  
[0.0014] [0.0010] [0.0012] [0.0009] [0.0012] [0.0009] 
Home owner                         0.0044*** -0.0006 0.0021** -0.0029*** 0.0019** -0.0026*** 
                                                          [0.0010] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0009] [0.0008] 
Mortgage home                -0.0023** 0.0007 -0.0013 0.0003 -0.0014 0.0003 
                                                          [0.0010] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0009] [0.0008] 
Log(Household income)                                          -0.1573*** -0.2726*** ― ― ― ― 
                                                          [0.0108] [0.0115]     
Log(Wage)                                                ― ― -0.0056*** -0.0048*** -0.0057*** -0.0047*** 
                                                            [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] 
Government transfers                                      ― ― ― ― -0.3209*** 0.6577*** 
                                                              [0.1109] [0.0938] 
Other parental support                                 ― ― ― ― -1.8738* -1.1528 
                                                              [1.0389] [0.7657] 
Log(Age)                                                  -0.0235*** -0.006*** -0.0151*** -0.0015 -0.0147*** -0.0024* 
                                                          [0.0016] [0.0013] [0.0014] [0.0012] [0.0014] [0.0012] 
Log(Labour market experience)                             0.0001 0.0008*** 0.001*** 0.0017*** 0.0011*** 0.0016*** 
                                                          [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] 
Marital Status: Single {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Married                     -0.0004 -0.007*** 0.0004 -0.0056*** 0.0002 -0.0053*** 
                                                          [0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0007] [0.0008] [0.0007] 
-''-: Widowed/Divorced/Separated                                -0.0032** -0.0008 0.0004 0.0026*** 0.0008 0.0019** 
                                                          [0.0012] [0.0010] [0.0011] [0.0009] [0.0011] [0.0009] 
Log(Household size)                                       0.008*** 0.004*** 0.001* -0.0018*** 0.0017*** -0.0021*** 
                                                          [0.0007] [0.0006] [0.0007] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0006] 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 
Education: University {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Less than university                                -0.0002 -0.0018** 0.0017** 0.0004 0.0019** 0.0001 
                                                          [0.0010] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0009] [0.0008] 
-''-: High school                                    -0.0026*** 0.0001 0.0001 0.0028*** 0.0001 0.0025*** 
                                                          [0.0010] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0009] [0.0008] 
-''-: Less than high school                          -0.0015 0.0028*** -0.0026** 0.0033*** -0.0025** 0.003*** 
                                                          [0.0012] [0.0010] [0.0011] [0.0009] [0.0011] [0.0009]        
#Observations 276,686 276,686 276,686 276,686 276,686 276,686 
Log-likelihood                                            -29,504.3 -23,463.7 -21,843.4 -18,636.7 -21,794 -18,492.3 
χ2                                                        5,306.4*** 3,901.6*** 14,392.5*** 10,247.1*** 14,456.5*** 10,458.2*** 
 
Notes: Comments in Table 4.2 apply. 
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Table 4.7 
The role of gender 
 
 Pooled sample Males Females 
                                                          (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 
Panel A: Calculations 
      
Predicted probability 0.0254 0.0189 0.0180 0.0195 0.0323 0.0184 
% Level wealth effect 21.2% 11.6% 27.0% 8.2% 15.8.% 18.5% 
% Permanent wealth effect -11.8% -4.8% -17.7% -7.2% -6.8.% -5.0% 
Panel B: Model Level Effects 
      
Liquid wealth                                                   0.0054*** 0.0022 0.0050*** 0.0016 0.0051* 0.0034 
                                                          [0.0017] [0.0013] [0.0020] [0.0017] [0.0028] [0.0022] 
Log(Wage)                                                   0.0161*** 0.0111*** 0.0102*** 0.0119*** 0.0214*** 0.0100*** 
                                                          [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0002] 
Log(Spouse’s wage)                                       0.0002 0.0004** 0.0007** -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0010*** 
                                                          [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] 
Home owner                0.0040* 0.0051*** 0.0049* -0.0006 0.0035 0.0092*** 
                                                          [0.0020] [0.0019] [0.0026] [0.0027] [0.0031] [0.0026] 
Mortgage home                     0.0018 -0.0009* 0.0022  0.0005  0.0011  -0.0022 
                                                          [0.0015] [0.0014] [0.0018] [0.0019] [0.0023] [0.0020 ] 
Female                                                    -0.0053*** 0.0072*** — — — — 
                                                          [0.0006] [0.0005]     
Ethnic group: White {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Black                                               0.0023*** 0.0059*** 0.0015 0.0033*** 0.0025* 0.0069*** 
                                                          [0.0008] [0.0007] [0.0009] [0.0011] [0.0014] [0.0009] 
-''-: Asian                                               0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0009 -0.0031 0.0025 0.0004 
                                                          [0.0016] [0.0014] [0.0019] [0.0021] [0.0024] [0.0020] 
-''-: Other                                               0.0003 -0.0014 0.0011 -0.0033* -0.0011 -0.0002 
                                                          [0.0013] [0.0012] [0.0015] [0.0018] [0.0020] [0.0018] 
Log(Age)                                                  -0.0816*** -0.0653*** -0.0641*** -0.0727*** -0.1002*** -0.0573*** 
                                                          [0.0056] [0.0050] [0.0074] [0.0073] [0.0084] [0.0070] 
Log(Labour market experience)                             -0.0037*** -0.0020*** -0.0026*** -0.0021*** -0.0048*** -0.0020*** 
                                                          [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0004] 
Marital Status: Single {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Married                     -0.0046* -0.0042* -0.0060* -0.0084*** -0.0029 -0.0024 
                                                          [0.0027] [0.0024] [0.0035] [0.0035] [0.0041] [0.0033] 
-''-: Widowed/Divorced/Separated                                -0.0018 -0.0061** 0.0046 -0.0017 -0.0066 -0.0069* 
                                                          [0.0034] [0.0029] [0.0048] [0.0045] [0.0051] [0.0039] 
Log(Household size)                                       -0.0033** 0.0009 -0.0012 -0.0009 -0.0066*** 0.0033 
                                                          [0.0017] [0.0015] [0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0027] [0.0022] 
Education: University {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Less than university                                0.0414*** 0.0324*** 0.0248*** 0.0348*** 0.0550*** 0.0305*** 
                                                          [0.0034] [0.0033] [0.0042] [0.0044] [0.0054] [0.0046] 
-''-: High school                                    0.0709*** 0.0442*** 0.0423*** 0.0355*** 0.0960*** 0.0515*** 
                                                          [0.0040] [0.0037] [0.0048] [0.0052] [0.0063] [0.0053] 
-''-: Less than high school                          0.1093*** 0.0729*** 0.0707*** 0.0687*** 0.1415*** 0.0739*** 
                                                          [0.0046] [0.0043] [0.0056] [0.0060] [0.0074] [0.0062] 
Panel C: Model Average Effects 
      
Liquid wealth                                                   -0.0087*** -0.0025 -0.0084*** -0.0031 -0.0070* -0.0031 
                                                          [0.0022] [0.0017] [0.0024] [0.0021] [0.0036] [0.0028] 
Log(Wage)                                                   -0.0217*** -0.0159*** -0.0153*** -0.0174*** -0.0275*** -0.0145*** 
                                                          [0.0022] [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0003] 
Log(Wage spouse)                                       -0.0004 -0.0006*** -0.0008*** -0.0006* -0.0003 -0.0011*** 
                                                          [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] 
Home owner                0.0019 -0.0080*** -0.0022 0.0002 0.0030  -0.0134*** 
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                                                          [0.0022] [0.0020] [0.0028] [0.0029] [0.0034] [0.0029]  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 
Mortgage home                     -0.0032* 0.0013 -0.0043** 0.0006 -0.0014 0.0019 
                                                          [0.0017] [0.0016] [0.0021] [0.0022] [0.0027] [0.0023] 
Log(Age)                                                  0.0667*** 0.0636*** 0.0569*** 0.0726*** 0.0795*** 0.0530*** 
                                                          [0.0058] [0.0052] [0.0076] [0.0075] [0.0087] [0.0072] 
Log(Labour market experience)                             0.0047*** 0.0037*** 0.0033*** 0.0036*** 0.0060*** 0.0039*** 
                                                          [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0005] 
Marital Status: Single {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Married                     0.0045 -0.0009 -0.0028 0.0097*** 0.0076* -0.0073*** 
                                                          [0.0028] [0.0025] [0.0037] [0.0036] [0.0043] [0.0035] 
-''-: Widowed/Divorced/Separated                                0.0021 0.0087*** -0.0065 -0.0030 0.0093* 0.0093*** 
                                                          [0.0036] [0.0031] [0.0050] [0.0047] [0.0054] [0.0041] 
Log(Household size)                                       0.0043*** -0.0028* 0.0010 -0.0013 0.0071*** -0.0057*** 
                                                          [0.0018] [0.0016] [0.0022] [0.0022] [0.0029] [0.0024] 
Education: University {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Less than university                                -0.0400*** -0.0320*** -0.0246*** -0.0364*** -0.0520*** -0.0291*** 
                                                          [0.0035] [0.0032] [0.0043] [0.0045] [0.0056] [0.0046] 
-''-: High school                                    -0.0708*** -0.0416*** -0.0449*** -0.0322*** -0.0936*** -0.0497*** 
                                                          [0.0040] [0.0037] [0.0049] [0.0052] [0.0064] [0.0054] 
-''-: Less than high school                          -0.1183*** -0.0697*** -0.0759*** -0.0659*** -0.1417*** -0.0708*** 
                                                          [0.0048] [0.0044] [0.0058] [0.0061] [0.0076] [0.0063] 
Panel D: Calculated Permanent Effects 
     
Liquid wealth -0.0030*** -0.0009 -0.0032*** -0.0014 -0.0022 -0.0009  
[0.0012] [0.0263] [0.0441] [0.0014] [0.0023] [0.0011] 
Log(Wage)                                                   -0.0063*** -0.0052*** -0.0052*** -0.0065*** -0.0064*** -0.0043*** 
                                                          [0.0002] [0.0004] [0.0002] [0.0004] [0.0005] [0.0002] 
Log(Wage spouse)                                       0.0001 -0.0003* -0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0003 
                                                          [0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0002] 
Home owner                     -0.0022*** -0.0034*** 0.0032*** -0.0003 0.0005 -0.0043*** 
                                                          [0.0016] [0.0013] [0.0014] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0014] 
Mortgage home                 -0.0014 -0.0003 -0.0021** 0.0016 -0.0002 -0.0003 
                                                          [0.0014] [0.0014] [0.0011] [0.0013] [0.0014] [0.0015] 
Log(Age)                                                  -0.0154*** -0.0024 -0.0076*** -0.0005 -0.0212*** -0.0045** 
                                                          [0.0011] [0.0012] [0.0023] [0.0023] [0.0025] [0.0025] 
Log(Labour market experience)                             0.0014*** 0.0023*** 0.0013*** 0.0023*** 0.0013*** 0.0028*** 
                                                          [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0006] [0.0002] 
Marital Status: Single {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Married                     -0.0008 -0.0054*** -0.0032*** 0.0016 0.0054*** -0.0102*** 
                                                          [0.0013] [0.0018] [0.0014] [0.0015] [0.0012] [0.0010] 
-''-: Widowed/Divorced/Separated                                0.0004 0.0034*** -0.0020 0.0015 0.0033 0.0026** 
                                                          [0.0014] [0.0012] [0.0016] [0.0011] [0.0029] [0.0015] 
Log(Household size)                                       0.0015* -0.0022*** 0.0024*** -0.0020*** 0.0012 -0.0025*** 
                                                          [0.0016] [0.0014] [0.0018] [0.0011] [0.0014] [0.0018] 
Education: University {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Less than university                                0.0025** 0.0006 0.0001 -0.0022 0.0031** 0.0010 
                                                          [0.0016] [0.0011] [0.0012] [0.0016] [0.0013] [0.0011] 
-''-: High school                                    0.0001 0.0036*** -0.0034** 0.0032*** 0.0024* 0.0025* 
                                                          [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0017] [0.0011] [0.0013] [0.0017] 
-''-: Less than high school                          -0.0032*** 0.0039*** -0.0054*** 0.0035** -0.0004 0.0037** 
                                                          [0.0015] [0.0014] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0021] [0.0018]        
#Observations 276,686 276,686 134,351 134,351 142,335 142,335 
Log-likelihood                                            -21,841.9 -18,632.9 -7,946.8 -8,387.8 -13,697.4 -9,999.5 
χ2                                                        14,390.6*** 10,248.9***  5,257.7***  6,023.8***  9,187.7***  4,335.5*** 
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Notes: Comments in Table 4.2 apply. 
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Table 4.8 
Specifications controlling for occupation and industry among the employed 
 
                                                          (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 
Panel A: Calculations       
Predicted probability 0.0203 0.0162 0.0202 0.0161 0.0249 0.0170 
% Level wealth effect 60.1% 27.2% 53.5% 26.1% 59.0% 27.1% 
% Permanent wealth effect -56.7% -38.3% -50.1% -40.4% -50.2% -38.2% 
Panel B: Model Level Effects 
      
Liquid wealth                                                   0.0122*** 0.0044*** 0.0108*** 0.0042*** 0.0147*** 0.0046*** 
                                                          [0.0016] [0.0013] [0.0015] [0.0013] [0.0019] [0.0014] 
Home owner                     0.0036* 0.0044** 0.0032*** 0.0048*** 0.0033*** 0.0047*** 
                                                          [0.0021] [0.0021] [0.0022] [0.0020] [0.0021] [0.0021] 
Mortgage home            0.0016 0.0017 0.0014 0.0015 0.0013 0.0015 
                                                          [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0014] [0.0015] [0.0014] [0.0014] 
Female                                                    -0.0120*** 0.0016*** -0.0111*** 0.0016*** -0.0189*** -0.0002 
                                                          [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0007] [0.0006] 
Ethnic group: White {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Black                                               -0.0004 0.0048*** -0.0002 0.0049*** 0.0008 0.0070*** 
                                                          [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0007] [0.0010] [0.0008] 
-''-: Asian                                               -0.0019 -0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0016 0.0011 -0.0008 
                                                          [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0021] [0.0018] 
-''-: Other                                               0.0014 0.0003 0.0011 0.0002 0.0038** 0.0011 
                                                          [0.0013] [0.0014] [0.0013] [0.0014] [0.0016] [0.0015] 
Log(Age)                                                  -0.0524*** -0.0328*** -0.0327*** -0.0224*** -0.0667*** -0.0309*** 
                                                          [0.0060] [0.0060] [0.0056] [0.0058] [0.0072] [0.0063] 
Log(Labour market experience)                             -0.0029*** -0.0021*** -0.0025*** -0.0019*** -0.0038*** -0.0024*** 
                                                          [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0002] [0.0003] [0.0003] [0.0003] 
Marital Status: Single {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.}  
      
-''-: Married                     -0.0028 -0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0002 -0.0016 -0.0017 
                                                          [0.0027] [0.0026] [0.0025] [0.0026] [0.0031] [0.0027] 
-''-: Widowed/Divorced/Separated                                0.0043 0.0005 0.0049 0.0013 0.0053 -0.0002 
                                                          [0.0036] [0.0033] [0.0033] [0.0032] [0.0042] [0.0034] 
Log(Household size)                                       -0.0121*** -0.0050*** -0.0107*** -0.0042*** -0.0121*** -0.0038** 
                                                          [0.0017] [0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0015] [0.0020] [0.0016] 
Education: University {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.}  
      
-''-: Less than university                                0.0355*** 0.0112*** 0.0259*** 0.0049 0.0484*** 0.0131*** 
                                                          [0.0035] [0.0042] [0.0033] [0.0040] [0.0044] [0.0044] 
-''-: High school                                    0.0615*** 0.0305*** 0.0510*** 0.0234*** 0.0836*** 0.0329*** 
                                                          [0.0041] [0.0048] [0.0039] [0.0047] [0.0051] [0.0051] 
-''-: Less than high school                          0.0984*** 0.0515*** 0.0819*** 0.0399*** 0.1400*** 0.0556*** 
 [0.0048] [0.0057] [0.0046] [0.0055] [0.0061] [0.0060] 
Part-Time Worker                                          0.0642*** 0.0353*** — — — — 
                                                          [0.0011] [0.0010]     
Union membership                                          — — 0.0325*** 0.0229*** — — 
                                                            [0.0026] [0.0023]   
Occupation: Skilled non-manual — — — — {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Skilled manual                                      — — — — -0.0041 -0.0108*** 
                                                              [0.0036] [0.0029] 
-''-: Unskilled non-manual                                — — — — -0.0023 -0.0080*** 
                                                              [0.0027] [0.0024] 
-''-: Unskilled manual                                     — — — — -0.0001 -0.0107*** 
                                                              [0.0029] [0.0025] 
Industry: Agric., Forestry, Fishing — — — — {Ref.} {Ref.} 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 
-''-: Mining                                          — — — — 0.0153 -0.0163 
                                                              [0.0162] [0.0118] 
-''-: Utilities                                           — — — — 0.0051 -0.0174 
                                                              [0.0170] [0.0138] 
-''-: Construction                                        — — — — 0.0018 -0.0044 
                                                              [0.0088] [0.0066] 
-''-: Manufacturing                                       — — — — 0.0057 -0.0040 
                                                              [0.0083] [0.0063] 
-''-: Wholesale Trade                                     — — — — -0.0013 -0.0067 
                                                              [0.0089] [0.0069] 
-''-: Retail Trade                                        — — — — 0.0001 -0.0069 
                                                              [0.0082] [0.0064] 
-''-: Transportation & Warehousing                      — — — — 0.0008 -0.0089 
                                                              [0.0094] [0.0071] 
-''-: Information                                         — — — — 0.0011 -0.0117 
                                                              [0.0095] [0.0075] 
-''-: Finance and Insurance                               — — — — 0.0041 -0.0114 
                                                              [0.0091] [0.0072] 
-''-: Real Estate and Rental and Leasing                  — — — — 0.0060 -0.0222*** 
                                                              [0.0102] [0.0083] 
-''-: Professional, Scientific & Technical  — — — — 0.0015 -0.0091 
                                                              [0.0090] [0.0070] 
-''-: Management of Companies/ Enterprises             — — — — 0.0001 0.0611 
                                                              [0.0001] [0.0507] 
-''-: Administrative and Support, Waste  — — — — -0.0028 -0.0116* 
      Management and Remediation Services     [0.0085] [0.0065] 
-''-: Educational Services                                — — — — 0.0045 0.0001 
                                                              [0.0101] [0.0088] 
-''-: Health Care and Social Assistance                   — — — — 0.0085 -0.0087 
                                                              [0.0086] [0.0069] 
-''-: Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation                 — — — — -0.0060 -0.0087 
                                                              [0.0099] [0.0081] 
-''-: Accommodation and Food Services                     — — — — -0.0047 -0.0064 
                                                              [0.0083] [0.0065] 
-''-: Other Services (exc. Public Administration)       — — — — -0.0009 -0.0001 
                                                              [0.0090] [0.0071] 
-''-: Public Administration                               — — — — 0.0167 0.0215 
                                                              [0.0172] [0.0132] 
Panel C: Model Average Effects       
Liquid wealth                                                   -0.0237*** -0.0106*** -0.0210*** -0.0107*** -0.0272*** -0.0111*** 
                                                          [0.0023] [0.0017] [0.0022] [0.0016] [0.0028] [0.0018] 
Home owner                     -0.0013 -0.0057** -0.0012 -0.0052* -0.0011 -0.0052** 
                                                          [0.0023] [0.0022] [0.0021] [0.0022] [0.0022] [0.0021] 
Mortgage home            -0.0031* -0.0037* -0.0030* -0.0036 -0.0032* 0.0037* 
                                                          [0.0017] [0.0018] [0.0016] [0.0018] [0.0016] [0.0018] 
Log(Age)                                                    0.0290*** 0.0288*** 0.0131** 0.0184*** 0.0378*** 0.0251*** 
                                                          [0.0062] [0.0062] [0.0058] [0.0060] [0.0074] [0.0065] 
Log(Labour market experience)                             0.0030*** 0.0029*** 0.0025*** 0.0027*** 0.0032*** 0.0034*** 
                                                          [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004] [0.0004] 
Marital Status: Single {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Married                     0.0039 -0.0034 0.0021 -0.0049* 0.0055 -0.0039 
                                                          [0.0028] [0.0027] [0.0026] [0.0027] [0.0033] [0.0029] 
-''-: Widowed/Divorced/Separated                                -0.0057 -0.0004 -0.0066* -0.0013 -0.0075 0.0003 
                                                          [0.0038] [0.0034] [0.0035] [0.0033] [0.0044] [0.0036] 
Log(Household size)                                       0.0159*** 0.0054*** 0.0146*** 0.0040** 0.0209*** 0.0040*** 
                                                          [0.0019] [0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0016] [0.0022] [0.0018] 
Table 4.8 continued in next page 
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Table 4.8 continued from last page 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 
Education: University {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Less than university                                -0.0337*** -0.0099** -0.0243*** -0.0031 -0.0487*** -0.0125*** 
                                                          [0.0035] [0.0043] [0.0034] [0.0041] [0.0044] [0.0045] 
-''-: High school                                    -0.0624*** -0.0271*** -0.0515*** -0.0193*** -0.0874*** -0.0303*** 
                                                          [0.0041] [0.0049] [0.0039] [0.0047] [0.0052] [0.0052] 
-''-: Less than high school                          -0.0994*** -0.0444*** -0.0828*** -0.0320*** -0.1398*** -0.0493*** 
 [0.0050] [0.0058] [0.0047] [0.0056] [0.0063] [0.0061] 
Part-time -0.0743*** -0.0493*** — — — — 
 [0.0017] [0.0017]     
Union membership — — -0.0494*** -0.0318*** — — 
   [0.0036] [0.0028]   
Occupation: Skilled non-manual — — — — {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Skilled manual                                      — — — — 0.0031 0.0112*** 
                                                              [0.0039] [0.0031] 
-''-: Unskilled non-manual                                — — — — 0.0075** 0.0088*** 
                                                              [0.0030] [0.0026] 
-''-: Unskilled manual                                     — — — — 0.0066** 0.0144*** 
                                                              [0.0031] [0.0027] 
Industry: Agric., Forestry, Fishing — — — — {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Mining                                          — — — — -0.0156 0.0134 
                                                              [0.0176] [0.0124] 
-''-: Utilities                                           — — — — -0.0106 0.0072 
                                                              [0.0181] [0.0143] 
-''-: Construction                                        — — — — -0.0019 0.0080 
                                                              [0.0095] [0.0071] 
-''-: Manufacturing                                       — — — — -0.0107 0.0013 
                                                              [0.0089] [0.0068] 
-''-: Wholesale Trade                                     — — — — -0.0037 0.0010 
                                                              [0.0097] [0.0075] 
-''-: Retail Trade                                        — — — — 0.0014 0.0032 
                                                              [0.0089] [0.0069] 
-''-: Transportation & Warehousing                      — — — — -0.0079 0.0059 
                                                              [0.0101] [0.0076] 
-''-: Information                                         — — — — -0.0025 0.0091 
                                                              [0.0102] [0.0081] 
-''-: Finance and Insurance                               — — — — -0.0113 0.0059 
                                                              [0.0098] [0.0078] 
-''-: Real Estate and Rental and Leasing                  — — — — -0.0041 0.0200* 
                                                              [0.0111] [0.0089] 
-''-: Professional, Scientific & Technical  — — — — -0.0031 0.0090 
                                                              [0.0096] [0.0076] 
-''-: Management of Companies/ Enterprises             — — — — 0.0001 -0.0646 
                                                              [0.0001] [0.0623] 
-''-: Administrative and Support, Waste  — — — — 0.0049 0.0123* 
      Management and Remediation Services     [0.0092] [0.0071] 
-''-: Educational Services                                — — — — 0.0003 -0.0066 
                                                              [0.0109] [0.0096] 
-''-: Health Care and Social Assistance                   — — — — -0.0119 0.0007 
                                                              [0.0092] [0.0074] 
-''-: Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation                 — — — — 0.0068 0.0052 
                                                              [0.0107] [0.0089] 
-''-: Accommodation and Food Services                     — — — — 0.0062 0.0036 
                                                              [0.0090] [0.0070] 
Table 4.8 continued in next page 
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Table 4.8 continued from last page 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 
-''-: Other Services (exc. Public Administration)       — — — — 0.0060 -0.0040 
                                                              [0.0097] [0.0078] 
-''-: Public Administration                               — — — — -0.0143 -0.0196 
                                                              [0.0191] [0.0154] 
Panel D: Calculated Permanent Effects       
Liquid wealth -0.0115*** -0.0062*** -0.0103*** -0.0065*** -0.0125*** -0.0065*** 
 [0.0013] [0.0009] [0.0013] [0.0009] [0.0016] [0.0010] 
Home owner                    0.0023** -0.0014 0.0021 -0.0013 0.0020 -0.0011 
 [0.0009] [0.0009]     
Mortgage home                  -0.0015 -0.0023** -0.0014 -0.0021** -0.0012 -0.0020** 
                                                          [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] 
Log(Age)                                                    -0.0233*** -0.0041*** -0.0197*** -0.0039*** -0.0289*** -0.0058*** 
                                                          [0.0015] [0.0014] [0.0014] [0.0014] [0.0018] [0.0015] 
Log(Labour market experience)                             0.0001 0.0008*** 0.0001 0.0009*** -0.0006*** 0.001*** 
                                                          [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] [0.0002] 
Marital Status: Single {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Married                     0.001 -0.0047*** 0.0011 -0.0052*** 0.0039*** -0.0057*** 
                                                          [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0010] [0.0008] 
-''-: Widowed/Divorced/Separated                                -0.0014 0.0001 -0.0017 0.0001 -0.0022 0.0001 
                                                          [0.0012] [0.0010] [0.0011] [0.0010] [0.0014] [0.0010] 
Log(Household size)                                       0.0038*** 0.0004 0.004*** -0.0002 0.0089*** 0.0002 
                                                          [0.0007] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0006] [0.0008] [0.0006] 
Education: University {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Less than university                                0.0018** 0.0012 0.0015* 0.0018** -0.0003 0.0006 
                                                          [0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0008] [0.0011] [0.0009] 
-''-: High school                                    -0.0009 0.0034*** -0.0005 0.0041*** -0.0038*** 0.0026*** 
                                                          [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0012] [0.0010] 
-''-: Less than high school                          -0.001 0.0071*** -0.0009 0.0079*** 0.0002 0.0063*** 
                                                          [0.0011] [0.0010] [0.0011] [0.0010] [0.0015] [0.0012] 
Part-time -0.0101*** -0.0141*** — — — — 
 [0.0010] [0.0010]     
Union membership — — -0.0169*** -0.0088*** — — 
   [0.0019] [0.0013]   
Occupation: Skilled non-manual — — — — {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Skilled manual                                      — — — — -0.001 0.0004 
                                                              [0.0015] [0.0012] 
-''-: Unskilled non-manual                                — — — — 0.0051*** 0.0008 
                                                              [0.0012] [0.0011] 
-''-: Unskilled manual                                     — — — — 0.0065*** 0.0037*** 
                                                              [0.0012] [0.0010] 
Industry: Agric., Forestry, Fishing — — — — {Ref.} {Ref.} 
       
-''-: Mining                                          — — — — -0.0003 -0.0029 
                                                              [0.0061] [0.0046] 
-''-: Utilities                                           — — — — -0.0055 -0.0102** 
                                                              [0.0061] [0.0049] 
-''-: Construction                                        — — — — -0.0001 0.0036 
                                                              [0.0034] [0.0025] 
-''-: Manufacturing                                       — — — — -0.005 -0.0027 
                                                              [0.0032] [0.0024] 
-''-: Wholesale Trade                                     — — — — -0.0051 -0.0057** 
                                                              [0.0036] [0.0028] 
Table 4.8 continued in next page 
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Table 4.8 continued from last page 
 
-''-: Retail Trade                                        — — — — 0.0016 -0.0037 
                                                              [0.0032] [0.0025] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 OLFt+1 Ut+1 
-''-: Transportation & Warehousing                      — — — — -0.0071* -0.003 
                                                              [0.0037] [0.0027] 
-''-: Information                                         — — — — -0.0014 -0.0027 
                                                              [0.0037] [0.0029] 
-''-: Finance and Insurance                               — — — — -0.0072** -0.0055** 
                                                              [0.0035] [0.0027] 
-''-: Real Estate and Rental and Leasing                  — — — — 0.0019 -0.0022 
     [0.0041] [0.0033] 
-''-: Professional, Scientific & Technical — — — — -0.0016 -0.0001 
     [0.0035] [0.0027] 
-''-: Management of Companies/ Enterprises             — — — — 0.0001 -0.0035 
                                                              [0.0000] [0.0269] 
-''-: Administrative and Support, Waste  — — — — 0.0021 0.0007 
      Management and Remediation Services     [0.0034] [0.0026] 
-''-: Educational Services                                — — — — 0.0049 -0.0066* 
                                                              [0.0039] [0.0035] 
-''-: Health Care and Social Assistance                   — — — — -0.0034 -0.008*** 
                                                              [0.0032] [0.0025] 
-''-: Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation                 — — — — 0.0007 -0.0035 
                                                              [0.0040] [0.0033] 
-''-: Accommodation and Food Services                     — — — — 0.0015 -0.0028 
                                                              [0.0032] [0.0024] 
-''-: Other Services (exc. Public Administration)       — — — — 0.0051 -0.0042 
                                                              [0.0034] [0.0027] 
-''-: Public Administration                               — — — — 0.0024 0.002  
    [0.0078] [0.0062]        
#Observations 260,519 223,706 260,519 223,706 211,533 212,046 
Log-likelihood                                            -23,745.9 -17,261.5 -21,311.8 -16,522.0 -21,864.1 -16,848.6 
χ2                                                        3,430.6***  1,899.9***  7,335.9***  3,071.9***  4,611.2***  2,153.7*** 
 
Notes: Comments in Table 4.2 apply. 
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CHAPTER 5:  
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
In this Ph.D. thesis, I study the behaviour of a frictional labour market model 
encompassing the presence of three labour market states: employment, unemployment and out-
of-labour force. More precisely, I investigate whether out-of-labour force and unemployment 
are two different labour market states. A negative answer might support the assumption that a 
model with only two labour market states (i.e., employment and unemployment) is still an 
appropriate approach to analyse the dynamics of labour market, as it is commonly assumed in 
the standard search and matching model. However, a positive answer would be requiring a new 
theoretical framework (including both out-of-labour force and unemployment) to study the 
dynamics of the labour market. This exercise is mainly performed by two different steps.  
Firstly, I assess the overall validity of a frictional model with three labour market states, 
investigating the business cycle behaviour of a textbook search model including the out-of-
labour force participation margin, in terms of direct transition of inactive workers into 
employment, further augmented for heterogeneity in home productivity and endogeneous 
separation. 
Secondly, I investigate the empirical behaviour of individuals classified into the unemployment 
and out-of-labour force state along two margins: the “entry margin” and the “exit margin”. The 
entry margin is defined in terms of potential differences in the entry wage for newly hired 
workers coming from the two non-employment states. The exit margin is defined in terms of 
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non-employment labour market outcomes, i.e., I test the choice of agents between flowing 
either into unemployment or into out-of-labour force, using wealth as our main explanatory 
variable.  
In Chapter 2, I analyse the business cycle properties of a modified Mortensen-Pissarides model, 
i.e., a model including three labour market states. I investigate whether this model is able to 
replicate the volatility of the labour market variables such as unemployment, job-finding rate, 
vacancies and the vacancy-searchers ratio. In Chapter 3, I empirically examine the response of 
real wages to aggregate cyclical indicators, more specifically, unemployment rate and aggregate 
labour productivity, for the U.S. economy, using a longitudinal dataset, the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation (SIPP). In Chapter 4, using the same longitudinal panel dataset, I 
empirically investigate the relationship between wealth and labour market transitions for the 
U.S. workers. 
In terms of results, in Chapter 2 of this Ph.D. thesis, I show that a three labour market state 
model is able to generate large volatilities for key labour market variables and replicate the 
most relevant empirical worker flows.  
Previous papers investigating the business-cycle moments of a frictional labour market model 
have been unsuccessful in rationalizing the large volatilities of key labour market variables such 
as vacancies, job-finding rate and unemployment. Different solutions have been proposed such 
as wage rigidities (Shimer, 2005), institutional factors (Hall, 2005), small rents (Hagedorn and 
Manovskii, 2008), asymmetric information on worker productivity (Kennan, 2010). However, 
all the contributions have focused on a framework with only two labour market states (i.e., 
employment and unemployment). Few exceptions are Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005),  Haefke 
and Reiter (2006), Veracierto (2008), Ebell (2011) and Campolmi and Gnocchi (2016) that 
examine the business cycle performance of models including endogenous labour force 
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participation. However, the models of these authors do not allow for inactive workers to direct 
transition into employment, hence inactive workers cannot be part of the large group of job 
searchers and cannot fill a vacancy. Such chance is totally reserved to the unemployed workers.  
The benchmark model I develop in Chapter 2 is able to explain around 50 percent of the 
empirical unemployment volatility, a result that constitutes a substantial improvement 
compared to the usual values (close to one-tenth the empirical analog) obtained by standard 
search model. I am also able to generate substantial fluctuations in the job-finding rate, 
vacancies and labour market tightness for values that represent around 50-60 percent of their 
empirical counterparts. Moreover, the model performs well in replicating the empirical value 
for the Beveridge Curve. Indeed, I find a value from our simulation close to 70 percent of the 
empirical counterpart.  
Furthermore, I am able to replicate the empirical values for the most relevant worker flows. 
Indeed, the model is successful in reproducing the out-of-labour force to employment flow, a 
statistical measure that previous papers have failed to match. The model is also able to explain 
60 percent of the employment to unemployment worker flow, 70 percent of the unemployment 
to employment worker flow and 65 percent of the employment to out-of-labour force worker 
flow, even if the model performance is less accurate for the two worker flows between 
unemployment and out of labour force. In this case, the model overpredicts the flows by a factor 
close to 50 percent. 
The reasonable performance of the model in replicating volatile second moments relies on two 
channels. The first channel, and the more relevant in terms of impact on the creation of 
vacancies, is the existence of frictions in the “full discovery” of the new value of the 
idiosyncratic variable. Indeed, the model is specified such that the value for home productivity 
is “common knowledge” for all the agents in the market only at the end of the period and not at 
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its occurrence at the beginning of the same, as it is the case for the aggregate productivity shock. 
This implies that when there is a positive aggregate productivity shock, it is a good moment for 
firms to open new vacancies and for workers to accept jobs offered to them. Hence, firms and 
workers form new matches. However, the survival of these new matches at the end of each 
period is conditional to the new draws for the values of home productivity, given that a high 
draw of home productivity would bring the worker to quit the job. Since firms are forward-
looking agents, they know a fraction of newly formed matches will be destroyed for newly 
matched employees drawing high values of home productivity, and they will increase the 
number of vacancies posted on the market. This produces large fluctuations in vacancies, and 
it brings to large fluctuations for the other labour market variables as well. The second channel 
is the introduction of a third margin, i.e., the inactive workers. Indeed, it allows to redefine the 
mass and the flows of workers between the three labour market states. 
A useful extension of the present model would involve a closer examination of labour market 
policies over the business-cycle. Works by Alvarez and Veracierto (2000), and Jung and 
Kuester (2015), have focused on different instruments that might be taken into account. For 
example, Garibaldi and Wasmer (2005), Kim (2008), and Mitman and Rabinovich (2011) 
discuss in their works the effects of the level of and eligibility for unemployment benefit. 
Despite the presence of a large literature on the insurance role played by this labour market 
policy, different findings on the qualitative and quantitative effects of this measure have been 
found. While, on one side, it seems evident the negative link between unemployment benefits 
and worker flows into the employment state, given that more generous unemployment benefits 
increase the workers’ outside option and consequently wages, making the firms less willing to 
post vacancies, on the other side, it has been showed the existence of a positive link between 
unemployment benefits and labour market participation since an increase in unemployment 
benefits magnifies the labour supply answer in terms of a large increase in the participation to 
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the labour market among the non-eligible, i.e., largely inactive workers, with a further positive 
effect in terms of a lower unemployment to out-of-labour force transition rate. 
Incorporating this feature into the present work could produce interesting results in terms of a 
richer dynamics as regards the interaction between labour market variables. Furthermore, the 
presence of insurance measures for “non-employed” individuals might be seen as a remedy to 
the slack performance of the model as concerns the replication of gross worker flows between 
unemployment and out-of-labour force.  
A further interesting extension of this exercise would be to check the extent to which the 
conclusions reached in this work are affected when one considers alternative models of 
formation of matches. Indeed, Fujita and Ramey (2012) have examined the ability of a 
Mortensen-Pissarides model to replicate labour market facts when on-the-job search is allowed.  
Their findings suggest that the model is able to rationalize Beveridge Curve, together with 
producing a volatile job finding rate and job separation rate. Including this additional margin to 
my model could improve the dynamic interrelationship between vacancy and labour 
productivity when job to job search is allowed. 
Lastly, it has to be noted how this study has been developed by considering an idiosyncratic 
shock that strictly affects workers’ side. However, in reality it is possible to observe also match-
specific idiosyncratic shocks and in this sense a focus on the firms’ side should provide further 
insights.     
In Chapter 3 of this Ph.D. thesis, I show that real wages for newly hired workers coming from 
out-of-labour force behave differently, over the cycle, from the real wages for newly hired 
workers coming from unemployment. I investigate the cyclical behaviour of real wages by 
estimating a wage equation in terms of the response to some aggregate cyclical indicators, 
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specifically the unemployment rate and the aggregate labour productivity. I perform this 
exercise for different groups of workers, namely, the job stayers, the newly hired workers from 
unemployment, the newly hired workers from out-of-labour force and the job changers. 
Therefore, I move one step forward compared to the standard empirical specifications of 
previous models. Indeed, prior studies, apart from the established interest in the standard 
categories of workers such as ongoing workers and job changers, have focused on either 
individuals classified as unemployed or individuals gathered into a large “black-box”, i.e., the 
non-employment state, to study the cyclical behaviour of real wages. I propose a new approach 
in investigating this relationship by disentangling the group of non-employment in the 
unemployed and the out-of-labour force workers and I estimate the cyclicality of real wages not 
only for individuals belonging to the unemployment state, but also for individuals classified as 
inactive workers. 
Previous works investigating the cyclical behavior of real wages have found a large 
procyclicality for the wage of newly hired workers, while a substantial lower cyclicality has 
been observed for the overall wages, a result suggesting real wages of job stayers are less 
responsive to the cycle. More in details, Haefke, Sonntag and Van Rens (2013), using data from 
Current Population Survey for the U.S. economy, show how the real wages of new hires is more 
sensitive than the real wages of ongoing workers to labour productivity shocks. Their findings 
suggest a value close to one as regards the elasticity of real wages for new hires, compared to 
values close to 0.2-0.3 for the elasticity of real wages for job stayers. Kudlyack (2014), who 
uses data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth for the U.S. economy, finds similar 
values to those in Haefke, Sonntag and Van Rens (2013).  
Using data from the “Quadros de Pessoal”, an employers/employees longitudinal dataset for 
the Portuguese economy, Carneiro, Guimares and Portugal (2012) and Martins, Solon and 
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Thomas (2012) find that the real wages of newly hired workers, using the unemployment rate 
as the aggregate cyclical indicator, is strongly procyclical. Carneiro, Guimares and Portugal 
(2012) find a value for the semi-elasticity of real wage for marginal workers of 2.20 percentage 
points, while Martins, Solon and Thomas (2012) find a value of 1.60 percentage points, 
assuming a fall of one percentage point in the unemployment rate. Both values are larger than 
the semi-elasticity of wage for job stayers. When the aggregate labour productivity is taken into 
account as the reference cyclical indicator, Carneiro, Gumares and Portugal (2012) find a value 
for the elasticity of real wage close to 1.10 percentage points, while Martins, Solon and Thomas 
(2012) find a value close to 0.50 percentage points (and they are still larger than the analog 
value for the job stayers). However, Gertler, Huckfeldt and Trigari (2016) investigating the 
relationship between real wages and unemployment rate, using data from the Survey of Income 
and Program Participation (SIPP) over the period 1990-2012, for the U.S. economy, find that 
the strong procyclicality of real wages of newly hired workers coming from unemployment 
disappears when job to job movements are taken into account. Indeed, they find a value for the 
semi-elasticity of real wages equal to 0.155 percentage points, very close to 0.160 reported for 
job stayers, while the semi-elasticity of wages for job changers is equal to 1.90 percentage 
points. 
However, the controversy in the literature between these two different approaches has been 
developed along a sharply stylized definition of the labour market. Works dealing with the 
search and matching model have dismissed any complication in the way they have traced out 
the economic structure of their models, embracing the basic assumption popularizing the 
relevance of only two labour market states: employment and unemployment. 
Using data for the U.S. economy, from the Survey of Income Participation Program, over the 
1996-2013 period, I document the large presence of direct flows of workers from the out-of-
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labour force state to the employment state and I estimate a model where it is allowed for entry 
wages for marginal workers coming from both unemployment and out-of-labour force. I 
identify four different groups of workers: job stayers, newly hired workers from unemployment, 
newly hired workers from out-of-labour force and job changers, with this last group being 
defined as, respectively, (i) individuals making a job to job transition with a monthly break 
between consecutive spells of employment, and (ii) individuals making a job to job transition 
with weekly’s (shorter than one month) break between consecutive periods in the employment 
state.  
Estimating the model according the two different approaches used in the literature, i.e., the one 
proposed by Carneiro, Guimares and Portugal (2012), allowing for staggered wages (they 
assume wages are set one year in advance), which it is labeled as CGP model, and the other one 
used by Gertler, Huckfeldt and Trigari (2016) that use higher-frequency data, which is labeled 
as GHT, I find, for the case with non-employed workers grouped together in one large “non-
employment” state, a value for the semi-elasticity of real wage for job stayers and marginal 
workers close to 0.20 and 0.227 percentage points, when I use the GHT specification, and 
values of 1.452 and 1.704 percentage points, with the CGP specification, that are more 
procyclical compared to the values for the job stayers. Introducing the distinction between 
marginal workers from unemployment and marginal workers coming from out-of-labour force, 
I find a percentage value for the semi-elasticity of wages for marginal workers coming from 
unemployment and out-of-labour force, with the GHT specification, of 0.194 and 0.328 
percentage points, compared to 0.204 for job stayers, and a percentage value of 1.575 and 2.201, 
compared to 1.454 for job stayers, when the CGP model is used. This implies that there exists 
a substantial wedge between the two measures of the semi-elasticity of real wages for the new 
hires belonging to the two different groups, with the real wages for new hires coming from out-
of-labour force more procyclical than the real wages for new hires coming from unemployment. 
 229 
 
When job changers are introduced in the model to control for the presence of individuals 
making job to job movements able to explain the large procyclicality of real wages of newly 
hired in the context of a “cyclical job-upgrading” environment, I find estimates of 0.317 
percentage points for new hires from out-of-labour force and 0.194 percentage points for new 
hires from unemployment, when the GHT approach is used, and estimates of 2.222 and 1.610 
percentage points for the semi-elasticity of real wage of new hires from, respectively, out-of-
labour force and unemployment, when it is used the CGP model. Furthermore, it can be also 
observed that there is evidence of a larger procyclicality in the real wages of job changers, with 
values of 0.373 and 2.342 percentage points. To test the robustness of this empirical analysis, I 
repeat this exercise using the aggregate labour productivity as the cyclical indicator and I find 
that the elasticity of real wages of newly hired workers from unemployment is equal to 0.945 
percentage points and for the newly hired workers coming from out-of-labour force is equal to 
1.006 percentage points, for the GHT specification, while it is equal to 0.991 and 1.055 
percentage points, respectively, for new hired from unemployment and out-of-labour force, 
with the CGP model. 
The results of the present study strengthen the conclusions from previous papers regarding the 
pro-cyclicality of the real wages of newly hired workers. However, this analysis is based on the 
hiring wage as the relevant variable to be investigated. Nevertheless, some recent works like 
Rudanko (2009) have pointed out that the labour market is largely made up of long-term 
employment relationships, where decisions about the creation of new matches depend not only 
on the current hiring wage, but also on the expectations of agents as regards the duration of the 
match, since this factor can affect wages in the case of long-term labour contracts. Thus, the 
relevance of the initial hiring wage as the relevant variable to be considered for this 
investigation would need to be further investigated, as clearly stated by Martins, Solon and 
Jonathan (2012), analysing the duration of the employment relationship, the evolution of wages 
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and productivity in these relationships and the dependence of the hiring wage from 
macroeconomic conditions (present, expected and past). 
Moreover, some literature has emphasised the presence of asymmetries in the cyclicality of real 
wage. Martins (2007) shows that real wages are substantially more procyclical during 
recessions than during expansion. Thus further research on this aspect is expected. 
Further possible extensions of this chapter could be made. For instance, one could introduce 
more heterogeneity in the model across different groups of workers. This heterogeneity could 
provide different matching rates across the different education groups, genders, occupations, 
firm size, etc. For instance, in some papers like Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) it has been argued 
that low educated and low income workers may experiment initial lower and rigid wages. 
Another possible extension could be to estimate the elasticity of real wages for new hires across 
different labour market experience/time of graduation groups. Kahn (2010) suggests that it is 
more likely that young job seekers that are recently graduated, but with little labour market 
experience, are the more affected by the time of college graduation. Who experiments poor 
labour market experience in terms of wages due to the poor economic conditions tends to have 
persistent negative wage effects. These results could suggest that newly hired workers 
graduated in bad economies could be more likely to develop an earning path with rigid wages. 
Moreover, someone might investigate possible differences in the response of wages for 
marginal workers to aggregate productivity shocks in the aftermath of the Great Recession and 
before it.  
Finally, a further extension of this research could focus on investigating the elasticity of real 
wages for newly hired workers using data from other labour markets like UK or Europe.  
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In Chapter 4 of this Ph.D. thesis, I show that wealth exerts a significant impact on the probability 
of transitioning in the non-employment states. More precisely, in this study I investigate how 
wealth can affect the “exit margin” for an individual in the labour market, i.e., the probability 
for individuals to transitioning into unemployment and out-of-labour force.  
Researchers have shown that search and matching models including idiosyncratic home or 
market productivity shocks are able to replicate labour market transitions, but these models are 
usually developed in a framework with only two labour market states and with risk neutral 
agents. However, if one considers the transition into the non-employment states as the start of 
a new search activity, a not fully addressed question is: what can finance this search? In this 
sense a crucial role emerges for wealth. While a few papers (Bloemen and Stancanelli, 2001, 
and Algan, Chevron, Hairault and Langot, 2003) have examined whether wealth can finance 
active search, i.e., searching while individuals are in the unemployment state, no answer has 
been given to the question whether wealth can finance passive searching, i.e., searching while 
individuals are in the out-of-labour force state. In this work, I test the presence of heterogeneity 
in the exit margin, i.e., the existence of differences between the probability of transitioning into 
unemployment and the probability of transitioning into out-of-labour force. I develop this 
analysis by using the transitory-permanent decomposition wealth effect.  
Using data from the Survey of Income Participation Program for the U.S. economy, over the 
period 1996-2013, I estimate the impact of wealth on the transition probabilities. I find that a 
transitory increase in wealth exerts a positive impact on the probability of transitioning to out-
of-labour force and the probability of transitioning to unemployment, but values for the former 
transition probability are nearly twice as large as those for the latter. On the other side, I find 
that a permanent increase in wealth has a negative impact on both transition probabilities, with 
the coefficient for the transition probability to out-of-labour force much larger than that for the 
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transition probability to unemployment. More precisely, I find that a transitory increase in 
individual wealth by $ 100,000 dollars increases by 50 percent the probability of transitioning 
to out-of-labour force and by 30 percent the probability of transitioning to unemployment. On 
the contrary, a permanent increase in individual wealth by $ 100,000 dollars decreases by 60 
percent the probability of transitioning to out-of-labour force and by 40 percent the probability 
of transitioning to unemployment. Using as main regressor a broader definition of wealth 
(including all other forms of wealth reported in the dataset such as real estate property assets 
and life insurance policies) the estimates confirm that a transitory increase in wealth exerts a 
positive impact on the probability of transitioning to out-of-labour force and unemployment, 
while the sign is reversed for the permanent effect. However, coefficients are in this case 
roughly 50 percent lower than in the benchmark case.  
Testing the robustness of our results by including in the model specification indicators of more 
illiquid forms of wealth such as home ownership, mortgaged home or other variables related to 
housing wealth, I find no substantial changes in the effect of wealth on the transition 
probabilities.  
Controlling by gender, one can observe that a transitory increase in wealth makes males more 
likely to transitioning into out-of-labour force rather than in unemployment, while the effect is 
reversed for females, where an increase in wealth makes this group of individuals more likely 
to transitioning into unemployment. When it is considered the permanent effect of an increase 
in wealth, I find that males are less likely to transitioning into out-of-labour force than to 
unemployment and the same qualitative indication holds for females, even if the difference 
between the two coefficients is very small.  
However, when I control for salary income, I find that estimates for the variable wealth confirm 
the standard qualitative results with the positive impact of a transitory increase in wealth on the 
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probability of becoming inactive and unemployed, and a negative impact on the transition 
probabilities for the case of the permanent increase in wealth, but one can see that quantitatively 
the effect of wealth is now quite different from previous results. Indeed, I find that a transitory 
increase in wealth increases the probability to transitioning into out-of-labour force only by 20 
percent, and the probability to transitioning into unemployment by roughly 12 percent. The 
values are negative and much lower for the permanent effect, 12 percent and 4 percent. 
Similar results are reported when I control for both gender and salary income. Looking at the 
coefficients, I find that a temporary increase in wealth for males rises the probability of 
transitioning into out-of-labour force by 27 percent and that to transitioning into unemployment 
by 8 percent, while for females the values are 16 percent and 18 percent, respectively. 
Examining the effect of a permanent increase in wealth, I find in this case a fall in the probability 
of transitioning into the inactivity state by 18 percent compared to the value of 7 percent for 
unemployment for males, while the values are 7 percent and 5 percent for females. 
The estimation of the causal relationship between wealth and labour market transition 
probabilities gives an empirical support to the theory identifying in wealth a key variable in 
determining labour market outcomes. However, it does not provide an answer on the 
identification of the forces at work, i.e., the channels by which wealth affects the individuals’ 
decision in terms of search behaviour. Further investigations in this direction might be useful 
for a clear understanding of the dynamics of the exit margin. In this sense, developing a search 
and matching model with incomplete financial markets and calibrated with structural 
parameters, obtained from the estimates of the model discussed in this study, would help in 
highlighting these channels. 
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Moreover, while the main question addressed by this work is the effect of wealth in terms of 
the unconditional probability of individuals to transitioning into the non-employment states, 
other dimensions of the searching decision could play a role. For example, some papers like 
Algan, Chevron, Hairault and Langot (2009), using French data, take into account only the sub-
sample of individuals who “voluntarily” quit the job. Thus, the estimated probabilities of 
transitioning into the non-employment states might be driven by two different searching 
decisions, i.e., voluntary and involuntary job separation. Given the limits of the SIPP data, it is 
not an easy task to disentangle the two groups of agents, but it is, nevertheless, an interesting 
future area of research.     
Furthermore, the empirical analysis developed in this work does focus on the effect of wealth 
in terms of financing the search activity, but a thoroughly associated investigation on the 
duration of this search activity would be also required. Indeed, the effect of an increase in wealth 
should be explored together with the expected rate of survival in the new searching state. 
Individual experiencing a large wealth shock are generally more likely to finance a longer 
period of search regardless of what her demographic characteristics or other similar factors are. 
However, it is unclear whether the duration of unemployment and inactivity is expected to be 
monotonically decreasing in wealth or other effects prevail. Understanding these questions 
might also be useful in defining optimal insurance measures for non-employed individuals.      
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